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Executive summary  
 
This summary sets out the main findings of the study, in particular the EU added value and 
the design of an EU-wide student loan scheme. In addition, it outlines the report’s 
methodology (section 2 of the report), empirical evidence (section 4) and consultation 
process (section 7).  
 
1 Policy objectives 
 
1. The report is based on two fundamental lines of argument: human capital matters 
and mobility matters. 
 
2. HUMAN CAPITAL MATTERS (section 1.1). In explaining why investment in human capital 
is an essential ingredient in achieving the objectives of the Lisbon Treaty and Europe 2020, 
the starting point is to recognise that technological advance is driving demand for new skills, 
more diverse, and skills. Separately, skills possess a shorter half-life than they did a 
generation ago, and require being frequently refreshed if they are to stay relevant. As a 
result, high-level and lifelong learning have major impacts on individual life chances and 
national economic performance. Higher education contributes to these by endowing 
graduates with broad, flexible problem-solving skills. Rising participation rates in higher 
education are thus no accident, and with no sign that these trends are slowing: 
 “Universities will be central to economic success in this century. They produce the 
raw material of a flourishing society: thoughtful, articulate and creative young people, 
trained to ask the right questions and to develop interesting new ideas.” (Cairncross 
2010) 
 
3. MOBILITY MATTERS (section 1.2) for four sets of reasons. It brings social gain through 
enhancing human rights and promotes European citizenship and cohesion. There are also 
economic gains, since mobility optimises adjustment to economic cycles, creates a more 
competitive knowledge economy, provides new skills and strengthens human capital. 
Student mobility assists subsequent labour mobility. These arguments underpin the EU 
objective that 20% of students should be internationally mobile, compared with the current 
figure of around 5%. 
 
4. Increased EU competitiveness. Mobility in higher education can foster labour mobility 
in several ways, making labour markets more efficient. 
 Knowledge transfer and convergence: there are significant differences in real income 
across member states. Circulation of skilled labour induces knowledge transfer and 
helps to bring real income in the poorer Member States closer to that in the richer 
ones, with benefits for both groups of countries  
 Improvement in personal skills: international mobility develops personal skills that 
improve employment prospects. Language skills improve employability and assist the 
functioning of the single market  
 
5. Though these gains are substantial, mobility also has potential costs. There are 
concerns that the single market will cause a “brain drain” from poorer to richer Member 
States, though it is important to be aware of countervailing factors, notably return migration, 
“brain circulation” (i.e. temporary migration), and remittances. 
 
6. Stronger human capital. Several of the EU Flagship Initiatives seek to strengthen 
human capital – examples include “Youth on the Move” and “An Agenda for Skills and Jobs”.  
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Student mobility: 
 Increases competition between universities through pressures for transferable 
credits, for more courses in foreign languages, for better foreign language teaching, 
and, more generally, pressures from more demanding students to improve quality 
 Contributes to labour mobility 
 At postgraduate level, fosters research and innovation 
 Can reduce brain drain: spending time in a foreign institution can be an alternative to 
emigration 
 Encourages talented students to stay in the EU rather than studying elsewhere 
 Increases skill sets through cross-cultural fertilisation of ideas – transferable skills 
that are valued by employers, e.g. flexibility, adaptability, problem-solving, critical 
thinking and deeper understanding of cultural differences in approaching problems 
 
7. OBJECTIVES OF HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY. The resulting policy objectives for higher 
education are: 
 Quality: high-quality higher education is an essential element in deepening human 
capital  
 Size: given the technological drivers already mentioned, comprehensive provision of 
higher education is an essential component of any efforts to increase the stock of 
human capital within the European Union. 
 Access: countries cannot afford to waste talent, thus widening participation by 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds creates both efficiency and equity gains 
 
These three objectives all apply to national systems. At an EU level, a fourth objective is: 
 Greater mobility 
 
2 Policies to foster mobility: Why a student loan scheme is necessary 
 
8. Mobility, though desirable, faces major impediments. These include constraints 
relating to information, language and financing. Given its terms of reference, the report 
concentrates on the last of these. 
 
9. The finance of higher education faces a head-on collision between two competing 
imperatives. On the one hand is the need for more resources to finance large, high-quality 
systems of tertiary education. On the other, constraints on public finance arising from 
competing demands, including ageing populations and spending on health, and those arising 
from elements of an increasingly competitive global economy which limits a country’s 
capacity to increase taxes. These fiscal constraints existed prior to the current economic 
crisis; but they have been aggravated.  
 
11.  The central conclusion from this line of argument is that public finance needs to be 
supplemented by private finance, for example, to finance student living costs. This 
conclusion is based not on ideology but on a realistic view of the contemporary world. 
 
12. There are six potential sources of private finance:  
(a) Family resources: while not unhelpful, this approach fails to widen participation 
(b) A student’s earnings while a student: again, this activity is not unhelpful, but is at 
the expense of study time and leisure activities 
(c) A student’s future earnings, i.e. loans 
(d) Employers: this option is limited by weak incentives for any single employer to 
contribute in a world with high labour mobility 
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(e) Entrepreneurial activities by universities: the effectiveness of this approach is 
easily overestimated 
(f) Charitable giving: again the effectiveness of this approach is easily overestimated 
 
13. Of these various sources of private finance, only student loans have the potential to 
be both large-scale and socially equitable. 
 
3 EU Added Value: Why an EU-wide loan scheme is desirable 
 
The next step in the argument (section 1.3) is to establish the added value of an EU-
wide student loan scheme, as opposed to relying on national schemes. The 
argument has three elements: 
 A student loan system is a necessary condition for higher-level EU policies. National 
student loan schemes are inadequate for those purposes. Though large-scale 
schemes exist in some countries, e.g. Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and 
Hungary, a number possess no such schemes, while in others loans are limited in 
scope, number and size. National schemes tend not to be portable and, where they 
are, generally limited in size and number. And information about student loans across 
countries is scarce and often available only in the national language 
 National student loan schemes are designed to reflect the situation of a particular 
country, e.g. the size of the loan is related to the domestic living costs, risk 
assessments are made at national level, and the costs of finance are related to the 
national cohort risk. Even if they are adequate at national level, such schemes will 
generally be inadequate for mobility purposes, particularly if a student from a poorer 
country wishes to study in a richer country. Potential conflicts of interest, e.g. 
concerns about the loss of talent (“brain drain”) or protectionist attitudes toward 
domestic higher education institutions, can render national governments reluctant to 
establish large-scale portable schemes. Secondly, there is an incentive to “free-ride” 
in the sense that while mobility is in the interests of Member States collectively, each 
has an interest in limiting its student lending (because establishing and running a 
wide-scale student loan scheme may be costly and risky), and relying on other 
countries’ loan schemes. 
 Thirdly, a national system with generous subsidies or government guarantees could 
lead to an influx of foreign students, risking uncontained increases in education 
budgets designed for domestic operation. Finally, loans for mobile students 
compound administrative costs and defaults, with potential risks for the stability of 
national schemes  
 
For these reasons an EU-level student mobility policy cannot be based solely on existing 
national level student loan schemes, since these are designed to serve mainly national 
purposes, and are diverse in many crucial aspects such as size, eligibility criteria and 
portability. 
 
14. An EU-wide loan scheme has major advantages, both in assisting the achievement 
of high-level EU goals and in operational terms. 
 
15. Assisting the achievement of EU goals:  
 Fostering mobility is one of the competencies of the EU, with the specific goal of 20% 
learning mobility by 2020 
 An EU-wide loan promotes the competitiveness of the EU by helping to strengthen 
human capital and by facilitating student mobility, thereby assisting labour mobility 
through the development of transferable skills 
 An EU-wide loan assists asymmetric student migration. To promote citizenship and 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 xi
cohesion it is desirable to have a reasonably balanced flow of people between 
countries. For the purposes of economic competitiveness, in contrast, an unbalanced 
flow is generally optimal. Students should flow to whichever higher education course 
most enhances their productivity, just as labour migrates to opportunities in which it 
can flourish.  
 
16. Operational advantages:  
 An EU-wide loan scheme has economies of scale. It provides a wider risk cohort and 
better diversification; facilitates efficient financing and risk management through 
improved market position; is more resistant to political, financial and social crises; 
and spreads the costs of design and implementation (e.g. set-up costs) over larger 
numbers of prospective borrowers 
 An EU-wide loan scheme may also have an informational advantage in mobile 
lending. Since it will be designed for mobile lending, it should have an EU-wide 
overview of all important aspects of lending, e.g. the ability to track borrowers at EU 
level  
 An EU-wide scheme addresses many of the problems discussed earlier, e.g. conflicts 
of interest, incentives to free-riding, etc., that arise with national loan schemes 
designed to support non-mobile borrowers  
 
4 Design and implementation of the loan scheme 
 
17. DESIGN. The theoretical discussion in section 3 of the report argues for a loan design 
with income-contingent repayments at least for low earners, i.e. where a borrower’s 
repayments take the form of x% of his/her subsequent earnings. The core of the argument is 
that, in contrast with home loans, lending for human capital has no physical collateral. As a 
result, lenders face considerable risk and will charge a high premium. Borrowers also face 
considerable risk: if earnings fall, a mortgage holder can usually sell his or her home and 
repay their loan. This option is not available with human capital. Thus lenders and borrowers 
both face high risk and, as a result, borrowing is inefficiently low. Income-contingent 
repayments are designed to reduce the risk that borrowers face by providing loans with in-
built insurance against inability to repay.  
 
18. However, income-contingent loans are administratively demanding. Section 5.2 
therefore explores a range of designs. 
 
Model 1a A pure mortgage loan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1b Mortgage loan with remission for low earners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
Monthly 
repayment 
Income 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 xii
 
Model 2a Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2b Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low- and middle-income 
earners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 3 Purely income-contingent loan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. The conclusion in section 5.2 is that the preferred option is model 2a, in which all but 
the lowest earners (in the diagram everyone who earns more than 100) make fixed monthly 
repayments, but with income-contingent protection for the lowest earners. In this model, the 
fixed monthly repayment (which rises each year in line with an aggregate variable such as 
average earnings) is low enough to make it realistic for a typical graduate earner in a poorer 
Member State to repay his/her loan. The advantage of this approach is twofold: it respects 
administrative constraints; and, if desired, model 2a has the capacity to evolve over time 
towards model 2b, with a wider range of income over which income contingency applies. 
 
20. Section 5.3 considers broader aspects of loan design. It suggests that for a range of 
reasons the loan facility should be available initially only (a) to postgraduate students, 
(b) who are internationally mobile, and (c) should be limited in size. There is also discussion 
of the relation between the size of the loan and repayment conditions, which are heavily 
constrained by the wide variation in income across Member States, and of the interest rate, 
which should take into account the cost of finance, the cohort risk, and operational costs. 
Finally there is discussion of appropriate (and inappropriate) ways of subsidising the loan 
scheme and of appropriate sources of finance for such subsidies. 
 
 IMPLEMENTING THE LOAN SCHEME involves disbursing loans (which is relatively easy) 
and collecting repayments (which is considerably harder), with appropriate enforcement 
activity. At the time a student applies (section 6.2) it is necessary to (a) identify students, (b) 
establish that they are mobile, and (c) ensure that they then attend the university to which 
they have applied. A central issue is the extent to which, when the loan is first introduced, 
the application process should be available on-line. Though clearly desirable as soon as 
100 
Monthly 
repayment 
Income 
500 
Monthly 
repayment 
Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
Income 
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feasible, it is very much the case that if you get it right, nobody remembers, but if you get it 
wrong, nobody forgets. Namely, bad implementation compromises policy. 
 
21. Collecting repayments (section 6.3) involves assessing monthly repayments, tracking 
repayments, and enforcement activities.  
 
 Section 6.4 discusses finance, in particular the likely size of the loan portfolio, default 
risks and potential sources of finance. Section 6.5 considers different ways in which the 
student loans administration might be organised, in particular whether there should be a 
specialised EU agency, or whether administration should be shared with existing 
stakeholders such as tax authorities or national student loans administrations. 
 
22. THE INITIAL PROPOSAL, summarised in section 8, has: 
 Limited eligibility 
 A fixed and long maturity period with income contingent elements for low earners 
(Model 2a) 
 The fixed level of monthly repayments and the income threshold below which 
repayments are income-contingent and country-specific 
 The interest rate, which is the same for all borrowers but variable over time. The 
interest rate comprises the risk-free rate, cohort risk premium and operational 
margin, adjusted in the light of any subsidy from outside the system (e.g. to help to 
finance start-up administrative costs) 
 The size of loan is limited to a maximum of between €10,000 and €12 000 
 EU-level subsidies should cover at least the start-up costs, and perhaps also provide 
some sort of guarantee 
 The scheme requires an essential core at EU-level, but administration can to a 
substantial extent be outsourced to national-level institutions such as tax authorities, 
national student loan centres, universities and commercial banks 
 
23. EVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL. The report concludes by showing how the initial system 
has the capacity to evolve over time: 
 The size of the loan: over time Model 2a (income contingency only for the poorest) 
could morph into 2b (income contingency for low and medium earners). This direction 
of travel makes it possible to offer larger loans per graduate, provided that 
(a) incomes grow; (b) incomes converge; (c) administrative capacity improves 
 Extending coverage to include a wider range of education levels, wider geographical 
coverage (e.g. loans for EU students studying outside the EU), and wider eligibility 
rules, e.g. loans for older students, for vocational education etc  
 A more sophisticated loan design  
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Introduction: an EU student loan facility 
 
The European Union is aiming to become 
“the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” 1 
 
The most recent iteration of the objectives of the EU are summarised in “Europe 
2020”, which in the light of the post-2008 economic crisis and the challenges of global 
competition, sets out a vision of Europe’s social market economy for the 21st century. 
 
The stated objective is to: 
“…turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy delivering high levels of 
employment, productivity and social cohesion”. 
 
“The three mutually reinforcing priorities are:  
 Smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation  
 Sustainable growth: promoting a more resource-efficient, greener and more 
competitive economy  
 Inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social and 
territorial cohesion” 2 
 
In pursuing these objectives, this report is based on a series of strategic arguments:  
 Technological advance is driving the demand for skills. 
 Failure to meet that demand through mass, high-quality higher education (and 
tertiary education more generally) puts Europe’s competitive performance at risk. 
 However, expansion of higher education faces fiscal constraints, given competing 
imperatives for public spending that long predate the economic crisis, including 
ageing populations and the spiralling cost of health provision.  
 Thus taxpayer finance of higher education, though an essential and continuing 
element in paying for higher education, is no longer sufficient or fit for purposes. 
Taxpayers alone cannot shoulder the cost of higher education, (including living 
costs). To achieve the aims of Lisbon and Europe 2020, public finance needs to be 
supplemented on a substantial scale by private finance, if only so that resources 
currently being used to finance living costs can be diverted to financing universities. 
 However students (and their families) face high costs in attending and completing 
higher education, which may act as a financial barrier to participation. A well-
designed student loan scheme could be an appropriate tool for providing financial 
assistance for students by enabling redistribution of some part of future incomes of 
individuals to finance part of the costs of higher education.  
 
 
To that end, this report discusses an EU-wide student loan facility. Section 1 
considers why such an instrument is necessary, i.e. assesses the EU added value of an EU-
wide loan, including cross references to salient responses from a series of interviews with 
stakeholders (the interviews are summarised in Appendix 1). Section 2 summarises the 
method and approach. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Lisbon Treaty 2009. 
2 Europe 2020. 
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 Section 3 sets out the analytical framework in some depth, with the theoretical core 
set out in section 3.1, (and which sceptical readers may wish to read at an early stage). 
 
 Section 4 considers international experience, including an overview of student 
financial support in Member States, with particular emphasis on mobility and its costs. 
Section 4 also benefits from the interviews with stakeholders summarised in Appendix 1. 
 
The subsequent two sections provide a set of recommendations for the design 
(section 5) and implementation (section 6) of the loan facility. Section 7 offers an analysis of 
the loan options proposed in section 5, building on the responses of a panel of experts 
consulted through the Delphi Method, using the Multi-Criteria Scoring Method and drawing 
from selected country studies. Section 8 concludes by considering a range of longer term 
options. 
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1. Why an EU loan facility: Student loans and human 
capital formation  
 
Section 1 sets out the core arguments, and is designed to be self-contained for readers who 
are prepared to take on trust the more detailed analytical arguments in section 3.1 regarding 
the gains – in terms of efficiency and equity – from competition and student loans in higher 
education. Section 1.1 explains why human capital is central and briefly introduces the idea 
of student loans. Section 1.2 explains why mobility within the EU matters. Section 1.3 sets 
out the potential gains from an EU-wide system of student loans, that is, the EU added 
value.  
 
1.1  The centrality of human capital in the 21st century 
  
In explaining why investment in human capital is an essential ingredient in achieving the 
objectives of Lisbon and Europe 2020, the starting point is to compare today’s world with 
that of the earlier years of the EU. 
 
THE WORLD ECONOMY HAS CHANGED. The depth and scale of the 21st century knowledge 
economy was unimaginable 50 years ago. Today education plays a key role in: 
 Promoting core values (democracy, human rights, social cohesion, protection of 
minorities etc) – as in the past 
 Developing knowledge for its own sake (intellectual freedom, independent voice, 
innovations etc) – as in the past 
 Fostering economic growth in a competitive economy (flexible skills, employment and 
competitiveness) – now more than ever 
 
Cairncross (2010) makes the point cogently: 
 
“Universities will be central to economic success in this century. They produce the 
raw material of a flourishing society: thoughtful, articulate and creative young people, 
trained to ask the right questions and to develop interesting new ideas.” (Cairncross 
2010) 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL DRIVERS. Technological advance, in particular information technology, has 
become a major driving force of increasing demand for new and flexible skills, and thus for 
greater and more frequent investment in learning, as knowledge has a shorter half-life than it 
did, say, a generation ago. Thus high-level learning and lifelong learning both have major 
impacts on individual life chances and national economic performance. Higher education 
contributes to all these attributes, notably by giving graduates broad, flexible skills and the 
ability to “learn to learn”3.  
 
 Higher rates of capital formation foster growth but, because of diminishing returns to 
physical capital, the effect on growth is only temporary. Long-term growth derives from 
innovation, technological development and accumulation of knowledge. “The key difference 
between physical and knowledge capital is that knowledge capital does not face diminishing 
returns…” (Baldwin – Wyplosz, 2009). It is noteworthy that despite expansion of student 
                                                 
 
3 Key Competences for Lifelong Learning – A European Framework, 2006. 
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numbers, the graduate premium has not declined.4 According to the 2005 Mid-Term Review 
of the Lisbon Strategy: 
 
“In advanced economies such as the EU, knowledge (meaning R&D, innovation and 
education) is a key driver of productivity growth. Knowledge is a critical factor with 
which Europe can ensure competitiveness in a global world where others compete 
with cheap labour or primary resources.”5 
 
Insufficient investment in human capital creates the risk that Europe will not be able 
to compete effectively with countries with higher spending on education and training. To 
illustrate the sort of competition Europe faces, 76% of 19-year-olds in South Korea were in 
tertiary education in 2007, by a long way the highest participation rate of any OECD country 
(the average for the EU19 was 29%); total spending on tertiary education in South Korea in 
2006 was 2.5% of GDP, almost double the average for the EU19 of 1.3%; and private 
spending on tertiary education in South Korea was significantly higher than total (public plus 
private) spending in any OECD country except the US and Canada (OECD 2009, Tables 
C1.3 and B2.4). More generally, the EU27 ranks much lower in terms of private financing of 
higher education than its main competitors, the US and Japan [S-13] (see Section 4)  
 
In sum, human capital matters. As a result, higher education – one of the main 
generators of human capital – is much more important than 50 years ago. 
  
WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY? Given these considerations, this 
Report focuses on policies to achieve three strategic objectives in higher education: 
 Size: the higher education sector has to be large enough to meet the demands of 
citizens, which derive in part from the rising demand for skills 
 Quality needs to be high, for the reasons just set out 
 Access to higher education should be open to anyone with the ability and the wish to 
participate, independent of family income. This objective can be defended as a value 
judgement; but it is also important for efficiency reasons 
 
 To set the context, Box 1 anticipates the more detailed discussion of section 3 by 
summarising the case for student loans, alongside grants, as part of the funding package for 
higher education. 
 
Box 1: Why student loans, not just grants?  
Why not finance higher education from taxation, like education? The short answer is that 
reliance mainly on taxation leads to a failure to achieve any of the objectives set out above. 
Moreover, over-reliance on taxation is a direct cause of the failure to achieve them. 
 
Failure 1: Size. Throughout Europe, mass higher education is losing in the 
political competition for public funds, given the competing and often politically more 
salient demands of pensions, health care and school education, and the pressures 
                                                 
 
4 According to the Eurostat LFS data 2010, every tenth person (25-64 years old) with lower than secondary 
education was unemployed, with the figure as high as 24% in Czech Republic, 27% in Poland and 49% in 
Slovakia. Unemployment rate of persons with upper secondary or vocational education was 8% (16% in Poland), 
while unemployment rates of people with tertiary education were much lower: 5% on average in EU27 and as low 
as 2% in Ireland, Czech Republic, the UK and Hungary. 
5 Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Strategy, 2005. 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 5
from international competition. As a result, shortage of finance constrains size in 
some countries. [S-12-13-14-15] This argument is based on long-term drivers, i.e. it 
is not a crisis response, e.g. see the Maastricht criteria. Meanwhile, increasing young 
people’s participation in tertiary education from 31% to 40% is one of Europe 2020’s 
headline targets. 
Failure 2: quality. Over-reliance on public finance puts quality at risk in several 
ways. The shortage of resources harms quality. Separately, tax-financed systems 
reduce competitive incentives facing universities. As explained more fully in section 
3.1, competition is essential for quality in a large, diverse higher education sector. 
Failure 3: access. Again, over-reliance on the taxpayer causes multiple 
problems. 
 Tax finance does not widen participation. Most university students are from 
middle-class backgrounds. This is true in most countries, and remains true in 
countries where there are no tuition fees, and even in countries where 
students receive grants to cover living costs. In the UK in 2002, when there 
were no tuition fees for people from poor backgrounds, 81% of young people 
whose parents were professionals went to university, as against 15% of 
people from manual backgrounds (UK Education and Skills Select 
Committee, 2002, p. 19)  
 Tax finance redistributes from poorer to richer families. The case for public 
finance for health care or compulsory school education is clear because 
everyone uses them. Higher education is different precisely because 
participation is a matter of choice – and it is mainly people from better-off 
backgrounds who participate. Thus the taxes of poorer people pay for the 
degrees of people who are mainly from better-off backgrounds and will 
themselves on average become better off. In the words of a British socialist 
commentator, 
“I, too, favour free, universal public services – schools, hospitals and so 
on. Though the more affluent could afford to pay, availability to all 
enhances social solidarity and ensures public services aren’t second class. 
But higher education isn’t universal: it is distributed not by right or by need, 
but by perceived merit. And the selected ones come mostly from more 
prosperous families. They will themselves go on to significantly higher 
earnings than average. Where is the social justice in that?” (Wilby, 2010) 
 Tax finance can harm access, in that spending on “free” higher education 
crowds out spending that would genuinely widen participation. In contrast, 
student loans – if properly designed – enable individuals to redistribute from 
their future earnings to finance part of the costs of their higher education 
 The real barrier to participation is lack of attainment in school, i.e. it is much 
more a problem relating to the 0-18 age bracket than it is for those aged 18+ 
problem. Thus the policies that genuinely address access are those that 
improve earlier educational outcomes. If policy makers have resources to 
widen participation, they are better spent on nursery education, improving 
schools, and on providing financial support for people who remain in school 
after the age of sixteen.  
 
 
We return to all these arguments in more detail in section 3. 
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1.2  Why mobility matters 
 
Having established the importance of higher education, the next step is to demonstrate the 
role of mobility, which is already a major item on the EU agenda. Article 18 of the Treaty 
states: 
“It is important... to emphasise that mobility requires Community intervention because 
by its nature it entails transnational aspects.” 
 
THE FOUR FREEDOMS. In EU law, the Four Freedoms is a common term for a set of treaty 
provisions, secondary legislation and court decisions which protect the ability of goods, 
capital, services, people and labour to move freely within the internal market of the EU. More 
precisely, they are: 
1. The free movement of goods 
2. The free movement of capital 
3. The free movement of services 
4. The free movement of persons 
Since 2007, the European Commission has started to advocate the free movement of 
knowledge as a fifth freedom.10 
 
THE CONCEPT. The free movement of persons refers to students, teachers, trainers, research 
staff and labour mobility. In this section we concentrate on the mobility of students in higher 
education and of the graduates who constitute the most skilled part of the labour force. 
Geographical and occupational mobility are both important EU objectives.6  
 
Mobility is important because: 
 It is an element in human rights 
 It promotes European citizenship, cohesion and peace 
 It promotes competitiveness by making labour markets more efficient 
 It strengthens human capital by encouraging competition in higher education  
 
1.2.1 Human rights 
 
Freedom of movement is a human right protected by the constitutions of many countries. It 
asserts that a citizen of a state is free to travel, reside in, and/or work in any part of the state 
within the limits of respect for the liberty and rights of others, and to leave that state and 
return at any time. 
 
 The Copenhagen criteria required aspiring Member States to ensure the rule of law, 
stability of the institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; to maintain the existence of a functioning market economy, and to 
ensure the capacity to cope with pressure and market forces within the Union, and the 
implementation of the “acquis communautaire”, thus emphasising inter alia the importance of 
free movement of persons. The process continued with the Lisbon Treaty, which reinforced 
the Four Freedoms and guaranteed the freedoms set out in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  
                                                 
 
6 Though the arguments are general, mobility outside the EU is beyond the scope of this report. 
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1.2.2 EU citizenship and cohesion  
 
The fundamental objective of the EU (and its predecessors) has been to create the 
conditions in which European nations can live together in peace. Its biggest threats have 
been closed cultural attitudes, nationalism and economic protectionism. Over the past half-
century, economic integration has dramatically changed the landscape, but more remains to 
be done to address closed cultural attitudes and nationalism. Mobility is an element in 
widening and deepening European cohesion and citizenship. 
 
THE CHALLENGE. Not least because of the economic crisis, new waves of protectionism are 
arising. Our interviews and less formal discussions with stakeholders highlighted the spread 
of nationalist and/or protectionist ways of thinking. Many people, even professionals, oppose 
competition, cost-sharing and mobility. These attitudes are a risk that any proposal to 
modernise higher education in the EU faces, and they serve to reinforce the importance of 
political implementation. [S-42] In addition, 
“A stronger, deeper, extended single market is vital for growth and job creation. 
However, current trends show signs of integration fatigue and disenchantment 
regarding the single market. The crisis has added temptations of economic 
nationalism. The Commission’s vigilance and a shared sense of responsibility among 
Member States have prevented a drift towards disintegration. But a new momentum 
– a genuine political commitment – is needed to relaunch the single market, through 
a quick adoption of the [Flagship] initiatives… Such political commitment will require 
a combination of measures to fill the gaps in the single market.” 7 
 
In contrast, empirical findings show that at an individual level, better understanding of each 
other’s values and cultures and shared projects can encourage friendship and avoid conflict. 
[S-1-2-3-4] This is exactly what mobility fosters, so that the potential gains are large. Does 
that mean that European integrity necessitates all students studying abroad? Evidence 
shows that that is not required. 
 
THE “TIPPING POINT” THEORY. Large-scale behavioural changes are possible by achieving a 
“tipping point” at which a critical mass has changed behaviour. Once the tipping point has 
been reached, positive feedback reinforces the change. The aim for policy is to reach this 
“tipping point”. Gladwell, 2009 summarises the basic ideas of social epidemic: 
 “Big changes can occur as a result of small events.”8 Thus small improvements can 
be enough to achieve policy goals 
 “The 80/20 Principle states that in any situation roughly 80% of the “work” will be 
done by 20% of the participants (Law of the Few).”9 Note the surprising coincidence 
with the mobility target of 20% of the EU 
 “Three different kinds of people play key roles in the dynamics of social epidemics: 
Connectors – the kinds of people who know everyone and possess special 
gifts for bringing the world together. Connectors are defined by having many 
acquaintances, a sign of social power  
Maven – means those who accumulate knowledge and who have information 
on a lot of different products, prices or places  
Salesmen – are the selected group of people with the skills to persuade us 
                                                 
 
7 Europe 2020. 
8 http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html 
9 http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html 
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when we are unconvinced of what we are hearing.”10 
These are exactly the main characteristics of the best students in higher education. 
 
MOBILE STUDENTS AS KEY PLAYERS. The most mature, but open-minded and risk-taking upper 
20% of students in higher education can play a crucial role in achieving EU objectives. [S-4] 
EU strategic documents highlight: 
 
“In the increasingly multicultural society of the future, the experience of mobility is 
critical to help form young people as future leaders and citizens, so that they can 
contribute to greater respect for diversity, a deepening of cooperation and a more 
stable and peaceful world.”11 
 
1.2.3 EU competitiveness 
 
An efficient labour market requires that labour is geographically mobile and also 
occupationally mobile, e.g. through investment in flexible human capital. Mobility in higher 
education contributes to both. 
 
THE CHALLENGE. The Four Freedoms are fundamental to the single market. Not only goods, 
but also factors of production can move freely between Member States. The single market is 
intended to bring about increased competition, increased specialisation and larger 
economies of scale by allowing goods and factors of production to move to where they are 
most valued, thereby improving allocative efficiency. Thus integration fuels economic growth. 
“GDP per capita of the EU would be approximately one-fifth lower today, if no economic 
integration had taken place since 1950.” (Badinger, 2001). 
 
 Notwithstanding the Four Freedoms, mobility within the EU is limited. Approximately 
1.5% of EU25 citizens live and work in a different Member State from their country of origin – 
a proportion that has hardly changed over the last 30 years.12 The enlargement brought 12 
countries and about 100 million new citizens into the EU. The substantial income gap 
between east and west in Europe raised the prospects of massive east-west migration, but 
that did not happen.  
 
 Why was there not more movement? There are two reasons – choice and constraint. 
As regards choice, the incentives to leave home, family and friends, to wade into a new 
culture with another language, have been too limited to trigger large-scale migration. 
(Baldwin, Wyplosz, 2009, 8.4.) It is also possible liberalisation itself has persuaded some 
people to stay or even return: “If I am allowed to leave, I want to stay”. Newcomer countries 
became “good places” not least because of their new EU membership. 
 
 Movement to some countries was constrained by the seven-year transitory 
arrangements. Second, and directly relevant to EU policy, are constraints in the form of 
missing links and bottlenecks: 
“Every day businesses and citizens are faced with the reality that bottlenecks to 
cross-border activity remain despite the legal existence of the single market. They 
realise that networks are not sufficiently interconnected and that the enforcement of 
                                                 
 
10 http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html 
11 “Making learning mobility an opportunity for all”, 2008. 
12 “Labour market mobility within Europe, Scientific Report on the Mobility of Cross-Border Workers 
within the EU-27/EEA/EFTA Countries”, 2007 
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single market rules remains uneven.”13 
Section 1.3 will argue that the absence of an EU-wide student loan is just such a bottleneck. 
 
 Limited mobility presents both a problem and an opportunity. It is a problem because 
the EU’s main competitors, the United States, China and Japan, are more advanced in this 
respect. Mobility of skilled workers and the possibility of temporary or permanent emigration 
is something Member States must not only live with but exploit. If EU Member States set 
barriers to labour mobility within the EU, and the EU fails to implement an attractive and 
innovation-driven environment – and an appropriate strategy – in order to benefit from the 
circulation of talented workers, it takes the risk that the best students and graduates will 
emigrate – for example, to the United States. It presents an opportunity in the sense that 
greater mobility offers the potential for large gains. Increased mobility is a core, not marginal, 
item on the agenda. 
 
 Mobility in higher education can foster labour mobility in several ways. 
 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND CONVERGENCE. Not least because of the relatively rapid 
enlargement of the EU, there are significant differences in the level of development across 
Member States. For example, many spheres of knowledge were prohibited by or otherwise 
missing from the syllabus in communist regimes. Circulation of skilled labour induces 
knowledge transfer and helps to narrow the gap in the real income between poorer and 
richer Member States, benefiting both.  
 
IMPROVEMENT IN PERSONAL SKILLS. International mobility develops personal skills that 
improve employment prospects. Learning mobility will lead to increased skill sets, which are 
valued by employers. These include flexibility, adaptability, creative problem-solving, critical 
thinking. Learning languages not only improves employability but also helps the functioning 
of the single market.  
“Mobility… allows young people to improve their personal skills and employability, 
and offers trainers the chance to broaden their experience and enhance their skills. 
In an increasingly complex Europe all the available means for facilitating and 
promoting mobility must be used in the most effective way possible, so that people – 
in particular young people – can identify with Europe.”14 
 
 Though these gains are substantial, mobility has potential costs as well as benefits. 
Those costs may be economic, or the economic costs might be limited but politically difficult. 
Two that stand out are the possibility of brain drain, and of social dumping. 
 
BRAIN DRAIN OR REVOLVING HUMAN CAPITAL? There are continuing concerns that the single 
market will cause a brain drain, that is, a flow in one direction of highly educated or 
professional people from one country, economic sector, or field to another, usually for better 
pay, living conditions or professional opportunities. This asymmetrical redistribution of talent 
can generate global benefits by improving knowledge transfer and satisfying the demand for 
skills. However, the ‘countries of origin’ regard such mobility as a direct loss, as emigrants 
effectively export the value of their training, which has been financed by the government or 
other organisations. 
 But it is important to be aware of countervailing factors. 15 
                                                 
 
13 Europe 2020. 
14 “Education and Training 2010” work program, 2001. 
15 http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/673/The_brain_drain:_Old_myths,_new_realities.html 
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 Return migration: in the longer term, return flows of people and capital can constitute 
an economic development strategy in their own right. In Chinese Taipei, for example, 
half the companies emerging from that economy’s largest science park, Hsinchu, 
were established by people returning from the US. And in China, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology estimated that returning overseas students started most 
internet-based ventures.  
 Fostering return migration: the reality, however, is that only a few countries have 
successfully lured their talented emigrants back home. The relative successes of 
Taiwan, South Korea and the Republic of Ireland have been attributed to economic 
and other policies that have encouraged domestic investment into innovation and 
R&D. The scientific diaspora and networks of immigrant entrepreneurs can also play 
an invaluable role as conduits of know-how and skills. Given the right mix of policies 
and sustained international co-operation, several countries could, as one Indian 
official pointed out, see the “brain drain” transformed into a “brain bank”. 
 “Brain circulation”: there is little available information on the mobility of graduates. 
However, it seems that skilled migration between European countries is on the rise 
but appears to be dominated by temporary flows of advanced students, researchers, 
managers and IT specialists, suggesting more a pattern of brain circulation than a 
draining of skills from one place to another. [S-23] 
 International contacts: even where emigration is permanent, countries gain in terms 
of contacts through their emigrant citizens, both economically and in terms of “soft 
power”. 
 Remittances: migrants often remit some of their earnings to their home country. 
 
GAINS FROM TRADE OR SOCIAL DUMPING? Some commentators worry that competitive markets 
will increase inequality, while for others the concern is that free movement will lead to “social 
dumping”, i.e. that international competition will exert downward pressure on the generosity 
of social protection in richer countries. Since economies are complex, multi-agency systems 
with nonlinear feedback effects, less direct consequences can be important in the long run 
but are difficult to predict. The principle of comparative advantage in conventional economic 
theory argues that the gains from free movement considerably outweigh the losses, since 
the market allows countries to specialise, thereby creating more jobs than are destroyed. 
Those arguments are hold to an extent as far as they go. But efficiency is not the only 
concern. Post-communist reforms promised (and were premised upon) higher living 
standards but also greater individual freedom and respect for human rights. Free movement 
is important because it contributes both to prosperity and to individual freedom. It is for this 
reason that the EU committed itself to free movement and free markets: these issues belong 
to the non-negotiable category for Member States. 
 
1.2.4 Stronger human capital  
 
It is useful to distinguish between two sorts of student mobility. In the first, a student 
undertaking a degree in country A takes part of his/her studies in country B (the average 
duration is 5-6 months) as part of his/her degree in country A. The Erasmus programme 
finances this type of mobility. In the second type, a student who obtains a bachelors degree 
in country A does a master’s degree in country B (so-called Bologna students) (Konevas, 
Duoba, 2007). 
 
THE CHALLENGE. Overall student mobility is around 5% of the total number of tertiary 
students, of which Erasmus programmes account for 1%16. Thus we can regard higher 
                                                 
 
16 “Education & Training” 2010  
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education as comprising largely separate national “captive” markets.  
 
 Against this background, the target of 20% student mobility is ambitious. Higher 
education ministers from the 46 Bologna Process countries meeting in Leuven called upon 
each country to increase mobility, to ensure its high quality, and to diversify its types and 
scope. Ministers also agreed to set a target that by 2020 at least 20% of those graduating in 
the European Higher Education Area should have had some study or training abroad, and 
stated:  
“We believe that mobility of students, early stage researchers and staff enhances the 
quality of programmes and excellence in research; it strengthens the academic and 
cultural internationalisation of European higher education. Mobility is important for 
personal development and employability; it fosters respect for diversity and a 
capacity to deal with other cultures. It encourages linguistic pluralism, thus 
underpinning the multilingual tradition of the European Higher Education Area and it 
increases cooperation and competition between higher education institutions. 
Therefore, mobility shall be the hallmark of the European Higher Education Area.”17 
 
 In pursuing the target of 20%, key barriers to mobility have been identified: 
 Lack of awareness of the advantages of mobility to the student 
 Lack of knowledge of language and culture of other countries 
 Problems over recognition and certification 
 Lack of portability of insurance (access to health services, pensions, etc) 
 Additional financial costs (travel, living costs and fees) 18 
 
These findings suggest that increasing student mobility will be challenging, firstly, 
because the barriers are significant. The fact that barriers have a socioeconomic gradient 
will complicate the problem further:  
“Without targeted help, mobility risks being the preserve of elites, with young people 
from lower socio-economic backgrounds locked out because it is costly and because 
the benefits it brings are not evident to them.” 19 
 
CURRENT ACTIONS: THE FLAGSHIP INITIATIVES. The Commission is putting forward a series of 
flagship initiatives, some of them directly linked to student mobility: 
“Youth on the move” is intended to enhance the performance of education systems 
and to facilitate the entry of young people into the labour market. 
“An agenda for new skills and jobs” seeks to modernise labour markets and empower 
people by developing their skills throughout the life cycle, The aim is to increase 
labour-force participation and improve the match between labour supply and 
demand, including through occupational and geographical mobility.  
“European platform against poverty” seeks to ensure social and territorial cohesion, 
such that the benefits of growth and jobs are shared widely and that people 
experiencing poverty and social exclusion can live in dignity and participate fully in 
society.  
Other flagship programmes have an indirect relation to student mobility: 
“Innovation Union” aims at improving framework conditions and access to finance for 
research and innovation so that innovative ideas can be turned into products and 
                                                 
 
17 Ministers responsible for higher education from the 46 Bologna Process countries meeting in Leuven, Louvain-
la-Neuve in April 2009 
18 “Making learning mobility an opportunity for all” 2008 
19 Ibid. 
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services that create growth and jobs.  
“A digital agenda for Europe” seeks to accelerate the roll-out of high-speed internet 
and to reap the benefits for households and firms of a digital single market.  
“Resource-efficient Europe” seeks to help decouple economic growth from the use of 
resources, support the shift towards a low-carbon economy, increase the use of 
renewable energy sources, modernise the transport sector and promote energy 
efficiency.  
“An industrial policy for the globalisation era” aims to improve the business 
environment, notably for SMEs, and to support the development of a strong and 
sustainable industrial base able to compete globally.  
 
WHAT TYPE OF STUDENT MOBILITY? For the purposes of promoting citizenship and cohesion a 
reasonably balanced flow of students between countries is desirable. This is a central 
objective of the Erasmus programme, which was designed to foster bilateral exchange, 
where the receiving country pays the tuition fee, while the sending country finances the 
major part of the scholarship to cover living costs. The aim of balanced exchanges has not 
been met, and countries with a positive student balance (Germany, UK, Sweden, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, etc.) meet most of the costs of the programme. 
 
For the purposes of economic competitiveness, however, an unbalanced flow is 
generally optimal. Students should flow to wherever a higher education course adds most to 
their productivity, just as labour flows to skills and locations where it can be most productive. 
The Erasmus design was not intended for this type of mobility – another mechanism is 
needed.  
 
Thus, the fact of limited student mobility is an opportunity because the rewards of 
increasing mobility are high, as indicated in the earlier discussion of the tipping-point theory. 
 
THE GAINS FROM STUDENT MOBILITY. Student mobility: 
 Increases competition among universities. International experience, e.g. in the US, 
UK and Australia, suggests a two-way link between mobility and the quality of higher 
education. Mobile students tend to gravitate towards the best universities. And, 
because they tend to be dynamic and vocal, mobile students create bottom-up 
pressures for improved quality, e.g. through transferable credits, demands for more 
courses in foreign languages, and better foreign language teaching. 
 Facilitates the establishment of academic networks. 
 Contributes to labour mobility. 
 At postgraduate level, fosters research and innovation. 
 Where short term, reduces brain drain. Spending some time in a foreign institution 
can be a viable alternative to emigration. With better mobility options and better 
finance, talented students can be encouraged to stay in the EU rather than go to 
competitor countries, notably the US. 
 
Alongside these generic gains, student mobility also contributes significantly to the 
objectives in Europe 2020 set out at the start of the report: 
 “Smart growth” requires (a) competition and (b) appropriate funding of the knowledge 
industry, and especially higher education. As discussed, student mobility has an 
important role in both. Moreover, mobile students typically constitute the most 
talented, adventurous and innovative young professionals of their generation – and 
often placed (or destined to be placed) at the centre of social networks: they are the 
engine of change. 
 “Sustainable growth” requires concentrating European industry on the labour- and 
knowledge-intensive industries. This carries two implications for higher education: (a) 
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increasing the size and improving the quality of higher education in the EU is 
important for competitiveness; and higher education is itself a knowledge-based 
industry in which Europe should be specialising (as discussed in section 1.1); (b) the 
shift of workers from older types of manufacturing, e.g. the automobile industry, into 
the green industry requires developing new skills. 
 “Inclusive growth” requires more jobs and more cohesion. There is robust empirical 
evidence that educational level and mobility are strongly correlated with income, 
employment and European citizenship (King, Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). 
 
1.3 Why an EU student loan?  
 
The arguments thus far are: 
 Human capital is central to Europe’s competitiveness, hence so is mass, high-quality 
higher education (section 1.1). 
 Mobility has a core dual role in fostering cohesion and citizenship (section 1.2.2), and 
strengthening economic competitiveness by improving investment in and deployment 
of human capital (section 1.2.3). 
 Student mobility is an important element in strengthening overall mobility (section 
1.2.4). 
 
This section explains how an EU-level student loan contributes to the wider EU policy 
agenda. The objectives of Europe 2020 assume a well-functioning higher education area. 
The factors that hinder EU higher education are: 
 over-regulation 
 lack of sufficient differentiation 
 unmet demand  
 under-funding20  
 
The first three problems call for more competition, the fourth for more and better funding. 
Figure 1 depicts the system of policy objectives and the tools, illustrating in particular that 
student lending is a necessary condition for high-priority EU policies.  
Specifically, this section establishes the considerable EU added value which a well-
designed EU student loan facility can unlock, discussing in turn why student loans are 
necessary and desirable to improve funding (1.3.1), and why it is necessary to have an EU 
loan system, rather than relying on national schemes (1.3.2 and 1.3.3).  
 
1.3.1 The gains from a student loan facility 
 
It is important to be clear as to what is and what is not being discussed. This section argues 
that a student loan facility would be useful, with more detailed analysis in section 3.1. The 
costs faced by a student at university include living costs and perhaps also other costs, e.g. 
administration fees and examination fees. The need to meet such costs creates a potential 
financial barrier, which for many students can be met only in part, or not at all, from family 
resources or through paid work. Student loans therefore assist participation in two ways: 
 As a device for consumption-smoothing, i.e. a mechanism that allows someone to 
transfer resources from his or her older (working and earning) self to his or her 
younger (student) self; or 
                                                 
 
20 “Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon 
Strategy”, 2005. 
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 As a device to assist participation, particularly given that lack of family resources and 
earning opportunities are generally a more binding constraint for students from 
poorer backgrounds 
Though the existence of tuition fees in some Member States reinforces these arguments, 
they also apply to countries with no tuition fees. Thus the discussion of loans and fees 
should be treated separately. The focus of this report is loans. The gains from a student loan 
facility include the following. 
 
MORE RESOURCES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION. We have argued that a mass, high-quality higher 
education system is essential for European competitiveness (section 1.1) and that such a 
system cannot be financed entirely by the taxpayer (Box 1). Thus public finance needs to be 
supplemented by private finance.  
 
As discussed in detail in section 3.1.3, the only way to bring in private finance on a large 
scale and in a socially equitable way is to have a well-designed student loan system. Without 
private finance, the quality and size of the European higher education sector will suffer; and 
unless a large component of private finance is a good loan scheme, access will suffer. [S-16]  
 
IMPROVED QUALITY. Anticipating the discussion in section 3.1.1, competition between 
universities is important to improving quality. Loans strengthen quality in two ways: 
 By providing more resources  
 By boosting student demand, thus strengthening competitive pressures 
 
Box 2. Are loans the right tool to improve student mobility? 
 
The 20% mobility target established in EU policies is inseparable from the quality of mobility, 
but it is equally important that access is substantially expanded. What the EU can do to 
increase mobility in absolute numbers is to remove various barriers. Desk research (see 
section 4.3.1) and interviews with key stakeholders (Appendix 1) showed a range of 
significant barriers encompassing individuals, institutions and education systems (see Figure 
1). Measures that focus on the system (removing administrative and financial barriers) can 
have the most direct effects. The Bologna process addressed administrative obstacles. Now 
it is necessary to alleviate financial barriers. These policies can be strengthened by 
complementary measures targeting less straightforward impediments, such as institutional 
problems and individual capabilities and behaviour. 
 
Based on previous surveys, many students find mobility abroad financially challenging. 
Limited funding for education in general leaves them with the option of working during their 
studies (see the Eurostudent survey), and hence discourages mobility (due to the risk 
associated with leaving a job in one’s home country and finding new employment in a 
country where the language may be different). In addition, our case studies suggest that 
students move where they can maximise value for money, looking for either the lowest costs 
for desired skills, or the highest expected returns to their education. Loans would allow more 
choice for the first group of students and help to fill the financial gap for the second group. 
Borrowers would not have to work or rely as much on family support during their studies, 
thus enabling previously non-mobile students to study abroad. As a consequence, students 
who are not eligible for means-tested or merit-based support, or national loans (which are 
mostly not universal) would be able to benefit from mobility. In addition, loans would optimise 
the financial flows to students who would benefit from mobility, since grants could be 
targeted more tightly on the brightest and the neediest students. 
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Figure 1. Prerequisites for mobility at individual, institution and system levels 
 
 
GREATER MOBILITY. Student loans are an important element in improving student mobility. 
Bologna addresses mobility on the delivery side. Student loans help to address finance-side 
impediments to mobility across different systems of higher education finance, and across 
Member States, and are part of a finance-side Bologna, with two sets of gains: 
 Direct effects improving mobility 
 Indirect benefits because mobility helps to strengthen competition between 
universities, not least because mobile students tend to be the best and the most 
demanding  
 
IMPROVED EQUITY AND ACCESS. As foreshadowed in Box 1, over-reliance on taxpayer finance 
is regressive – the taxes of poorer people finance the university education of a group that 
come mainly from better-off families. This is not just an accident. Some people argue that 
higher education should be treated as a tax-financed social good that a civilised country 
should offer. This is a beguiling vision – and one which was possible when higher education 
was consumed by a small number of people. But those times have gone. There are three 
steps in the argument. 21 
 Technological advances mean that mass higher education is essential for national 
economic performance 
 We live in a free society in which citizens can both choose how hard they wish to 
work and whether they wish to emigrate. Both facts impose limits on taxation, and 
those limits are reinforced by international capital mobility 
 Mass higher education, which is expensive, plus limited taxation, lead to rationing of 
places and finance. In any such rationed system, middle-class families are likely to 
do better, leading to disproportionate middle-class use. Thus – systemically and 
predictably – excessive reliance on tax finance is regressive and harms access 
 
In addition, taxpayer finance crowds out the policies that widen participation discussed in 
section 3.1.4. 
 
A loan system addresses both the regressivity issue and the crowding-out issue and, if well 
designed, will not harm access. But why is it necessary to have an EU loan facility to unlock 
these large gains? There are two parts to the argument: the inadequacies of national loan 
                                                 
 
21 Barr (2004a, Ch. 14). 
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schemes (section 1.3.2), and the gains that can come only from an EU-wide facility or that 
are more pronounced with such a facility in place (1.3.3). 
 
1.3.2 Why an EU loan facility: problems with national schemes 
 
National loan systems face two potential sets of problems: they may be inadequate even as 
national systems; and even where that is not the case, they are designed for domestic, non-
mobile students, for covering (part of) the costs of higher education in a given country, i.e. 
the size of the loan is related to the domestic costs and income levels.  
 
MANY NATIONAL LOAN SCHEMES ARE INADEQUATE EVEN FOR NON-MOBILE STUDENTS. [S-25-28-
29-30] If we examine the current practice in student lending across the EU and the candidate 
countries, we see the following (see the fuller discussion in section 4.1.1): 
 There are some large-scale and robust student loan systems, for example, in the UK, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Hungary etc.  
However: 
 In some countries student loans are not available at all 
 Where loans exist, they may be limited in scope, number and size 
 Existing national schemes are often not portable 
 Where they are portable, the size of the loan (e.g. in the newer Member States) is too 
small to cover tuition, living and travel expenses in another country 
 Take-up rates, especially by students from lower socio-economic backgrounds, are 
small, most likely because of market interest rates and the absence of targeted 
subsidies. The problem particularly limits mobility of students from low-income 
countries to high-income countries 
 Information about student lending is scarce and often available only in the national 
language 
 Over the last few years, many countries have recognised the importance of student 
loans, and various attempts have been made (e.g. in Slovakia and Bulgaria), but they 
have failed to introduce a reliable system. Reform of an existing student loan system 
or the introduction of a new system is a current issue in most European countries  
 
On the face of it, the solution to the mobility problem is to apply the single market 
principle and require national schemes to remove legal and illegal barriers to portability of 
loans (and grants). This thinking is reflected in many policy papers: 
“National grants/loans should be fully portable within the EU. Full portability of 
pension rights coupled with the removal of other obstacles to professional, 
international or inter-sectoral mobility is needed to foster staff and researcher mobility 
and hence innovation.”22 
 
Such a strategy, however, tackles a symptom rather than the cause. The problems just 
outlined are not accidental. There are good reasons, to which we now turn, why national 
schemes will fail to foster mobility sufficiently. [S-27-31-32] 
                                                 
 
22 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Delivering the 
modernisation agenda for universities: education, research and innovation”, 2006. 
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CONFLICTING INTERESTS arise between the Member State and the wider EU. Even within a 
country, assessment of student mobility by different stakeholders can be very different. The 
main concerns include: 
 A brain drain on the educational or the labour market (negative) 
 A burden on the national student loan schemes (negative) 
 Knowledge transfer and brain gain (positive) 
 Improved access and labour force (positive) 
 More opportunity for students and a multicultural environment (positive) 
 
Given both positive and negative effects, the student lending strategy of a Member 
State is hard to predict; the outcome depends on local preferences and political forces. It 
should be noted that stakeholders frequently do not have problems with student loans per 
se, but with top-down policies such as competition, cost-sharing and mobility (protectionist 
attitudes were noted earlier). Since mobility by its very nature raises the issue of EU 
competence, the potential for conflicting interests is clear. 
 
FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS WITH MAKING NATIONAL SCHEMES PORTABLE. 
National student loan systems are not the right instrument for fostering international student 
mobility. Requiring national schemes to make loans internationally portable creates potential 
problems of coverage, administrative difficulty and financial leakage. 
 
 Lack of coverage. Not all schemes are large, national-level, government-controlled 
and universally accessible. Loans may be provided by private banks using risk-assessment 
techniques. Private lenders are likely to refuse to lend for activities they regard as 
particularly risky. 
 
Administrative problems include verifying eligibility (for example: has the student 
enrolled in the higher education institution?), maintaining contact with the borrower across 
changes of address or of name, and especially collecting repayments (verification of 
incomes, etc.). These problems increase administrative costs and defaults, jeopardising the 
stability of national schemes. 
 
Financial problems. Portable national loans risk under- or over-financing. Under-
financing leads to welfare losses, since students are not able to finance their studies abroad; 
over-financing creates situations where borrowers cannot safely repay, as discussed in Box 
5. Another potential problem arises where the loan system includes a general or targeted 
subsidy or state guarantee. A generous national system could lead to an influx of foreign 
students, causing an “explosion” of the education budget designed for a domestic scale of 
operation.  
  
For such reasons, even a large, well-designed loan scheme in a country with a 
properly functioning higher education system and successfully applied European strategic 
ideas may collapse financially and administratively if mobility reaches a critical level. This 
explains why developed and less developed countries are reluctant to create their own, 
universal, large and open student loan system, even if they would profit from the increased 
competition, cost-sharing and mobility. 
 
1.3.3 Gains from an EU student loan facility  
 
Analytical discussion of the appropriate level of government to organise a loan scheme for 
mobile students can be rooted in the literature on fiscal federalism. This section focuses on 
the practical arguments. Discussion starts with a series of specific gains.  
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FINANCE. A system with EU-wide funding makes it possible to offer loans for mobile students 
from all countries. In contrast, with national schemes, richer Member States can finance 
large-scale loans, but not poorer Member States. 
 
MOBILITY AND EU ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Mobility benefits the individuals who are mobile. 
Studying abroad reinforces economic benefits – see for example, Erasmus Valera study, 
REFLEX study data used by J. G Mora, who demonstrate a net increase in earnings of €200 
per month (other factors controlled for); and Parey and Waldinger, who find that studying 
abroad increases an individual’s probability of working in a foreign country by about 15 
percentage points. 
 
Mobility to poorer Member States is particularly important, contributing to their 
economic development, and thus bringing their living standards closer to those of the richer 
Member States. An EU loan facility is an important ingredient in fostering such mobility. 
 
 Additionally, as noted earlier, though mobility that is broadly balanced across 
countries fosters cohesion, economic development requires unbalanced mobility: students 
should flow to wherever a higher education course best suits their needs and talents, just as 
labour flows to skills and locations where it is most productive.  
 
The point is more general than economic efficiency. A larger number of educated 
people across the region gains benefits in terms of: 
 Reduced conflict and better governance, because there is a larger pool of well-
qualified candidates to fill various positions (and a better-educated electorate) 
 Better all-round education (because learning creates learning) 
 
EQUITY GAINS. Since unbalanced mobility occurs largely through flows from poorer to richer 
Member States, the poorer countries are likely to benefit most in the long run, provided that 
a significant number of their mobile graduates eventually return. Thus mobility has particular 
benefits for low-income countries.  
 
An EU loan facility makes unbalanced mobility possible, as a result of: 
 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS. Alongside the spillover effects of national schemes, an EU-wide loan 
facility creates wider gains by making unbalanced mobility possible. In contrast, if a Member 
State creates its own comprehensive, portable loan scheme, other countries will profit from 
the mobility and enhanced competition without spending public money or guaranteeing 
student lending, and without high administrative costs and default risk. Thus countries 
without portable loans benefit by free-riding on the schemes of others. Though mobility is in 
the interests of all Member States, each Member State has an interest in limiting its student 
lending, an outcome that is clearly suboptimal. Thus it is mistaken to expect Member States 
to solve the problem on their own. A common policy is needed. Appendix 6 goes into further 
detail on the possible spillover effects of a national student loan scheme. 
 
ADMINISTRATION AND COLLECTION OF REPAYMENTS. Many national schemes are open only to 
residents, and residency is often defined very strictly. 
 
In addition, as already noted, even richer Member States may have difficulty 
collecting repayments for national loans from large numbers of mobile students: a notable 
example is that of the difficulties faced by the UK Student Loans Company in collecting loan 
repayments from students from other EU countries who study in England and then work 
elsewhere. The key for any scheme lies in tracking individual borrowers and effectively 
collecting repayments. Pursuing mobility by attempting to make national schemes portable 
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would lead to 27 (or more) different schemes, each with its own mechanism for collecting 
repayments from borrowers in 27 (or more) countries. 
 
Fixing that problem through an EU collection system for national schemes would be 
problematic, not least because a wide array of national schemes, with different design 
features, some public and some private, would need to communicate on a common basis 
with the EU collection entity. This line of argument suggests a role for an EU-level student 
loan to facilitate international student mobility, if such mobility is to be large scale. 
 
 The EU has an informational advantage over individual Member States in mobile 
lending. The necessary information on preferences, opportunities, financing needs, riskiness 
and income perspectives of mobile students and workers are much more easily accessible 
at community level. More generally, an EU-level mobility loan facility could collect and 
disseminate comprehensive information on mobility opportunities and the corresponding 
financial support.  
 
Another informational gain concerns data on migration, which are generally lacking or 
notoriously unreliable. An EU-level mobility loan could fill this gap and provide policy makers 
with information about mobility trends. Moreover “implementation would make available a 
wealth of data on the economic return of studies”. [S-39] 
 
SCALE EFFECTS arise in a number of ways. An EU-wide loan: 
 Provides a wider risk cohort and better diversification; [S-23] 
 Facilitates more efficient financing and risk management, due to better market 
position; [S-23-33] 
 Assists efficient collection, with lower administrative costs, especially for mobile 
students; [40] 
 Is more resistant to political, financial and social crises; 
 Spreads the costs of design and implementation (set-up costs, consultancy etc.) over 
larger numbers of prospective borrowers. 
 
BENEFITS FOR NATIONAL LOAN SYSTEMS. Addressing student mobility at EU level would 
greatly simplify the task of introducing or expanding national loan schemes designed to 
support non-mobile borrowers.  
 
IN SUM, improving national schemes is important. But only an EU scheme can (a) provide 
mobility on a large scale for all Member States including poorer ones, and (b) can collect 
repayments effectively from internationally mobile students. Thus, alongside the specific 
gains just discussed, an EU-wide loan facility is an essential complement to national 
schemes in contributing to the wider gains discussed in section 1.3.1: 
 A greater volume of resources for investment in human capital; 
 Greater student mobility, which contributes to greater mobility generally, with benefits 
in terms of EU cohesion and EU economic competitiveness; 
 Improved production of human capital through the effects of vocal mobile students in 
increasing competitive pressures on university, and hence their quality; 
 Improved equity and wider access. 
 
1.3.4 Summary of EU added value 
The EU added value of an EU-level student loan scheme rests on four sets of arguments: 
student loans are necessary for higher-level EU policies; national loan schemes are not the 
right instruments; national student loan schemes will never be the right instruments; and the 
potential gains from an EU-level student loan scheme are high. 
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STUDENT LOANS ARE NECESSARY FOR HIGHER-LEVEL EU POLICIES. 
 Human capital, and especially the higher sector, plays a crucial role in the European 
strategy: “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (Europe 2020). 
 Size, quality and access can be improved by strengthening competition and 
improving funding. 
 “Captive” national higher education markets are a major bottleneck. 
 Student mobility is less than 5%. The target for 2020 is 20% 
 Increased student mobility is important not only for the efficiency of higher education, 
but is also a basic human right. It can strengthen EU citizenship and cohesion, and 
enhances labour mobility (both geographical and occupational), thus increasing the 
competitiveness of the labour market. 
 The Bologna process addressed the administrative barriers to mobility. Research 
experiments suggest that financing is a major remaining barrier. 
 The lack of financing, which is also true for the immobile students, makes the EU less 
competitive globally. Given obvious budget constraints, finance can be increased 
only by involving private financing, if only to assist with living costs. Addressing 
liquidity constraints in this way assists participation, especially for people from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 
NATIONAL LOAN SCHEMES ARE NOT THE RIGHT INSTRUMENT. 
We surveyed national student loan schemes across the EU and candidate countries, and 
found the following: 
 There are some large-scale, robust systems, for example, in the UK, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Hungary. However, 
 Some countries have no student loans. 
 Where loans exist, they may be limited in scope, number and/or size. 
 Existing national schemes are mostly not portable. 
 Where they are portable:  
 The size of the loan (e.g. in the newer Member States) is too small adequately 
to cover all expenses, including travel. 
 They are too few to affect student mobility significantly.  
 Take-up rates, especially by students from lower socio-economic backgrounds are 
small, most likely because of market interest rates and the absence of targeted 
subsidies. The problem particularly limits the mobility of students from low-income 
countries to high-income countries. 
 Information about student lending is scarce and often available only in the national 
language. 
 In recent years, many countries have recognised the importance of student loans, 
and various attempts have been made (e.g. in Slovakia and Bulgaria), but they have 
failed to introduce a reliable system. Reform of an existing student loan system or the 
introduction of a new system is a current issue in most European countries.  
 
NATIONAL STUDENT LOAN SCHEMES WILL NEVER BE THE RIGHT INSTRUMENT. 
 Conflicts of interests (related especially to brain drain and social dumping) impede 
national governments from implementing a universal, open and robust scheme. 
Stakeholders frequently have problems not with student loans per se, but with top-
down policies such as competition, cost-sharing and mobility. 
 If a Member State creates its own comprehensive, portable loan scheme, other 
countries will profit from the resulting mobility and enhanced competition without 
spending public money or guaranteeing student lending, and without high 
administrative costs and default risk. Thus countries without portable loans benefit by 
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free-riding on the schemes of others. Though mobility is in the interests of all Member 
States, each individual Member State has an interest in limiting its student lending, 
an outcome that is clearly suboptimal. Thus it is mistaken to expect Member States 
to solve the problem on their own. A common policy is needed. 
 National student loan systems are not the right instrument to foster international 
student mobility. Requiring national schemes to make loans internationally portable 
creates potential problems of:  
 Lack of coverage: not all schemes are large, national-level, government-
controlled and universally accessible. Loans may be provided by private 
banks using risk-assessment techniques. Private lenders are likely to refuse 
to lend for activities they regard as particularly risky. 
 Administrative problems include verifying eligibility (has the student enrolled in 
the higher education institution), maintaining contact with the borrower across 
changes of address or of name, and especially collecting repayments. These 
problems increase administrative costs and defaults, jeopardising the stability 
of national schemes. 
 Financial problems: portable national loans risk under- or over-
financing. Under-financing leads to welfare losses, since students are not 
able to finance their studies abroad; over-financing creates situations where 
borrowers cannot repay reliably, as discussed in Box 4. Another potential 
problem arises where the loan system includes a general or targeted subsidy 
or state guarantee; a generous national system could lead to an influx of 
foreign students, causing an “explosion” of the education budget designed for 
a domestic scale of operation.  
For these reasons, even a large, well-designed loan scheme in a country with a properly 
functioning higher education system and successfully applied European strategic ideas may 
collapse in a financial and administrative sense if mobility reaches a critical level. This 
explains why countries are reluctant to create their own, universal, large and open student 
loan system, even if they would profit from the resulting increased competition, cost-sharing 
and mobility. 
 
THE POTENTIAL GAINS FROM AN EU-LEVEL STUDENT LOAN SCHEME ARE HIGH. 
 Contribution to EU-level policies: a stable human capital institution is needed for the 
EU – especially to support student mobility. 
 Positive scale effects arise in a number of ways. An EU-wide loan: 
 Provides a wider risk cohort and better diversification;  
 Facilitates more efficient financing and risk management, due to better market 
position; 
 Assists efficient collection, with lower administrative costs than a national 
scheme trying to collect from internationally mobile graduates; 
 Is more resistant to political, financial and social crises; 
 Spreads the costs of design and implementation (set-up costs, consultancy) 
etc. over larger numbers of prospective borrowers. 
 The EU has an informational advantage in mobile lending. The necessary information 
on preferences, opportunities, financing needs, riskiness and income perspectives of 
mobile students and workers are more easily accessible at community level. More 
generally, an EU-level mobility loan facility could collect and disseminate 
comprehensive information on mobility opportunities and the corresponding financial 
support. Another informational gain concerns data on migration, which are generally 
lacking or notoriously unreliable. An EU-level mobility loan would help to fill this gap 
and provide policy makers with information about mobility trends. 
Benefits for national schemes (no free-rider problem any more): addressing student mobility 
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at EU level would simplify the task of introducing or expanding national loan schemes 
designed to support non-mobile borrowers. 
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2. The Approach  
 
2.1 Research principles  
 
1. “This Study should carry out original research, while taking into account existing reports 
and studies.” (ToR, Annex1, 2.2.) In doing so, the research and our recommendations are 
based on the following principles. 
 
2. Simple: the starting point is a simple model that is financially, politically and 
administratively as simple as possible and therefore robust. 
 
3. Evolutionary: the proposals are constructed so as to offer evolutionary pathways that 
allow for a natural evolution into more wide-ranging schemes. 
 
4. A long game, since these are institutions that: 
 Are long lived for the individual (consumption smoothing over the life cycle, like 
pensions); 
 Are not easy to administer (it is easy to give out the money, hard to get it back); 
 Have political implications given the existence of national loan schemes and the 
possibility of conflicts of interests with different stakeholders. 
 
5. A holistic view: removing financial impediments to mobility is helpful, but there are other 
impediments to consider, e.g. differences in language, culture, administration (which 
Bologna is addressing). Loans are an important instrument but it is also necessary to be 
aware of broader aspects such as grants and impediments to information. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
  
2.2.1 First phase 
 
In the first part of the research project our methodology consisted of three elements:  
 Literature review  
 Interviews 
 Survey 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW. We drew on the following basic literature: 
 Barr N. (2004a) The Economics of the Welfare State, Oxford University Press, 4th 
Edition 
 Baldwin R. and Wyplosz C. (2009) The Economics of the European Integration, 
McGraw-Hill, 3rd Edition 
 Higher Education Information System (HIS) 2008. “Social and Economic Conditions 
of Student Life in Europe: Synopsis of indicators / Final report of Eurostudent III 
2005–2008”  
 Summary report of the Peer Learning Activity on “Ways to increase mobility: funding 
models examined” (Cluster ), 2009 
 Slides of the “International Policy Conference on Student Loans” (2009) organised by 
the European Investment Bank in co-operation with the European Commission 
 Europe 2020 A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
 Databases: Eurostat and Eurydice 
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INTERVIEWS. In order to get an insight of the opinions of different stakeholders, we carried 
out a series of structured interviews. We gathered arguments in favour of and against an 
EU-wide student loan facility, including new ideas from a wide range of people with diverse 
backgrounds. We listed selected concerns, supporting statements and brainstorming ideas, 
which we have then addressed in Section 2 (EU added value) using cross-references. 
 
SURVEY. In order to obtain up-to-date information on the current student loan practices we 
also conducted a survey of national loan schemes. This survey was a useful supplement to 
the literature review in describing the major characteristics of existing loan schemes in 
Europe, with special emphasis on the issues of portability. Surveys with loan scheme 
managers have been carried out in 33 countries – 27 EU Member States, plus EFTA/EEA 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) and candidate countries (Croatia, FYROM, Turkey, 
Iceland).  
 
 Some of the constraints faced by the initial phase and early responses are 
summarised in Appendix 1. 
 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT. In order to enhance and foster collaboration within the research 
team, we set up an interactive webpage, which served as a hub for communication and a 
knowledge repository. At a later stage, and with the approval of the contractor, selected 
elements of this site could be shared with a group of experts involved in the Delphi method 
or with the wider public as a key reference point about student support and mobility 
opportunities. 
 
 
2.2.2 Second phase 
 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE PROJECT (ToR, Annex1, 2.2.) 
 
“Where added value is demonstrated, to investigate the feasibility for the establishment of a 
student lending facility at EU/EEA level. This should include, as a minimum, detailed 
reflection upon the following: 
a. Target group (cycle, background, participants in existing mobility 
programmes or free-movers) 
b. Nature of loan (living/maintenance costs, tuition fees or administration 
costs, top-up to other grant/loan, eligibility conditions) 
c. How to handle differences in living costs between different countries (e.g. 
loan taken for mobility period in a high cost country, and repayment period 
spent in a country where income levels are lower) 
d. Interest rate: fixed-variable-subsidised; risk premium 
e. Repayment terms (mortgage, income contingent, collected through 
taxation/national insurance contribution systems or by the lender directly) 
f. Management of a potential scheme: institutional structure to allocate loans, 
EU/EEA or national/regional level; independent body; banking sector 
g. Costs of a potential scheme (impact on the EU budget), including 
costs associated with scheme management 
h. Provision for default and non-payment (death, permanent disability, etc), 
and risk-sharing options (e.g. fund at European level) 
i. Potential for leverage of additional funding for the establishment of a 
scheme 
j. Potential for using mutual guarantee schemes 
k. Impact of Community and national legal framework and regulations 
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Based upon the findings of the research, formulate proposals for the establishment of a 
student loan facility/scheme at European level, including the presentation of three options. 
For each option, case studies of how this might be implemented in a representative sample 
of countries (at least five) should be included.  
 
A testing seminar should be organised with representatives of the main stakeholders and 
experts in the field to present the conclusions and proposals and receive feedback. 
 
METHODOLOGY. The Delphi method generates alternatives and multi-criteria scoring. For the 
Delphi method we involved 6-8 international experts based on the following selection criteria: 
1. High-level experts, mainly for the problem framing and approach 
2. Diversity of areas of expertises, but  
3. Relevant enough for the key questions to be answered  
The basic idea is that at this stage the EU added value and the need for an EU loan scheme 
will not be reiterated. Our questions were mainly about the how rather than the why. We 
chose a team of Delphi experts who understood and supported this policy direction.  
 
Based on the findings of the interim report, the Delphi expert panel were asked two 
questions: 
1. Starting point: the key issues of the interim report were highlighted and we asked for 
their opinion, approval or their suggestions for issues to be raised.  
2. Main point: we asked the direction of the concrete solution, especially in the area of 
managing widely diverse graduate incomes and the resulting default risk. 
Based on the answers of these two questions the core research team summarised 
the common points and developed potential working alternatives (7-8), on which they briefly 
commented. The second stage was to send the findings back to the Delphi expert panel for 
a second round of comments on questions 1 and 2. Upon the conclusion of the second 
round, the core team narrowed down the alternatives into three working models. 
 
The three proposed models of the EU student loan scheme were then sent to the 
Delphi expert panel for their comments and observations.  
 
Based on the two Delphi rounds, the core research team prepared a Multi-criteria 
Scoring Model (MCSM) and detailed case studies for each of the three alternatives. This 
process included structuring criteria and assessment alternatives, taking into account the 
key facts and arguments. 
 
Finally, the Delphi rounds and the MCSM are summarised, highlighting the three 
working alternatives and pointing out the one that is considered the best by the experts and 
by the analysis of the core team. 
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3 Analytical framework  
 
This section summarises key elements in the literature on student loans. However, one of 
the central reasons for discussing loans is to improve human capital in Europe. This means 
that a proper analysis requires additional discussion of the competitiveness of universities in 
Member States and also of tuition fees. Analysis of the determinants of access is also 
needed. Discussion in this section covers all these aspects. 
 
3.1  Lessons from economic theory for higher education finance23  
 
Section 1.1 sets out three central objectives of higher education policy: size, quality and 
access. A strategy for achieving these should be rooted in economic theory. Section 3.1 sets 
out the analytical core of the recommendations in this report and, for that reason, all the 
analytical arguments are brought together. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 apply the conclusions to 
efficiency and equity aspects of higher education in the EU. 
 
This section sets out four strategic lessons: 
 Competition between universities is beneficial.  
 Graduates should contribute to the cost of their degree. 
 Well-designed student loans have core characteristics.  
 The policies that widen participation are well known but politically difficult. 
 
3.1.1 Competition between universities assists quality  
 
In most countries, higher education is largely centrally planned. The argument against 
central planning of universities is not ideological, but rooted in the economics of information, 
which argues that competition is useful where consumers are well informed – thus we have 
competition between supermarkets, but less between hospitals or schools.24 In the case of 
higher education, the model of the well-informed consumer broadly holds. Thus competition, 
with suitable regulation, benefits students, both by promoting quality and because well-
informed students are better able than planners to make choices that are aligned with their 
interests and those of the economy. Though that proposition is largely correct for many 
students, there is an important exception: people from poorer backgrounds might not be fully 
informed, with implications for access that are discussed in section 3.1.4. 
 
On the supply side, central planning – whether or not it was ever desirable – is no 
longer feasible. As noted, technological change has led to greater numbers of universities 
and students, and much greater diversity of subjects taught. The myth that all universities 
are the same and should be funded equally is no longer credible. In principle, differential 
funding could be implemented by an all-knowing central planner, but the problem is too 
complex for complete reliance on that mechanism: mass higher education needs to be 
financed in a way that allows institutions to charge different prices to reflect their different 
costs and objectives. Such competition needs to be supported by an effective system of 
quality control. 
 
For all these reasons, students are more capable than central planners of making 
choices that answer their own needs and those of the economy. In contrast, attempts at 
                                                 
 
23 This discussion draws heavily on Barr (2004b). 
24 See Barr, 2004a, Chs 12-14 on health care, schools, and universities, respectively. 
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manpower planning are even more likely than hitherto to be wrong because of the increasing 
complexity of post-industrial society. 
“Mobilising all Europe’s brain power and applying it in the economy and society will 
require much more diversity than hitherto with respect to target groups, teaching 
modes, entry and exit points, the mix of disciplines and competencies in curricula, 
etc. Outstanding quality can only emerge from a terrain with an across-the-board 
‘culture of excellence’. Excellence is never a permanent achievement: it always 
needs to be challenged. It can exist in a few entire universities, but much more widely 
in individual faculties or teams within institutions or networks.”25 
 
It is worth reinforcing a point made earlier: competition is beneficial whether or not the 
system of higher education has tuition fees. A system with no fees can include competition 
inter alia through the publication of “league tables” of quality and / or through mechanisms 
whereby the finance a university receives is affected, at least at the margin, by measures of 
quality. 
 
Thus the argument is that competition is beneficial, and that student choice is an important 
driver of competition. A student loan facility assists competition by relaxing liquidity 
constraints, thus empowering student choice. 
 
3.1.2 Graduates should contribute to the cost of their degree 
 
Higher education creates benefits to society beyond those to the individual. Though difficult 
to quantify, they include (a) Production benefits: well-educated people make people with 
whom they work more productive; (b) Cultural benefits: well-educated people bring other 
people into contact and foster shared attitudes; (c) Civic benefits: there is a strong 
relationship between education and civic engagement. Broader social benefits include the 
transmission of values and the development of knowledge for its own sake. These social 
benefits all justify taxpayer subsidies as a permanent part of the landscape.  
 
However, there are also substantial and well-documented private benefits. 
“Very high private returns suggest that education may need to be expanded by 
increasing access and by making loans more readily available to individuals, rather 
than by lowering the costs of education.” (OECD, 2010, p.136) 
As a result: 
“At the tertiary level, high private returns... suggest that a greater contribution by 
individuals and other private entities to the costs of tertiary education may be justified 
so long as there are ways to ensure that funding is available to students irrespective 
of their economic background.” (ibid., p. 228; see also Psacharopoulos, 2009)  
Private benefits arise not only in terms of higher earnings and a lower probability of being 
unemployed, but also in the form of greater job satisfaction (a huge benefit) and / or greater 
enjoyment of leisure. [S-18-20] Given large private benefits on average, it is both efficient 
and fair that the beneficiaries should bear some of the costs. However, students are 
financially constrained, and most cannot afford to pay tuition fees or living costs. Thus 
beneficiaries should contribute to the cost of their degree when they can afford to do so – as 
graduates – not when they are students. This leads to the third set of lessons.  
 
                                                 
 
25 Communication from the Commission “Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their 
full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy”, 2005 
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3.1.3 Well-designed student loans have core characteristics  
 
A well-designed student loan system should assist investment in human capital in ways that 
are both efficient and support social justice. To those ends, the system should be 
(a) attractive for the students and (b) financially sustainable. [S-34] 
 
Is borrowing a good idea? 
Before addressing those issue, however, it is necessary to consider a prior question: is 
borrowing a good idea? Economic theory argues that people seek to maximise their 
wellbeing not at a single point but over time. Students sit in class not because they cannot 
think of anything more enjoyable to do, but because they hope that what they learn will 
contribute to their future earning capacity, job satisfaction and quality of life. Athletes rarely 
train out of sheer enjoyment of the training process, but because of the resulting boost to 
their performance. People try to lose weight not because they enjoy dieting, but because 
they recognise the potential health benefits. 
 
 Saving and borrowing raise identical issues. Someone who saves does so not 
because the consumption she gives up today has no value, but because she places a higher 
value on the resulting extra consumption in the future. A teenager who saves for an airline 
ticket is making a judgement call that he will get more enjoyment from the trip than from 
spending the money now. Similarly, someone who takes out a student loan is making a 
judgement that the returns of a degree (financial and non-financial) will exceed the cost of 
the loan. In doing so, he redistributes from himself when working to himself when a student. 
Similarly, most people hope to live long enough to be able to retire. They save to that end, in 
effect redistributing income from their younger to their older self. The idea of saving and 
borrowing in this way – consumption smoothing – is that people can thereby increase their 
wellbeing. Thus people tend to borrow when young, to finance part of the cost of their 
education and to buy a house, and to save during prime earning years to finance 
consumption in retirement. 
 
 It need hardly be said that borrowing too much is suboptimal. But given the potential 
gains in wellbeing, it is important to make the point that too little borrowing is also 
suboptimal. The ability to borrow from a well-designed student loan system raises the 
potential welfare of young people. 
 
Why not leave loans to private provision? 
A conventional loan, say to buy a house, makes a useful benchmark. The loan will have a 
fixed duration, and monthly repayments are entirely determined by three variables: the size 
of the loan, its duration and the interest rate. Apart from adjustments reflecting changes in 
the interest rate, the monthly repayment is fixed. 
 
Buying a house is a relatively low-risk activity. 
 
1. The buyer generally knows what he is buying, having lived in a house all his life. 
2. The house is unlikely to fall down. 
3. The value of the house will increase, at least in the long run. 
4. If income falls, making repayments problematic, he has the option to sell the house. 
5. Because the house acts as security for the loan, he can get a loan on good terms. 
 
For these reasons, the private market provides home loans. The contrast with lending to 
finance investment in human capital, e.g. a university degree, is sharp. The central 
difference is that there is no physical collateral for lending which finances investment in 
human capital. 
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Risk-facing borrowers Borrowing to finance human capital is risky to the borrower 
because (2), (3), and (4), though true for housing, are less true for investment in skills. A 
qualification can “fall down”, because a borrower may fail his exams. He still has to make 
loan repayments, but without the qualification that would have led to the increased earnings 
from which to make those repayments. A second source of risk is that though the average 
private return to investment in human capital is positive, there is considerable variation about 
that average. Finally (element (4)), someone who has borrowed to acquire a qualification, 
but then has low earnings and high repayments, does not have the option to sell the 
qualification, which further increases his exposure to risk. For all these reasons, borrowing to 
finance investment in human capital exposes the borrower to more risk and uncertainty than 
borrowing to buy a house. The problem arises for all borrowers, and most acutely for those 
from poorer backgrounds. As a result, borrowing to finance investment in human capital will 
be inefficiently low. 
 
Risk-facing lenders. Lenders also face risk and uncertainty. If I borrow to buy a 
house, the house acts as security. If I am unable to repay, the lender can repossess the 
house, sell it and take what he is owed. And since the lender cannot hide the house or run 
away with it, deliberate default is not a problem. Thus the private sector provides loans on 
good terms. The contrast with human capital is clear. Lenders have no security. They face 
uncertainty about the riskiness of an applicant – whether the person will acquire the 
qualification and whether their subsequent earnings will allow him or her to repay – and 
therefore charge a risk premium. Since lenders are not well informed about the riskiness of 
an applicant, they face incentives to cherry-pick, i.e. to find ways of lending only to the best 
risks, analogous to private medical insurance. An obvious way to do this is to lend only to 
students who can provide security, e.g. a home-owning parent. The resulting lending, once 
more, will be inefficiently low. 
 
Thus conventional loans lead to inefficiently low borrowing and lending. They are also 
inequitable. The various efficiency problems impact most on people from poor backgrounds, 
women, and ethnic minorities, who may be less well informed about the benefits of a 
qualification and therefore less prepared to risk a loan. In addition, these groups are less 
likely to be attractive to cherry-picking institutions. 
 
Characteristics of a good student loan scheme 
 
Discussion thus far has sought to make two points. First, the analysis points to a graduate 
contribution because: 
 It is efficient in microeconomic terms because of the private benefits of a degree. 
 It is necessary for fiscal reasons, given the high cost of mass higher education and 
competing fiscal pressures such as population ageing and combating social 
exclusion. 
 It improves equity by reducing the regressivity of taxpayer finance. 
Second, conventional loans are inefficient and inequitable. 
 
The two sets of arguments underpin the position that graduate contributions should 
be based on student loans which are least partly income-contingent repayments; are ideally 
large enough to cover tuition charges and realistic living costs; and are universal, self-
sustaining, and potentially capable of being privately financed. 
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INCOME-CONTINGENT. Income-contingent repayments – that is, repayments calculated as x% 
of the borrower’s subsequent earnings, collected alongside income tax26 [S-43-44-45] – are 
designed specifically to address the problems of conventional loans. In efficiency terms, they 
are designed explicitly to protect borrowers from excessive risk. In equity terms, they assist 
access because they have built-in insurance against inability to repay. Though proposals for 
income-contingent repayments are old, more recent arguments draw on lessons from the 
economics of information and behavioural economics. Income-contingent repayments build 
in insurance against inability to repay, thereby increasing efficiency by protecting borrowers 
from excessive risk. For the same reason, they also protect access. Note that what is being 
discussed is not a tax, which goes on forever, but a genuine loan, where repayments stop 
once the loan has been repaid.  
 
In a pure income-contingent system, a graduate’s monthly repayments are a fraction 
of her income, deducted at source alongside income tax, as in Australia, New Zealand and 
the UK. It is also possible to have what might be regarded as a hybrid, with income-
contingent repayments at lower earnings and fixed monthly repayments for higher earnings. 
In section 5 we discuss this approach in more detail, paying particular attention to schemes 
where the income-contingent element is only at low levels of income, which minimises 
administrative burdens but offers the possibility over time of raising the level of income below 
which repayments are income-contingent. 
 
SUFFICIENTLY LARGE. Ideally, the loan should be large enough to cover fees and living costs, 
resolving student poverty and promoting access by making higher education free at the point 
of use.  
UNIVERSAL. Access to a loan should not require a parental guarantee or collateral. A loan 
scheme that is self-sustaining faces less need to restrict the size of loans for fiscal reasons. 
This makes it possible to offer loans without an income test. Since loans are intended to 
smooth consumption, the absence of an income test is desirable. 
SELF-SUSTAINING. Loans should be as self-sustaining as possible, not least to make it 
possible to extend loans to as many different types of student (undergraduate, postgraduate, 
full-time and part-time) as possible. To that end, loans should not have blanket interest 
subsidies; they should charge an interest rate related to the government’s cost of borrowing 
with targeted interest subsidies for low earners and perhaps a slightly higher rate of interest 
for higher earners. Many countries, including the UK, offer loans at a zero real interest rate, 
that is, with a blanket interest subsidy. The high cost and bad targeting of interest subsidies 
is shown internationally by Shen and Ziderman (2009). In a system like that in the UK, with 
(a) income-contingent repayments and (b) forgiveness of any loan that has not been repaid 
after (say) 25 years, interest subsidies are particularly pernicious. 
 The subsidy is enormously expensive. In the UK, nearly one-third of all lending to 
students never comes back simply because of the interest subsidy.  
 Because of the resulting fiscal pressures, loans are too small, harming access.  
 The subsidies also crowd out university income, putting quality at risk, and more 
recently putting size at risk – in England in 2010 there was a severe shortage of 
university places.  
 The subsidies are deeply regressive. They do not help students (graduates make 
repayments, not students). They help low-earning graduates only slightly: graduates 
                                                 
 
26 For fuller discussion, see Barr, 2001, Ch. 12. 
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with low monthly earnings are protected by income-contingency, and those with low 
lifetime earnings by forgiveness after 25 years. They do not help high-earning 
graduates early in their careers: with income-contingent loans, monthly repayments 
depend only on earnings; interest rates only affect the duration of the loan. Thus the 
major beneficiaries are successful professionals in mid-career, whose loan 
repayments are switched off earlier because of the subsidy than would otherwise be 
the case. A move to a somewhat higher interest rate would be progressive. 
 
CAPABLE OF BEING PRIVATELY FINANCED. Even high-income countries (e.g. the UK) are facing 
difficulties in financing the cash-flow costs of student loans from public sources. If fiscal 
constraints make it difficult for taxpayers to finance the cash-flow costs of the loan there are 
advantages if the detailed design of the loan allows it to be classified as private under 
Eurostat rules. [S-52] (see section 6.4.5). 
 
Of current schemes, the Hungarian loan comes closest (other than on the size of 
loan available to each student). Hungary illustrates the benefits of a simple, robust scheme. 
 
3.1.4 The policies that widen participation are well known but politically 
difficult  
 
A fourth set of lessons concerns the determinants of access. The goal of improving 
participation is enormously important: for efficiency reasons (countries cannot afford to 
waste talent); for widely supported equity reasons; and for political reasons. But discussion 
of policy is bedevilled by the widely held view that free higher education is necessary for 
access reasons, and that fees and loans harm access. That argument is intuitively plausible, 
but profoundly mistaken. 
 
CAUSES OF FAILURE: THE RIGHT DIAGNOSIS. Failure to participate in higher education is much 
less of an 18+ problem than a 0-18 problem, frequently with roots in early childhood. There 
are two strategic constraints on participation: a prior-attainment constraint (the 0-18 
problem), and a liquidity constraint (the 18+ problem). 
 
Prior-attainment constraint. The role of a person’s attainment in school stands out as 
the single most important determinant of participation. As noted in Box 1, in the UK in 2002 
the participation rate for children from professional backgrounds was 81%, and that from 
manual backgrounds, 15%. Yet restricting the sample to young people with good high school 
graduate grades, the figure was roughly 90% for both groups. The reason is simple – pupils 
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds have lower school-achievement rates. If someone 
achieves well in secondary education, the problem of participation in higher education is 
largely solved. 
 
Liquidity constraints. The second impediment to participation is liquidity constraint. As 
noted earlier, students are generally poor so that, without assistance, only young people with 
well-off parents would be able to afford to go to university. However, the evidence suggests 
that for the great bulk of students, well-designed loans are as effective as grants at 
addressing liquidity constraints. 
 
It is often argued that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are debt-averse. 
The problem is real, particularly where people are badly informed about higher education 
and how the loan system operates and, as discussed below, policy needs to address this 
aspect. However, many studies of debt aversion are flawed. They are mostly based on 
survey evidence, hence on what people say not on what they do. Second, they fail to control 
for critical differences in the characteristics of potential university applicants, notably the 
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extent of their information and the level of their attainment. The second flaw is fatal. 
 The flawed argument is that people from poor backgrounds do not go to university 
because they are debt-averse, thus money intended to widen participation should be 
spent on grants and bursaries. 
 The argument that the evidence supports is that people from poor backgrounds do 
not go to university mainly because of low attainment, and that if that problem is fixed 
are just as likely to go to university as people from better-off backgrounds. Thus 
money intended to widen participation should be spent mainly on raising grades in 
school and on improving information. 
 
THE RIGHT PRESCRIPTION. What does this imply for policy that really starts to improve 
participation? Poor attainment in school can be argued to stem from four causes: lack of 
education, lack of information about university, lack of aspirations and lack of money. A well-
designed strategy should address all of these. 
 Raising attainment: access fails when someone leaves school at 16, usually for 
reasons that started much earlier. There is ample evidence of the huge importance of 
early child development. A central element in widening participation is to strengthen 
pre-university education, from nursery school onwards  
 Increasing information 
 Raising aspirations 
A series of policies address both information and aspirations: mentoring of schoolchildren by 
university students, visit days, Saturday schools, summer schools, winter schools, and the 
like. The major purpose of such activities is to demystify university, to give schoolchildren 
sources of information that are authoritative (university teachers) and credible with young 
people (student mentors). 
 More money: the right policies include financial support to encourage people to 
complete high school. In important respects grants at this stage are more important 
than at university. That does not rule out grants for university students but, at least as 
regards participation, it is important to be clear that grants are the tail; it is attainment 
that is the dog. 
 
Though the evidence is clear, the political problem is the continuing widespread belief 
that grants are the major instrument to widen participation, together with robust defence by 
middle-class families of a system of which they are the main beneficiaries. 
 
3.2 Economic efficiency (“The most competitive, knowledge-
based… with full employment…”) 
 
3.2.1. Efficiency at the EU level 
 
The analysis in section 1 focused on the competitiveness of the EU by strengthening human 
capital and promoting mobility. We now turn to mechanisms to achieve those objectives. 
 
 High-quality and large-scale higher education requires: 
 More resources. Since these cannot come on a sufficient scale from the taxpayer 
(Box 1), they come through tuition fees that students can finance through loans 
(section 3.1.3, and further in section 3.2.2). 
 Efficient use of those resources. Incentives to efficiency, including responsiveness to 
the demands of students and employers, comes through a competitive regime 
(section 3.1.1). Variable fees are part of that incentive structure. 
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Mobility requires: 
 Good information about opportunities, both within a student’s home country and 
elsewhere. Section 3.1.4. notes the critical role of information. 
 Addressing liquidity constraints, notably through a loan system that is portable 
internationally. The reasons why national loan systems are the wrong instrument for 
internationally mobile students were set out in section 1.3.2. 
 
None of these policies alone is sufficient, but the combination offers a strategy to 
raise skills, improve employability and increase labour mobility, thereby improving the EU’s 
competitiveness. 
 
3.2.2 Efficiency at the country and individual level 
WHY PRIVATE FINANCE? Relying mainly on taxpayer finance is no longer feasible, given the 
imperative of mass, high-quality higher education; nor is the approach desirable, in that it 
redistributes from poorer to better-off families. Box 1 explained why relying on public finance 
fails to achieve the core objectives of size, quality and access. 
 
WHY LOANS, NOT OTHER FORMS OF PRIVATE FINANCE? There are six potential sources of 
private finance:27 
1. Family resources are useful as far as they go, but do not promote access. 
2. A student’s earnings while a student: in most countries, with the exception of the 
US, these are generally small. In addition, time spent earning money competes 
with study time and leisure activities. 
3. A student’s future earnings – that is, loans. 
4. Employers: it is in the interests of employers that people are trained, but it is also 
in the interests of each employer to try to free-ride on training financed by their 
competitors. This type of externality did not arise when workers tended to stay 
with a single employer for many years, but today’s labour markets require 
mobility. Thus, contrary to popular belief, employer contributions are likely to be 
small. 
5. Entrepreneurial activities by universities: the concern here is that net revenues 
are generally small and there is a risk of diverting scarce institutional capacity to 
lower-priority activities. 
6. Philanthropy – e.g. charitable foundations or bequests in wills – are useful but 
marginal, except in the case of a small number of US universities. 
Having ruled out 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 as major sources of private finance, we are left with loans 
as the only approach with the potential to yield resources in a large-scale and equitable way. 
[S-13] To those ends, the design of the loan is paramount. 
 
DESIGNING STUDENT LOANS. Section 3.1.3 sets out the theoretical arguments for loans with 
the following characteristics: 
 Income-contingent repayments, at least at low levels of earnings, to address 
uncertainty on the part of borrowers and lenders; 
 Large enough to cover fees and living costs, to address liquidity constraints; 
 Universal, i.e. not requiring a parental guarantee, to assist participation; 
 Self-sustaining, i.e. no blanket interest subsidy, to ensure that the scheme is fiscally 
parsimonious if publicly financed, or attractive to private lenders if privately financed. 
 
                                                 
 
27 Barr (2004a, Ch. 14). 
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INCOME-CONTINGENT LOANS AS A FORM OF GRADUATE TAX. A graduate tax continues for life, or 
until retirement, or for (say) 25 years. Though intuitively plausible, a graduate tax of this sort 
is highly problematical even within a single country, and even more so in the context of 
internationally mobile students, for the reasons set out in Box 3. From the point of view of the 
individual graduate, however, income-contingent repayments collected as a payroll 
deduction are just like a graduate tax, except that they stop once the graduate has repaid 
what he or she borrowed. 
 
Box 3: What is wrong with a graduate tax? 
A pure graduate tax for (say) 25 years is problematical for at least five reasons. 
1) It is public money. The revenue from a tax is public finance, ruling out net private finance 
until cumulative repayments by graduates outweigh the cumulative upfront outgoings. 
2) Funding is closed-ended. With a graduate tax, the ministry of finance (or equivalent) 
controls the funding envelope. Funding is a zero-sum game: world-famous universities and 
local universities compete for the same pot of money. 
3) Incentives to quality are muted. Public finance plus closed-ended funding restores central 
planning, muting the competitive incentives facing universities, and hence creating concerns 
about quality. As explained in section 3.1.1, competition is an important ingredient in quality. 
4) A closed-economy model. Consider a graduate tax in the UK. If repayments are part of a 
person’s income tax liability, they apply only to people with UK taxable earnings, thus 
exempting students from other EU countries who study in the UK but then work elsewhere, 
and UK graduates who work abroad. Unless the graduate tax is small (in which case it is not 
a powerful instrument in promoting quality) it will create incentives to emigrate. 
5) Politically problematical. Though it sounds like a good idea, a graduate tax would be 
politically difficult. If the tax is compulsory, it causes what might be called “the Mick Jagger 
problem”. In a graduate tax regime, Mick Jagger, once a university student, would finance a 
good part of UK higher education. Compulsion, as well as encouraging emigration, will come 
under political attack from the right, as violating individual freedom, risking the long-term 
stability of the system. On the other hand, if the tax is voluntary, the problem is one of 
adverse selection – the rich would pay upfront, reducing the redistributive capacity of the 
system. This tendency would provoke attack from the political Left. 
 
Income-contingent repayments can also be regarded as analogous to a social 
insurance contribution: as noted earlier, pensions redistribute from a person’s middle years 
to her older self, student loans from her middle years to her younger self. The analogy with 
social insurance is particularly appropriate of a loan scheme like that in Hungary, with a 
cohort risk premium, so that within a cohort higher-earning graduates subsidise lower-
earning graduates. 
 
WHY LOANS, NOT ONLY GRANTS. This topic was discussed in Box 1 in terms of the objectives 
of size, quality and access. The main argument is that a system that relies mainly on 
taxpayer finance cannot achieve all of them and may achieve none. We can now reinforce 
those conclusions by drawing on the economic theory section 3.1. 
Efficiency arguments:  
 Tax funding on its own is inefficient, given the private benefits discussed in section 
3.1.2. [S-19-20] 
 Tax funding is unaffordable [S-14-15-16-17] given the conflict between (a) the 
imperative for a large, high-quality tertiary sector in the interests of national economic 
performance and (b) fiscal constraints arising from competing long-run demands on 
scarce public funds. 
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Equity arguments: 
 Tax funding is unfair. As discussed in Box 1, children from the top socio-economic 
backgrounds are over-represented in higher education, therefore relying on taxpayer 
finance is regressive. Note that over-representation of students from better-off 
backgrounds is even more significant among mobile students. [S-19] 
 This is all the more the case given the large private returns to higher education. 
 Even worse, excessive reliance on tax funding diverts to students from wealthier 
backgrounds the resources that should be used to finance the wide-ranging activities 
needed to improve access discussed in section 3.1.4. 
 
Separately, there are concerns about the methods available for allocating grants. 
Grants can be allocated (a) equally, (b) by profession, (c) on academic merit, or (d) on the 
basis of need. 
 Grants allocated equally tend to be too small to have a significant impact on access. 
 Grant allocated by professions reintroduce implicit manpower planning. 
 Merit-based grants tend to benefit students from better-off backgrounds since, as an 
empirical matter, academic merit is highly correlated with family wealth. 
 Targeting grants on the basis of need, though desirable, is not easy. The financial 
situation of the family and that of the student can be very different, reliable means 
testing is expensive, and income may be a bad yardstick of deprivation. 
 
Listing those concerns is not intended as an attack on grants; nor is the emphasis on 
prior attainment in section 3.1.4. But, as noted earlier, if the objective is to widen 
participation, grants are not the most powerful instrument. 
 
EFFICIENCY CONCERNS. It is sometimes argued that we are over-educating the population, 
with the risk of wasting public resources, leading to inflation of diplomas and the crowding 
out of less-qualified people from the labour market. Those arguments should be recognised 
but not exaggerated. 
 If the supply of graduates increases then, other things being equal, the financial 
return to degrees will decline. But that will not happen if increases in supply are 
broadly matched by the increasing demand for skills discussed in section 1.1. It can 
be argued that that is exactly what has happened. Though higher education has 
expanded throughout Europe, the advantages of a degree, including the graduate 
premium, have remained broadly constant. 
 A second counter-argument concerns the relative costs of over-investing and under-
investing, the latter in the long run reducing Europe’s competitiveness. Given the 
high spending on human capital in competing countries, including the US, Japan and 
South Korea, there is an insurance element to spending on higher education as well 
as an investment element. 
 The argument about over-investment is less acute when we talk about loans rather 
than grants. 
 
A second concern is that the approach suggested here will reintroduce central 
planning in the form of manpower planning. To address that concern it is useful to 
summarise earlier arguments by discussing the role of government in higher education. 
 
WHAT ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT? Earlier discussion favoured competition. That is not an 
argument for free markets but for regulated markets, nor is it an attack on taxpayer support. 
 
Government has an important and continuing role: 
 To provide taxpayer support to higher education to reflect external benefits, to assist 
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access and to finance research. 
 To regulate the system through some measure of price control on fees and by 
ensuring that there is effective quality assurance. 
 To set incentives by offering larger subsidies for subjects the government wishes to 
favour and by offering larger subsidies for some students. Thus the role of 
government changes from that of central planner to that of setter of incentives. 
 To redistribute within higher education, for example, with more taxpayer support for 
universities in a less favourable market position in terms of the fees they can charge. 
 To ensure that there is a good loan scheme;  
 To adopt, encourage and mandate policies to widen participation, through policies to 
improve information, by allocating grants to students from poor backgrounds – 
particularly where this addresses debt aversion, – and by adopting policies to 
improve the quality of school education. [S-21] 
 
“To strengthen both efficiency and equity, Member States should create appropriate 
conditions and incentives to generate higher investment from public and private 
sources, including, where appropriate, through tuition fees combined with 
accompanying financial measures for the disadvantaged. Specific actions at school 
level are also needed.”28 
 
All these policies operate at a national level. Some, including loans, also have 
important EU dimensions.  
 
3.3 Social justice (“…and higher social cohesion …”)  
3.3.1 Equity at the individual and national level 
DISTRIBUTIONAL GAINS. Student loans bring about significant distributional gains. 
 They reduce the regressivity of over-reliance on taxpayer finance (Box 1), which 
results because students come disproportionately from better-off backgrounds, and 
internationally mobile students even more so.  
 They free resources that can be used to finance the policies with the greatest impact 
on improving participation, notably wide-ranging action at earlier ages (section 3.1.4). 
In contrast, over-reliance on taxpayer support actively crowds out those policies. 
Given the evidence that the main constraint on participation is prior achievement, it is 
no surprise that tax finance per se is not a powerful determinant of participation. 
 
PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT. The private benefits of higher education were discussed in section 
3.1.2. They include higher earnings and lower rates of unemployment. These far from 
exhaust the total number of gains from higher education, which include greater job 
satisfaction and greater enjoyment of leisure. Though harder to quantify, they can also 
improve self-confidence. To the extent that a system of loans frees resources to raise the 
participation of students from poorer backgrounds, these gains can be shared more widely.  
 
GENDER EQUITY. As discussed more fully in Box 4, gender equality is increasingly important 
both for its own sake and because of the importance of women in the labour market.  
 
ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION. Studying abroad reinforces economic benefits 
(see, for example, Janson et al, (2009)) as well as fostering personal development. And 
since internationally mobile students are even more likely than non-mobile students to come 
                                                 
 
28 “Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems”, 2006. 
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from better-off backgrounds, the effect of sharing these gains more widely is even stronger. 
 
OVER-BORROWING. As discussed in section 3.1.3, too little borrowing is suboptimal (for 
example, people would have to save into middle age before they could afford to buy a 
house), but so, clearly, is too much borrowing. Policy design therefore needs to ensure that 
the amount that a student can borrow makes sense given his or her future earnings 
prospects on average, with income-contingency offering insurance against inability to repay 
for graduates whose long-term earnings turn out to be low. Making sure that loans are large 
enough to foster investment in human capital, but not too large, is partly an efficiency issue 
but also has an equity dimension: without access to loans, highly qualified students from 
poorer backgrounds face a more acute liquidity constraint than students from better-off 
backgrounds and, once more, the point has particular force for internationally mobile 
students. 
 
Box 4. Equal opportunities  
 
The EU has prioritised equal opportunities since the Treaty of Amsterdam. In 2000 the 
Commission proposed a new strategy29 that provides for inclusion of gender equality in all 
EU policies and activities, complemented by specific actions for disadvantaged groups. Non-
discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity/race, religion/belief, age, disability and sexual 
orientation, were subsequently added30. 
 
When introducing new policy instruments, it is recommended to assess the differences in 
“rights, resources, participation, values and norms”31 among different groups, and whether 
European policies can help to eliminate existing inequalities. For student loans specifically, 
the following observations are relevant: 
 Education in the EU is segregated both horizontally and vertically. Women make up 
66% of students in the humanities and arts, but only 24% in engineering (Eurostat, 
2006). 
 6% of women and 4% of men aged 20-34 across the EU (Eurostat, 2007) are 
unemployed three or more years after graduating from tertiary education. 
 Although comparable data are scarce, the gender pay gap in some countries was as 
large as 21% in public administration (SK), 28% in business (CY) and real estate 
(PT), 33% in healthcare and social work (PT), 36% in ICT (CZ), and 49% in the 
finance sector (CZ) (Eurostat). 
 The unequal distribution of household duties reduces labour market opportunities.32 
 
Current loan schemes do not necessarily have built-in incentives for under-represented 
groups to take up loans, or preferential treatment in repaying them. Yet some notable 
examples are: 
 Prodigy Finance Ltd., a private lender consulted for this study, already offers 
repayment freezes in case of parental leave. 
 In the Dutch national scheme the borrower may request repayment to be postponed 
in case of parental leave. 
                                                 
 
29 Commission Communication of 7 June 2000: “Towards a Community framework strategy on gender equality 
(2001-2005)” (COM(2000) 335 final). 
30 Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 and Employment Framework Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000. 
31 European Commission, Equal Opportunities Unit DG 5 (1998), A Guide to Gender Impact Assessment, p. 4. 
32 Fagan, C., (2010): Analysis note: Men and Gender Equality – tackling gender segregated family roles and 
social care jobs. EGGE – European Network of Experts on Employment and Gender Equality. Study on behalf of 
the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. 
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 The UK scheme has automatic adjustment for parental leave in that, if earnings are 
low or zero, loan repayments are zero. 
 
Although the situation of various under-represented groups in education is difficult to 
compare across the EU, the loan scheme should address the main equality issues in the 
Member States. The proposed loan scheme should address equal opportunities in the 
following stages: 
 Information: targeted campaigns, websites, FAQs designed for under-represented 
groups (including in minority languages). Information on requesting a means test 
should be made very clear to students from disadvantaged groups. 
 Access: ensuring equal opportunities to access the loan for all residents (including 
refugees, asylum seekers, migrants and children thereof, or groups like non-citizen 
ethnic minorities in Latvia and Estonia). 
 Repayment: mobilising other EU and national instruments to provide help with 
repayments for disadvantaged groups or persons in professions atypical for their 
gender; repayment freezes during parental leave; repayment reductions for persons 
with demanding family responsibilities (such as taking care of a disabled child); 
creating the borrower’s repayment plan solely on the basis of individual income (not 
family or partner’s – it should not be taken for granted that parents or partner will 
financially support the borrower). 
 
3.3.2 Equity: cross-country aspects 
EU CITIZENSHIP/EUROPEAN IDENTITY. Loans for internationally mobile students foster mobility, 
with the gains in terms of EU citizenship and EU identity discussed in section 1.2. Though 
broadly balanced mobility may be appropriate for promoting citizenship and identity, the 
discussion in section 1.2.4 suggests that the pursuit of international competitiveness requires 
unbalanced mobility, where students flow to whichever higher education course best suits 
his interests and abilities and workers move to jobs in which they are most productive. As 
discussed in section 1.3, national loan schemes are not the right instrument for large-scale 
international mobility, and particularly not for large-scale unbalanced mobility. 
 
CROSS-BORDER SOLIDARITY. This point follows directly from the previous one. The net flow of 
students will tend to be from poorer to richer Member States. This highlights further 
problems with national loan schemes as an instrument for international student mobility. To 
illustrate, consider a poorer Member State with lower costs of living, lower earnings and 
lower tuition fees than a richer Member State. 
 The poorer country will generally face tighter fiscal constraints even in terms of 
financing a loan scheme for non-mobile students. 
 The problem is more acute for internationally mobile students, whose loan 
requirements will be higher (a) because studying abroad has extra costs even in two 
similar countries and (b) because costs will generally be higher in a richer country. 
 If the student then stays abroad (i.e. there is brain drain), the potential cost to the 
poorer country is generally larger if the poorer country has financed a large loan; and 
if there is a perceived (though not necessarily real) brain drain there could be political 
repercussions. 
 If the student returns to the poorer country, his earnings are likely to be low relative to 
earnings in the richer country, so that he might not be able to repay his loan fully. 
 
An EU loan scheme can avoid the worst of these problems. Implicit in the idea is a 
notion of cross-border solidarity, i.e. that the mobile graduates of richer Member States will 
generally subsidise those from poorer Member States. The extent of such redistribution 
involves balancing economic efficiency (e.g. the gains from mobility) and distributional 
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concerns, both of which give reasons for more redistribution, and political considerations, 
which point towards caution. 
 
CONCERNS. The issue of the brain drain was discussed in section 1.2.3 in the context of EU 
competitiveness. There are two sets of responses. First, as noted, the problem of brain drain 
can be exaggerated.  
 Much migration is temporary, including mobile students.  
 Emigrants, whether temporary or permanent, can be of particular benefit to their 
country of origin, with international experience and international networks.  
 Through remittances, emigration can yield an income flow to the sending country. 
 
A second response is to note that some policies raise inescapable conflicts of interest 
between Member States collectively (i.e. the EU) and individual Member States. Thus 
international mobility creates all the benefits discussed in section 1.2. From the viewpoint of 
an individual Member State, however, though there are generally gains, there are also 
losses, and it may be that the gains are less visible (and hence less politically helpful) than 
the losses. The conclusion is the mobility is beneficial and should be encouraged, but it is 
necessary also to take account of the particular position of individual Member States. 
 
A different concern is that student mobility could erode domestic higher education, if 
the best students study abroad, and particularly if they proceed to academic positions 
abroad. If an EU-wide loan scheme has that effect, again there is a potential conflict of 
interest between the EU as a whole and individual Member States. This observation need 
not be an argument against mobility, but suggests that policy makers might consider 
mechanisms to attract mobile students to return.33 
                                                 
 
33 As an example, Fulbright Scholars who study in the US receive the appropriate US visa. At the end of the 
course of study the visa can be extended by one year for practical experience. At that stage, at the latest, the 
visa is cancelled and the individual is not eligible for another visa for two years. This mechanism does not force 
the student to return to his home country, but certainly changes the likelihood that he will do so.  
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4. International experience  
 
This section summarises international experience. Section 4.1 reviews systems of student 
financial support in different countries, with particular emphasis on portability. Section 4.2 
sets out some of facts about mobility, and section 4.3 assesses the costs of mobility, given 
the lack of finance as a major barrier.  
 
The section has benefited extensively from interviews with a number of different 
stakeholders. Interviewees included representatives of international organisations, financial 
institutions and academia. The main contributions are summarised in Appendix 1, which sets 
out the supporting statements and concerns of the interviewees against the same set of 
categories (Target of mobility of 20%; Are loans the right tool to foster access and mobility?; 
Barriers to mobility; Grants versus loans (cost-sharing); Brain drain versus brain circulation; 
Cross-border solidarity; EU added value; Task-sharing between the EU and Member States; 
Income contingent repayments; Financing of the scheme; Default risk; Political problems, 
Conflicts of interests). Appendix 1 also includes a number of interesting ideas that emerged 
from the interviews, as well as the full list of interviewees. 
 
Additionally, section 4.1 has built on the forthcoming Cedefop study “The role of 
loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe”, especially section 4.1.1 
which offers a review of loan schemes across Europe. 
 
4.1. Review of student financial support – with special emphasis 
on portability  
 
4.1.1. Loans 
 
LOAN SYSTEMS. In the framework of the project “The role of loans in financing vocational 
education and training”, surveys of loan scheme managers have been carried out in 33 
countries – 27 EU Member States, plus EFTA/EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway) and 
candidate countries (Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, 
Iceland).34 Appendix 9 presents loan schemes that were reported by loan scheme 
managers at ISCED 5A-6 level in 33 selected countries. The results show that almost all 
European countries have at least one loan scheme for higher education (i.e. a scheme 
available for students at ISCED 5A-6 level). There are only three countries that do not have 
any loan schemes available: Czech Republic, Ireland and Romania (the latter, however, 
plans to introduce a loan scheme in 2011). However loan schemes are very different in 
terms of the number of borrowers. Some of them are marginal (e.g. in Austria, Bulgaria, 
France, private loans in the Netherlands, Poland, Professional and Career Development 
Loans in the UK), while others are large (e.g. in Finland, Hungary, public loans in the 
Netherlands, Sweden, student loans in the UK). This is most often related either to the use 
of student fees in the country (schemes are usually larger in countries where fees are 
applied) and / or the overall duration of the loan scheme (schemes are usually larger in 
countries where they are applied for a longer period). Unfortunately, information on the size 
                                                 
 
34 In the framework of the project “The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe” 
commissioned by Cedefop, the contractor – Public Policy and Management Institute – during the period of June – 
September 2010 has carried out two main surveys of loan scheme managers in 33 countries: Detailed survey of 
loan scheme managers in the eight selected countries (Austria, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and General Survey of loan scheme managers in the remaining 
countries.  
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of the loan schemes is not available for all countries. Information for some countries may be 
found in Appendix 12.  
LACK OF INFORMATION. Student loan schemes are not always transparent. Only a few 
provide detailed information on their websites about the loan conditions. Those countries 
that do provide detailed information include Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain (only 
for loans for postgraduate students in Catalonia) and the UK. Lack of information can be a 
substantial technical barrier for foreign students. Appendix 17 describes student loan 
schemes in light of this problem. 
 
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS. The tables include both wholly public schemes (e.g. in 
Sweden) and schemes financed from private sources (e.g. in Austria). They do not include 
all possible variations of private loan mechanisms. In fact, they concentrate mainly on loan 
schemes where the state has at least some role (e.g. it provides loans, loan guarantees, 
subsidises the interest rate, etc.). Thus some private schemes may not fully be reflected in 
the tables, though in terms of overall coverage the omission is small.  
 
ACCESS. Appendix 10 demonstrates that none of the 32 loan schemes are universal – 
schemes apply at least one eligibility or risk-assessment criteria. The most common criteria 
are related to nationality, residence and age requirements. About one-third of all schemes 
also check parental or learner income / assets and / or whether the applicant has any 
outstanding debts. Meanwhile approximately half of the schemes also apply other eligibility / 
risk-assessment criteria. For example, loans are sometimes only available for registered 
students enrolled in full-time studies, for programmes approved by authorities and / or those 
provided by accredited higher education institutions. Some schemes (e.g. the German loan, 
the maintenance loan component in the UK student loan scheme) have a means test. Most 
loan schemes do not require a certain academic standard, while some (e.g. Italian, public 
Dutch and Swedish loan schemes) have a merit-based component. 
 
LOAN AMOUNT. Loan amounts are highly correlated with the domestic living standards and 
costs. For example, in the newer Member States and Candidate Countries this amount is 
usually up to €300 per month (except Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia), while in the older EU 
Member States and EEA members it usually equals €300-€1,100 per month (except the 
French-speaking community in Belgium, Italy, the private loans in the Netherlands, Spain 
and Professional and Career Development loans in the UK, which provide smaller amounts 
and Iceland, which provides unlimited loans). See Appendix 12 for further details. 
 
INCOME-CONTINGENT OR MORTGAGE-TYPE REPAYMENT. Conventional (or traditional, 
mortgage-type) loan schemes for higher education are more widespread in Europe than 
income-contingent schemes or schemes with income-contingent elements. Only eight out of 
33 European countries (i.e. Belgium, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) have income-contingent educational loan schemes 
or schemes with income-contingent elements in place, while the conventional loans are 
present in 24 countries. The UK is the only country that has both types of loan schemes in 
which government plays at least some financial role. 
 
STATE SUBSIDY. Student loan schemes are heavily subsidised by the state. Appendix 13 
provides information on the types of state subsidies. It shows that governments usually 
provide a grace period, a subsidy to compensate for the costs of loan forgiveness, and an 
interest rate subsidy. The latter can be either universal, as in the UK, or targeted at certain 
groups, for example, borrowers who are caring for small children (Hungary) or graduates 
with low earnings (Finland). In some countries, individual loans are guaranteed by 
government (e.g. in France up to 70% of the principal is guaranteed by the state for 10 
years), or by the institution that manages the loan system (e.g. Hungary). In rare cases, 
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governments allow for tax deduction to be used in order to recover part of the payments 
made (Finland) or to subsidise savings by the borrower (Austria).  
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. The administrative costs of loans vary greatly, depending on factors 
such as the loan mechanism or whether it is government or retail banks providing the loans. 
The information on administrative costs in Europe is very limited. One way to compare the 
administrative costs of different loan schemes is to measure them as a percentage of total 
outstanding loans, although this statistic is only available for a few countries. Over the past 
three academic years, average administrative costs in Poland form 0.03% of total 
outstanding loans, in Hungary 1.3%, in Sweden 0.17% and in Finland (data only for 2009) 
0.2%.  
 
RECOVERY RATIOS. When evaluating the operation of some 70 student loan systems all over 
the world, Shen and Ziderman (2008) emphasise financial sustainability, and they identify 
three key measures: 
 Size of built-in subsidy (hidden grant) 
 Expected default losses 
 Administration costs 
 
They define the so-called recovery rate at the present value of estimated net repayment 
cash flow (that equals the scheduled cash-flow minus expected and minus administration 
costs) divided by the present value of the initiated loan. Recovery ratios for some European 
loan schemes are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Recovery rates in selected European countries 
Country Recovery ratios 
Hungary* 100 
Netherlands 98,45 
Finland 90,33 
Belgium - French-speaking 69,75 
Denmark 64,76 
Sweden 64,63 
Norway 56,61 
Estonia 47,76 
Germany 38,23 
Latvia 24,63 
 
Source: Shen and Ziderman (2008), p. 321 
* It is a core design feature of the Hungarian arrangements that the loan scheme is self-
sustaining.  
TAKE-UP RATES. As Appendix 16 suggests, loan take-up rates differ throughout the sample. 
In the case of Austria, although exact take-up rates are not known, these rates are very low; 
take-up in England and Wales was over 80% of eligible students. The other countries with 
younger loan systems (Hungary and Poland) had take-up rates of between 10% and 25%; 
the Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Finland) with longer-established schemes had 
take-up rates of between 40% and 50%.  
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PARTICIPATION. Section 3.1.4 argued that the major impediment to participation is lack of 
attainment in school. Although comparable data are nearly non-existent, this section 
attempts to cross-check information about the participation of disadvantaged learners. 
Primary evidence on the participation of different socio-economic groups shows that: 1) 
female learners usually make up a larger share (except the Netherlands), 2) the loans were 
mostly used to finance full-time studies and 3) loans are given to persons aged 34 and less. 
Very scarce primary evidence can be supported by previous studies. A recent study shows 
that on average, in nine EU15 countries, persons from working-class families were two 
times less represented among students than among the general population.35 For example, 
only 8% of all Dutch students come from ethnic minority backgrounds, and 9% from the 
lowest income quartile families.36 A comprehensive economic model and empirical 
research, carried out on Dutch students in 2005, also showed that risk aversion, predictably, 
is more notable among students from lower socio-economic backgrounds. However, the 
author predicted that low-income groups would be under-represented in high-cost study 
programmes even if they were compensated for the difference between high- and low-cost 
programmes and received grants. Enrolling in shorter, less expensive study programmes is 
often a risk-management choice of poor students.37 In addition, poorer students tend to 
work part-time in order to minimise their debt.38 The same study found that although 
students from low socio-economic backgrounds tend to be debt-averse39 (even if student 
loan repayments were favourable) and expect lower future earnings (and hence returns of 
their education) they often take loans out of necessity.40 For example, Dutch students with 
low debt-acceptance rate borrowed more than others, in order to make ends meet.41 It has 
been also documented that the participation of women and students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds grew in the Netherlands as loans were introduced.42 According to another 
study similar to the Dutch one, many of the former were nonetheless willing to borrow 
(although since the study is rather old, its findings should be taken with some 
reservations).43  
 
4.1.2. Grants 
 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT. Financial supports for students in tertiary education may take several 
forms, principally: grants, loans, exemption from and reduction of administrative and tuition 
fees, and financial support for parents through family allowances and tax relief. Grants can 
be dedicated to living costs, administrative fees, tuition fees44, and / or accommodation. 
Besides, in five countries grants are also available for young parents studying in HE, 
specifically: Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Slovakia and the UK (Scotland). 
 
GRANTS IN EUROPE. In order to help students to cover the cost of living, nearly all countries 
under discussion employ grants either alone or combined with loans – the only exceptions 
                                                 
 
35 Vossensteyn, (2009) p. 41. 
36 Vossensteyn, (2009) p. 41. 
37 Vossensteyn, (2005) p. 93-94. 
38 Vossensteyn, (2005), p. 95. 
39 Another example is the UK, where 48% students from the lowest socio-economic classes expressed concerns 
about borrowing, compared to 34% of students from higher social classes. See: (Debande. 2004) 161-190. 
40 Vossensteyn, (2005), p. 96, 162. 
41 Vossensteyn, (2005), p. 96. 
42 Guille, (2000) p. 12. 
43 Johnes, (1994.) 
44 In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Malta and the UK (Scotland), students do not have to 
contribute financially to tuition fees or administrative costs, provided that they managed to gain a state-subsidised 
place; therefore it follows logically that the grants are designed to go towards the cost of living or accommodation. 
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being Latvia (in the case of students without a subsidised place) and Iceland. Applying 
grants in the form of loan alleviations is not widely used: only two countries (Austria and 
Spain) award grants to help students to pay back their loan, while Luxembourg offers grants 
and loans in combination. 
 
MEANS-TESTING. In a concern for equity, grants can be means tested with respect to 
personal student income or parental income. In the case of undergraduate programmes, this 
condition for the award of support exists in all countries with the exception of Latvia (for 
students with subsidised places) and Malta. Grants are linked in two ways to income: first, 
the amount of the grant can be the negative function of income as it is in Belgium, France, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. The second possible 
formula involves a specific grant threshold, with grants awarded only to those below a 
specific income level, as they are in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania and 
Sweden. This income level may be very high, like in Sweden.45 
 
SIZE OF THE GRANTS. In many countries the size of a grant is determined by a decentralised 
authority. The grant / cost ratio varies widely even within a country: 0 to 20 (in the Flemish 
Community of Belgium), or 1 to 39 (in Germany). The nominal value of the grants can be 
very different too: in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic grants are less then €1,000 a year46, 
while in Austria and Luxembourg they can be as much as €7,000. Appendix 12 shows the 
minimum and maximum amount of grants in different countries. 
 
 
4.1.3. Portability 
 
PORTABILITY OF LOANS FOR NATIONAL CITIZENS STUDYING ABROAD. Loans for nationals who 
leave their country to study abroad are available in 26 out of the 32 countries surveyed (the 
exceptions being Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Turkey 
and the UK). There is a framework to provide loans for nationals studying abroad without 
limitations in seven schemes (that fact does not automatically imply that the loans are easily 
accessible and there are no de facto limitations). The remaining schemes have built-in 
restrictions, e.g. loans are given only for partial studies (Erasmus – Italy, France, Lithuania, 
Poland), studies of a particular length (Germany, Iceland), studies which cannot be 
undertaken in a country of residence (Belgium, Professional and Career Development loans 
in the UK), studies approved by national agencies (Denmark, Latvia, Norway, Portugal), 
studies corresponding to national curricula (Finland), etc. Finland is the only country that 
does not restrict its national loans to citizens, but also provides them for foreign nationals 
undertaking study programmes abroad. See Appendix 14 for more details. 
 
As discussed in section 1.3.2, national loan systems face two potential sets of problems: 
they may be inadequate even as national systems; and even where that is not the case, 
they are designed for non-mobile students, covering (part of) the costs of higher education 
in a given country, i.e. the size of the loan is related to domestic costs and income levels.  
 
AVAILABILITY OF NATIONAL LOANS FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS. Foreign students who study in 
European countries are less likely to get a loan. At first glance, Table 3 suggests that in 25 
out of the 32 loan schemes identified during the survey, foreign students are eligible for a 
loan. However, more detailed analysis shows that only schemes in Bulgaria and Denmark 
                                                 
 
45 Key Data on Higher Education in Europe, 2007 Edition. 
46 Converted by means of “Purchasing Power Parity”. 
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impose no restrictions on foreign citizens. The remaining loan schemes all impose technical 
barriers such as: (1) a residency requirement; (2) limitation of loans only to studies in 
national education institutions (e.g. Austria, Poland, Spain and the UK); or (3) a request for 
additional collateral (Portugal, Spain). Often these technical barriers are substantial, and 
limit participation of foreign students in a particular loan scheme. For example, to obtain a 
residence permit the person has to live and/or work in a country for a number of years, 
gather a number of documents and go through assorted processes. As a result, loans in 
these countries are taken mainly by foreign nationals who have been living in the country for 
some time, often for purposes other than studying. Thus, although portability of national 
loans for foreign students exists de jure, in practice it is limited if not impossible.  
Results of surveys of loan scheme managers suggest that portability of loans is 
limited mostly to citizens, while students who are foreign nationals are considerably 
less likely to get a loan. 
 
PORTABILITY OUTSIDE THE EU. Loans for non-EU and / or non-EFTA citizens are available in 
most of the loan schemes (in 22 out of 32). In six of the countries surveyed, loans for 
foreign nationals have residence requirements. Six EFTA and candidate countries (except 
for Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) provide loans for their citizens 
who undertake a study programme (or part of it) abroad.  
 
Table 2. Portability of loans across European countries* 
Countries Loan is available for foreign nationals coming to a country 
Loan is available for 
nationals studying 
abroad 
Austria Yes, but needs to have a permanent residence 
and use loan for training / education in Austria Yes, no limitations 
Belgium (French-
speaking 
community) 
Yes, but only for children of foreign nationals 
resident in the region if they learn / study in 
French 
Yes, if the course is in the 
French language and not 
available in the French 
community 
Bulgaria Yes, for EU citizens only No 
Croatia 
(Međimurje 
county) 
No Yes, no limitations 
Cyprus No 
Yes, for parents residing in 
country whose child(ren) 
study abroad 
Denmark Yes, no limitations Yes, but approval of school / university is required 
Estonia Yes, but only those with long-term residence 
permit or permanent right of residence  Yes, no limitations 
Finland 
Yes, but need to have a residence permit (which 
is given after four years of living in a country) and 
you live for a purpose other than studying 
Yes, but studies should 
correspond to Finnish 
studies or form a part of a 
Finnish degree programme 
France Yes, for EU/EEA citizens living in a country for 
five years 
Yes, but only for partial 
studies (e.g. Erasmus) 
FYROM No No 
Germany 
Yes, for EU nationals and non-EU citizens with 
certain residence permit – no minimum residence 
requirement; for others – five years’ residence (or 
three years’ parents residence) 
Yes, unlimited in EU, but 
maximum 1 year elsewhere 
Greece Yes, but there may be some restrictions applied 
by the bank  
Yes, but there may be some 
restrictions applied by the 
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Countries Loan is available for foreign nationals coming to a country 
Loan is available for 
nationals studying 
abroad 
bank 
Hungary Yes, for EU/EEA citizens with residence permit 
and living for a purpose other than studying Yes, no limitations 
Iceland No 
Yes, but there are limits to 
the size of loan for school 
fees and the number of 
years person can receive a 
loan 
Italy Yes, only residents of Italy, aged between 18-35 
and complying with the set merit criteria 
Yes, but only for partial 
studies (e.g. Erasmus) 
Latvia Yes, for EU and other citizens with valid 
residence permit 
Yes, but only for universities 
accredited in a foreign 
country 
Liechtenstein 
Yes, but only for persons with at least three 
years of uninterrupted residence or five years’ 
regular residence or having a parent with regular 
residence  
(five years’ residence during the last 10 years) 
Yes, but only if they have 
five years’ regular residence 
during last 10 years and do 
not receive support from 
country of their current 
residence 
Lithuania Yes, EU nationals or non-EU nationals with 
residence permit 
Yes, but only for partial 
studies (e.g. Erasmus) 
Luxembourg 
Yes, but only for those working in Luxembourg, 
family of a person working in Luxembourg, or 
resident in a country for five years 
Yes, no limitations 
Malta No 
Yes, only portable loans 
exist (they must be brought 
abroad or used for distance 
courses based abroad) 
Netherlands1 – 
public loan 
Yes, for EU/EEA/Switzerland living in a country 
for five years without interruption or, if the period 
is shorter, they (or they parent(s)) have to work 
minimum 32 hours per week. Citizens of other 
countries are eligible with certain residence 
permits. If person has a study permit then s/he is 
not eligible 
Yes, but only for registered 
full-time students in a 
country and for training / 
studies which are part of 
Dutch training/studies 
Netherlands2 – 
private loan Yes, but only if foreign nationals get public loan 
Yes, but only if learner / 
student continued receiving 
public loan 
Norway 
Yes, special quota for students from developing 
countries; EU/EEA/EFTA nationals are eligible if 
they reside for family reasons or if they were 
working two years continuously before starting an 
education 
Yes, but only for 
programmes approved by 
Norwegian Agency for 
Quality Assurance in 
Education) 
Poland - The 
student loan and 
credit scheme 
Yes, for EU nationals working / living or whose 
members of family work / live in Poland and who 
are studying in Polish HE institutions  
Yes, but only for registered 
students in a country and 
only for partial studies (e.g. 
Erasmus) 
Portugal Yes, no limitations, however additional collateral 
may be requested by banks 
Yes, but only in 
programmes approved by 
Portuguese Ministry of 
Higher Education 
Slovakia No Yes, no limitations 
Slovenia Yes, only residents of Slovenia Yes, no limitations 
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Countries Loan is available for foreign nationals coming to a country 
Loan is available for 
nationals studying 
abroad 
Spain (Catalonia) Yes, only for studies in Catalonia, additional 
collateral may be requested by banks 
Yes, only for Catalan 
residents 
Sweden 
Yes, for EU citizens (and equals) having 
residence permit or living or working in Sweden 
for two years or family members of Swedish 
citizens / residents and who did not come to 
Sweden for the purpose of studying. Other 
nationals with a residence permit are also eligible 
Yes, but for those who lived 
in a country for at least two 
years and for training / 
studies provided by 
institutions approved by 
authorities 
Turkey No No 
UK1 – UK student 
loan 
Yes, for EU nationals residing in a country for 3 
years and attending a full-time course at a UK 
university 
No 
UK2 – 
Professional and 
Career 
Development loan 
Yes, but foreigner has to be settled in the UK and 
have a residence permit 
Yes, but only if the course is 
not available in the UK 
‘Yes’ answers / 
all ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
answers 
25/32 26/32 
*In this table only the formal (de jure) conditions of loan portability are considered (survey 
did not examine how / if they are applied in practice (de facto).  
Source: Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop 
(forthcoming). The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
PORTABILITY OF GRANTS. Eurydice report (2009) found that most Member States had some 
mechanisms to support mobility, most notably in the form of grants or loans.47 
Unfortunately, Eurydice does not differ between financial support mechanisms; therefore we 
are not able to clearly separate them. Although national student support mechanisms 
(grants or loans) were portable, at least for certain types of programmes, in most countries 
(except Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Turkey), only five countries (the German-
speaking Community of Belgium, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) 
offered unconditional portability.  
 
GENERAL RESTRICTIONS ON PORTABILITY. Where portability is allowed, Member States applied 
various restrictions. The most common were linked to (a) the particular study programme (21 
countries), (b) the length of time abroad (19 countries), (c) student progress (18 countries), (d) the 
host country (15 countries), and (e) the host institution (14 countries). Generally, students stood a 
better chance for portability of their national student support if their study abroad was fully 
integrated into studies at home (e.g. part of a study programme, or providing a qualification 
lacking in the home country) or when a particular programme did not exist in their home country.48  
                                                 
 
47 Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency. P9 Eurydice. 2009. “Higher Education in Europe 2009: 
Developments in the Bologna Process.” Brussels, p. 51. Unfortunately, Eurydice does not differ between financial 
support mechanisms. Therefore we are not able to provide information on portability beyond that for loans. 
48 Eurydice, p. 55-56. 
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4.2. Facts on mobility  
 
NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION. National demographic structures influence the 
number of participates in education. Due to the decline in numbers of young people in the 
last decade the number of pupils and students has decreased by 5%. (This ratio is between 
15% and 25% in the EU.) There is a high level of education participation in the 3-19 age 
groups in all European countries. A comparison of participation rates for young people in 
the 3-19 and 3-29 age groups shows a sharp decline in enrolment (the average rates are 
92% and 64%).49Using data for ISCED 5-6 students for 2004-2007, projections were made 
to estimate numbers of students in 2010.  
 
Figure 2. Number of ISCED 5-6 students by countries (facts and estimations) 
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Source: Eurostat and authors’ estimates  
 
EDUCATION DURATION AND AGE DISTRIBUTION. The expected duration of education for a 5-
year-old child in Europe is more than 17 years. This can be used to predict the future 
enrolment patterns of higher education.50 In some countries the expected duration 
increased by more than one year during the last five years (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, 
Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia). The typical (median) age is 21.4 years for 
a student of ISCED 5-6. The share of older students has increased in most countries. The 
median age of Danish students is the highest: 25 years.51 
 
                                                 
 
49 EACEA P9 Eurydice, Key Data on Education in Europe 2009, p. 92. 
50 Data between 14 and 15 are misleading for Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta, because tertiary students studying 
abroad are not included but the majority of students in these countries study abroad. 
51 Source: Eurostat, Education indicators – non-finance (educ_itertp) Tertiary education participation 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/data/database 
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Figure 3. Expected duration of education at age 5 in Europe 
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Source: Eurostat  
 
PREDICTIONS OF STUDENT NUMBERS. In the longer run three factors will influence the overall 
number of students studying in the EU: 
• Demographic decrease of young people in the EU (-)52 
• Increasing participation rates in the HE (+) 
• In- / outflow of international students outside the EU (+/-) 
The first factor tends to decrease and is easy to forecast, the factor will probably increase 
according to the present trends, and the third factor is hard to foresee and is strongly 
related to the performance of the higher education industry in Europe. 
 
NUMBER OF MOBILE STUDENTS. At any given moment, students in higher education in the EU 
can be divided into two: (1) immobile students (studying in their home country) (2) mobile 
students (studying in another Member State). We have to recall here that mobile students 
are categorised as (1) Full-cycle (Bologna) students (studying abroad for a whole degree); 
and (2) Credit (Erasmus) students (studying abroad for a sorter period as part of an 
exchange programme during their home studies) – in section 2.3.3. Available statistical data 
on student mobility are often differentiated according to the duration of the study. Full-cycle 
students typically spend at least one year abroad, while Erasmus programmes last 5-6 
months. For the sake of simplicity we will identify full-cycle (Bologna) students as spending 
one year or more abroad while Credit (Erasmus) students as spending less than one year 
abroad. Figure 5 shows the basic categories and the corresponding student numbers in 
thousands for EU27 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Turkey (Eurostat 2010). 
 
                                                 
 
52 Turkey is an exception. 
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Figure 4. Number of mobile students 2007, EU+EFTA+candidates, in thousands 
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Source: the authors 
CREDIT-MOBILITY AND FULL-CYCLE MOBILITY PATTERNS. Credit-mobility balance is expected to 
be close to zero, while in the case of full-cycle mobile students, unbalanced flows are not 
limited by any mechanism. The participation of different countries in the two types of 
mobility is very different. Credit mobility ranges between 1%-2% with an average of 0.84%, 
and there are only four outliers with significantly higher mobility: Liechtenstein (6%), Greece 
(5%) and Malta (5%). Full-cycle mobility shows much more diversity with an average of 
2.48%. Cyprus is an extreme case, with a ratio of 97% (almost all the students learn in 
Greece), followed by Liechtenstein (28%), Iceland (21%), Ireland (15%) and Slovakia 
(11%). (Luxemburg is not plotted on the graph because 100% of the students study abroad 
as full-cycle mobile students, hence ratios cannot be calculated.) If we consider the sum of 
the two types of mobility, then the less mobile countries are the U.K (1.3%), Turkey (1.6%), 
Poland (2%), Hungary (2.2%) and Romania (2.3%). Approximately half of all mobile 
students in Europe go to the U.K or Germany to study. Figure 5 shows the sending 
countries in the space of their two mobility ratios (national students studying abroad / total 
number of students enrolled in the home HE). 
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Figure 5. Credit-mobility and full-cycle mobility ratios, EU27+EFTA+candidates 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
DIPLOMA MOBILITY IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. EU member countries can be classified into 
three groups according to their diploma-mobility ratio in the last decade. It is interesting to 
note that low income countries and high income countries are equally represented in each 
category, thus the income of the country does not seem to have explanatory effect on 
student mobility. (Eurostat 2010) 
1. Low mobility 
Ratio of mobile students below 2%: nine countries  
(CZ, HU, LV, PL and ES, IT, NL, SI, UK ) 
2. Average mobility 
Ratio of mobile students 2%-4%: 10 countries  
(EE, LT, RO and DE, FR, PT, BE, SE, DK, FI) 
3. High mobility 
Ratio of mobile students over 4%: eight countries.  
(BG, SK and AT, IE, EL, MT, CY, LU)  
 
CHANGES IN DIPLOMA MOBILITY. Figure 6 shows how mobility ratios evolved over time in 
different countries. Outliers (Cyprus and Luxembourg) were excluded from this analysis. 
Student mobility increased the most in Ireland, Slovakia, Poland and Latvia during 2002-
2006. It can be concluded that low-mobility countries show stability over time. High mobility 
countries can be much more volatile. 
 
Countries by mobility ratios
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 
Credit-type mobility
Full-cycle 
type mobility 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 52
Figure 6. Mobility ratios by countries 
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Source: Eurydice - Key Data on Education in Europe 2009, p. 120 
 
MOBILITY IN OLD AND NEW MEMBER STATES. We compared total mobility ratios of the old and 
new Member States in the period 2002-2006 and EU27,53 and we got the following results: 
• Surprisingly, there were no significant differences in mobility according to the t-test 
in the investigated period.  
• However, students from new EU member countries become slightly more mobile 
after the accession dates. In contrast, labour mobility from the new Member States 
declined after accession. See 2.3.3. / Labour mobility in the EU. 
 
Table 3. Percentage of all mobile students 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Mean (new Member States) 2.81 3.27 3.46 3.57 4.00 
Mean (old Members States) 3.52 3.16 3.31 3.24 3.84 
 
Source: Estimated by the authors 
 
CYCLES OF EDUCATION. The purpose of the Bologna Process (or Bologna Accords) is to 
create the European Higher Education Area by making academic degree standards and 
quality assurance standards more comparable and compatible throughout Europe. The 
cycles are defined in terms of qualification and European Credit Transfer and Accumulation 
System (ECTS) credits: 
• First cycle: typically 180-240 ECTS credits, usually awarding a bachelor degree  
• Second cycle: typically 90-120 ECTS credits, usually awarding a master’s degree 
• Third cycle: doctoral degree. No ECTS range is given 
In most cases, these will take three, two, and three years respectively to complete. Figure 7 
presents how cycles of education and ISCED classification relate to each other in a 
simplified model of the tertiary education after the Bologna process. The International 
                                                 
 
53 Eurydice, Key Data on Education in Europe 2009, p. 120. 
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Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) was designed by UNESCO in the early 1970s 
to serve as an instrument suitable for assembling, compiling and presenting statistics of 
education both within individual countries and internationally.  
 
Figure 7. A simplified model of tertiary education after the Bologna process  
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Source: the authors 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL. Figure 7 does not reflect the real world structures for several 
reasons: 
• In many cases bachelor and master’s cycles are not introduced to university curricula 
(e.g. in fields of medicine, art etc.). 
• In most countries the traditional systems also prevail for some years. 
• The duration of the cycles may vary by countries, by institutions and by students (not 
always 3+2+3 years). 
• There exist shorter term professional training programmes as well, which are part of 
the tertiary education. 
 
STUDENT NUMBERS. All available data on HE are categorised according to the ISCED 
classification. Tables 4a and 4b show the total number and the percentage of the students 
by ISCED levels in 2007. 
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Table 4a. Number of students by ISCED levels, EU27+EFTA+candidates, 2007 
 
Total number Diploma mobile students 
ISCED 5A 18,027 440 
ISCED 5B 3,200 59 
ISCED 6 541 36 
Total 21,769 534 
 
Table 4b. Percentage of students by ISCED levels, EU27+EFTA+candidates, 2007 
 
Total % Diploma mobile students% 
ISCED 5A 83% 82% 
ISCED 5B 15% 11% 
ISCED 6 2% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Eurostat 
 
LACK OF DATA. We could not find reliable information on the number of immobile / mobile 
students in bachelor, master’s and PhD programmes across the EU, and therefore had to 
estimate numbers (in EU27+EFTA+candidates countries) based on available information 
and some simplifying assumptions. Putting the elements together, Table 5 shows estimates 
of student numbers in different cycles. 
 
Table 5. Estimated student numbers by cycles of education, 2007 
Thousands of 
students 
Total
(Immobile+Mobile)
Immobile Mobile 
(Diploma+Credit) 
Diploma 
mobile
Credit 
mobile
Bachelor 16,721 16,189 531 389 142
Master’s 4,507 4,357 150 110 40
PhD 541 506 36 36 -
Total 21,769 21,052 717 534 183
Source: the authors 
 
ASSUMPTIONS. Table 5 is based on the following assumptions: 
• ISCED 5B is equivalent to bachelor programmes (and incorporate shorter term tertiary 
training), with an average duration of three years. 
• ISCED 6 is equivalent to PhD programmes, with an average duration of three years. 
• ISCED 5A refers partly to bachelor programmes (first three years) and partly to 
master’s programmes (the fourth and fifth years). 
• The number of master’s students was estimated as 50% of bachelors students who 
enrolled in an ISCED 5A programme (students in ISCED 5B programmes will not 
continue their studies after graduation). This simplifying assumption takes into 
consideration also the possible drop-outs during bachelors programmes. Since the 
Bologna process has not finished in many countries, retention and completion rates 
have not stabilised and are not readily available. However, retention is the critical factor 
when estimating students’ distribution across cycles. Our assumption of 50% was based 
on expert estimation. If more reliable factual data are available the calculations can be 
refined. 
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• For the sake of simplicity we excluded the possibility of drop-outs during a master’s 
programme, though it is known that there are some, albeit not significant numbers.  
• The relative weights of the different ISCED levels are the same in the Erasmus 
programme (except for PhD students). 
 
Student mobility can be measured by at least two different methods. Let us define the 
following measures: 
1. “Year-based mobility measure”: the ratio of the mobile students’ number to the total 
student number within a year.  
2. “Degree-based mobility measure”: the ratio of graduates with international 
experience during their previous studies. 
It is easy to see that the two measures are not the same. The latter always gives higher 
numbers because degrees typically last more than one year. For example, in 2007 the 
overall year-based mobility measure was 717 / 21,769 = 3.3%, while the corresponding 
overall degree-based mobility measure was around 5.1%. The next table shows the degree-
based mobility measures in more detail. 
 
Table 6. Degree-based mobility measures, in 2007  
Graduates (%) Credit  Diploma Credit+Diploma 
Bachelor 1.7% 2.3% 4.0% 
Master’s 3.5% 4.8% 8.2% 
PhD - 13.7% 13.7% 
Total 2.1% 3.6% 5.1% 
Source: the authors 
 
When estimating the degree-based mobility measures in Table 6 we supposed that  
• Credit-mobility is only possible in the 2nd and 3rd year of the bachelor 
programme and in the 1st and 2nd year of the master’s programme. 
• Students participate only once in a credit-mobility programme (Erasmus) during 
their studies. 
• Mobility experience during the bachelor programme is independent of the 
adherence to the master’s programme, and the same is true for the PhD 
programmes. 
• Graduates of the master’s programmes might have mobility experience during 
the bachelor programme and the same is true for the PhD programme. 
• Full-cycle mobile student stay abroad for the whole programme. 
 
THE TARGET OF 20% MOBILE STUDENTS. Ministers of Education in the EU set a degree-based 
mobility target in 2010: “In 2020, at least 20% of those graduating in the European Higher 
Education Area should have had a study or training period abroad.”  
Let us suppose that the total number of the students and the relative weights of bachelor-
master’s-PhD programmes and the relative weights of credit / diploma mobility remain the 
same, and the only change will be that some immobile students become mobile. The 
number of mobile students in a year will therefore be X times more. Calculations show that in 
order to achieve the 20% target of the policy makers, X should be 3.89 – see the next table.  
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Table 7. Actual mobility and target mobility 
  
2007 
(actual)
2020
(target)
Year-based mobility 3.30% 12.80%
Degree-based mobility 5.10% 20.0%
Source: the authors 
 
Tables 8 and 9 show these numbers in more detail. 
Table 8. Degree-based mobility measures corresponding to the 20% target for 2020 
Graduates (%) Credit Diploma Credit+Diploma  
Bachelor 6.6% 9.0% 15.7% 
Master’s 13.5% 18.5% 32.1% 
PhD - 53.5% 53.5% 
Total 8.1% 14.0% 20.0% 
Source: the authors 
Table 9. Number of new mobile students per year corresponding to the 20% target for 2020 
Thousands Credit Diploma Credit+Diploma  
Bachelor      410     1,124     1,535  
Master’s      116      318      434  
PhD       -      104      104  
Total      526     1,546     2,072  
Source: the authors 
 
CONCLUSION. If the target of 20% mobile students is to be met, the total number of students 
studying abroad needs to be almost four times higher in 2020 than in 2007, i.e. slightly more 
than two million students per year must become mobile. 
FINANCING INCREASING MOBILITY. Let us make the following suppositions about financing 
policies: 
• The financing needs of all kinds of credit mobility (526,000 new mobile students per 
year) will be covered by increasing grants and from the national student loans, which can 
be made portable for this purpose. 
• Diploma mobility at bachelor and PhD-level (1,124,000 and 104,000 new mobile 
students per year respectively) will be financed from grants, from student earnings, from 
family support and from other sources. 
• Diploma mobility at the master’s level (318,000 new mobile students per year) will be 
financed from the EU-level student loan scheme. For justification, see section 5.1. 
 
THE NUMBER OF BORROWERS. If we suppose that the composition of mobile students in 2007 
remains broadly unchanged, i.e. mobility increases proportionally in all the segments, and 
the EU-level student loan scheme focuses only on the credit-mobile master’s students, the 
outcome is approximately 318,000 potential new borrowers per year. 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE CALCULATIONS. Given the simplifying assumptions, the major limitations 
are: 
• The introduction of the new policy may alter the relative size of the different types of 
mobility. For example, if a student lending facility is available only for diploma-type 
master’s students, this type of mobility may grow faster. 
• The estimation of the actual number of mobile students may be biased.  
• Student numbers in 2007 reflect a transition towards the Bologna system, so that the 
relative number of master’s students may be slightly underestimated. 
• Take-up rates depend on many factors and are difficult to estimate. We estimated the 
number of new mobile students needed to achieve the policy target of 20% for 2020. If 
that target is too ambitious, our estimates are correspondingly too large. 
 
4.3. Costs of mobility  
 
4.3.1. Student surveys  
 
EUROSTUDENT SURVEY (2008). The latest available results of the Eurostudent survey show 
that one of the most important obstacles to student mobility is the differences in students’ 
purchasing power across Europe – it is considerably lower in the eastern and southern 
parts of Europe.54 Students from countries with high national income (e.g. Finland, Sweden 
and the UK) have much greater choice than students from low-income countries (e.g. most 
of newer EU Member States).55 Although, in many cases, the share of state support for 
mobile students is considerably higher than that for the average national student.56  
 
ESU STUDY (2010). A study by the European Students’ Union called portability of student 
grants and loans “the only concrete ministerial commitment in the field of financing mobility”. 
According to the study, the countries where almost none of the mobile students faced 
problems meeting their living expenses from their grant or loan were Norway, Sweden and 
Hungary. Few students from Finland and Luxembourg reported having problems in meeting 
their living expenses from their grant or loan while abroad. However, many students 
reported such problems in Estonia, Ireland, Poland and Portugal57. As many as 59% of 
students surveyed reported dissatisfaction with available financing for mobility.58 Financial 
problems are aggravated in case of Bologna students. Student representatives suggest 
creating an EU-wide mobility fund rather than a loan scheme, since “uneven distribution of 
students across socio-economic backgrounds and insecurity about the returns of education 
within an unfamiliar educational system may make students even more risk-averse”59. 
Survey results show that (1) financial insecurity (57% of surveyed students stated this 
reason); and (2) insufficient support for mobility in home country (48%) were considered the 
major obstacles to participating in international mobility. Therefore, full-time or part-time jobs 
appear to be the only possibility for students in these countries to overcome income 
differentials and to remain mobile. The report also underlines the extent to which a 
reduction in income disparity is a major issue for achieving equal opportunities in mobility. 
                                                 
 
54 “Social and Economic Conditions of Student Life in Europe: Synopsis of indicators / Final report of Eurostudent 
III 2005–2008”, (2008), p. 148. 
55 “Social and Economic Conditions of Student Life in Europe: Synopsis of indicators / Final report of Eurostudent 
III 2005–2008”, p. 148.  
56 “Social and Economic Conditions of Student Life in Europe: Synopsis of indicators / Final report of Eurostudent 
III 2005–2008”, p. 147. 
57 “Bologna at the finish line: An account of ten years of European higher education reform.” (2010), p. 17. 
58 Cradden, (2008), p. 18. 
59 “Bologna at the finish line: An account of ten years of European higher education reform” (2010), p. 18. 
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As most of the mobility flows in Europe are from low-income to high-income countries60 the 
necessity of overcoming this substantial obstacle is quite clear.  
 
Costs and supports of mobility are different by countries, by cycle of education (bachelor or 
master’s), by institutions (public / private) and by mobility programmes (credit type / diploma 
type) as well. A typical Erasmus study abroad lasts one semester. The only cost is the living 
and the travel, because tuition fees are dismissed. Grants are not sufficient to cover all the 
costs but the remainder (€1,000-€2,000 per semester) is quite low, therefore it could be 
easily financed from national student loans. No EU intervention would be needed for this 
purpose. See Appendix 20 for more detail on the Erasmus costs and supports.  
 
In line with our basic concept (section 5.1.2), we next calculate the average financing needs 
of master’s study abroad. 
 
4.3.2 Estimation of the input data 
 
FINANCING NEEDS OF MOBILITY. The financing needs can be defined as the difference of the 
following cost and support elements: 
 Tuition fee 
 Living costs 
 Other costs (books, insurance etc.) 
 Travel costs 
 Grants 
 Loans 
Parental supports, tax advantages and social benefits will be excluded from the analysis. 
 
ESTIMATION OF THE INPUT DATA. We collected data from surveys, published papers and 
databases (Eurostat, Eurodyce). Many problems were encountered and solved by 
simplification, for example: 
• Data is related to different years. 
• Definitions are different study by study; we have addressed this where possible. 
• Some data were not available and thus needed to be estimated. 
• Where we found contradicting data we chose the most relevant ones. 
• Costs and supports may vary over a wide range within a country, depending on 
universities, programmes and individuals. We estimated the typical value (mode). 
In the event that more information become available, input data can be completed or 
modified. 
 
INPUT DATA. We used our rough estimates in Table 10, below.  
 
Table 10. Estimated costs and supports per annum of master’s study abroad 
 
Euro per year 
per student 
Tuition fee 
 
Other costs Travel cost Living cost Grants 
 
Loans
Austria 1,000 527 700 6,000 7,000 5,000
Belgium 700 675 443 6,750 4,000 1,200
Bulgaria 60 244 607 4,331 150 1,200
Cyprus 3,000 166 727 4,554 2,500 5,000
                                                 
 
60 “Social and Economic Conditions of Student Life in Europe: Synopsis of indicators / Final report of Eurostudent 
III 2005–2008”, p. 149.  
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Czech Rep. 0 219 507 3,161 650 0
Denmark 0 675 464 6,805 7,000 3,500
Estonia 1,000 128 529 3,870 1,600 1,900
Finland 0 675 514 6,315 6,000 2,500
France 0 1,120 550 6,576 7,400 15,000
Germany 1,000 400 329 6,250 4,500 4,500
Greece 0 166 700 5,643 0 0
Hungary 700 244 764 5,793 0 1,700
Ireland 0 675 443 8,591 3,300 0
Italy 800 166 443 6,526 0 10,000
Latvia 2,900 21 550 4,500 2,100 1,800
Lithuania 3,400 58 764 3,453 1,300 2,000
Luxembourg 200 675 693 7,037 8,100 8,000
Malta 0 166 507 4,797 1,100 5,800
Netherlands 1,538 800 507 6,840 5,000 4,200
Poland 0 123 557 3,470 0 1,400
Portugal 500 371 668 5,397 5,000 5,000
Romania 400 215 693 4,084 0 0
Slovakia 0 166 686 3,150 380 1,400
Slovenia 600 166 586 4,107 3,000 5,000
Spain 800 675 514 6,060 0 6,000
Sweden 0 657 364 6,993 2,500 5,000
U.K. 3,600 382 700 8,623 2,900 10,800
Iceland 2,200 166 514 8,811 2,000 4,000
Liechtenstein 3,000 675 450 7,037 10,000 10,000
Norway 0 839 582 8,640 3,900 10,000
Turkey 100 272 764 4,577 700 2,000
Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
EXCHANGE RATE CORRECTION. Eurydice and Eurostat data were reported in PPS (purchase 
parity standards) EUR. To quantify the real financial cost of mobility these data have to be 
converted simply by nominal euro exchange rates. We made the necessary corrections. 
Exchange rates were from the European Central Bank’s homepage. 
 
TUITION FEES. The estimation reflects typical values of tuition fees. Tuition fees at private 
universities can be much higher. In some countries (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, etc.) 
there are no tuition fees for a determined part of students, because they are fully state 
funded. The other students have to pay tuition fees. Because EU students are less likely to 
get a state-financed position, we applied a modest value of not-state-funded fees in these 
cases. Data are derived from country studies by Johnstone (2010), complemented where 
necessary with data from the Eurydice report on tuition fees in Europe (Eurydice 2007). See 
Appendix 18 for more details on the estimation of the tuition fees. 
 
OTHER COSTS. Other costs represent book expenses, social insurance (in France) and 
some registration fees based on Johnstone (2010). Missing data were estimated as 
country-group averages. We divided the countries into three groups according to their per 
capita GDP: (1) high income (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, Liechtenstein, Norway), (2) 
medium income (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Iceland, Croatia), and (3) low income 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). 
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LIVING COSTS. Moderate living costs were calculated from a foreign student’s point of view. 
In larger cities, this makes the assumption that students will live in dormitory or other low-
budget accommodation. The calculation is based on the paper of Carbonell (2007), who 
made a survey of Erasmus students’ living costs. 
 
TRAVEL COSTS. Travel costs are identified as the price of two one-way tickets between the 
two capitals. Prices were downloaded from the internet. A matrix was set up containing the 
price of a one-way ticket between the investigated countries at the end of August 2010. We 
determined the travel cost belonging to a particular country and doubled it. The highest 
travel costs relate to Turkey, Greece, and Lithuania. This calculation clearly over-estimates 
the direct cost of an air flight but it can, in addition, assist students to cover other 
transactional costs. 
 
GRANTS. Because of the variety of grants and the complexity of eligibility rules, it is clearly 
not possible for every student to be awarded the entire grant that is potentially available. 
Grants to cover living costs are usually means tested, while grants to cover tuition-fees are 
related to the size of the fees. Since we had no information on the probability of receiving a 
grant, we introduced modest amounts. However, it is still possible that our calculation over-
estimates the size and the impact of student grants. Data sources are (1) key data on 
Higher Education 2007 (Eurydice, EACEA 2008), and (2) homepages of national institutes. 
Erasmus supports and some specific grant are not considered; our estimation focused only 
on the general mobility supports. Eurydice, EACEA (2008) provides more information on the 
grant systems in Europe. 
 
LOANS. Our estimations are around the highest value of student loan allowance in the given 
country. Usually, all mobile students are eligible for the loan, and they have the right to take 
the maximum amount. However, in some cases we found several schemes, e.g. in 
Germany, where eligibility rules and loan allowances vary by region. Data are taken from 
the PPMI survey, Eurydice, EACEA, Kefala (2006), and websites of national institutes. 
 
4.3.3. Calculations 
 
FINANCING OF MOBILE STUDENTS. For each country we have calculated the total costs and 
the total support costs. See Table 11. On the left-hand side, countries are ranked by the 
total cost of studying, while on the right-hand side countries are ranked by the total support 
that is available to students.  
 
UNDER-FINANCING. Accordingly, thus, the least affordable pairs can be seen at the top of the 
table (and the easiest at the bottom). For example if students of Greece, Romania, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary Slovakia, Turkey etc. wish to study in the U.K. or in the 
Netherlands, for example, it would not be possible for them to finance their studies through 
utilisation of their own resources, even were all student supports of the home country to be 
fully portable. In contrast to this, we show in section 2.3.2. that financial supports are not 
available for foreign students in most of the countries due to legislation and /or financial 
barriers. It can be concluded that mobility relations are seriously limited by the scarcity of 
financial resources even when home supports are totally portable. 
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Table 11. Total costs versus total supports per annum of a master’s study abroad, in euro 
 
TO Total costs
Total 
supports FROM
UK  13,082 0 Greece 
Ireland  11,118 0 Romania 
Italy  10,609 650 Czech Rep.
Spain  7,189 1,350 Bulgaria 
Poland  6,680 1,400 Poland 
Lithuania  5,822 1,700 Hungary 
Germany  5,729 1,780 Slovakia 
Latvia  5,571 2,700 Turkey 
Liechtenstein  4,125 2,900 UK 
Iceland  2,880 3,300 Ireland 
Netherlands  2,845 3,300 Lithuania 
Portugal  2,539 3,500 Estonia 
Slovenia  2,252 3,900 Latvia 
Austria  2,227 5,200 Belgium 
Belgium  1,818 6,000 Spain 
Hungary  1,708 6,000 Iceland 
France  1,670 6,900 Malta 
Estonia  1,657 7,500 Cyprus 
Romania  1,608 7,500 Sweden 
Luxembourg  1,568 8,000 Slovenia 
Norway  1,421 8,500 Finland 
Finland  1,189 9,000 Germany 
Denmark  1,139 9,200 Netherlands 
Turkey  1,136 10,000 Italy 
Sweden  1,021 10,000 Portugal 
Bulgaria  911 10,500 Denmark 
Cyprus  893 12,000 Austria 
Greece  866 13,900 Norway 
Slovakia  852 16,100 Luxembourg 
Czech Rep. 726 20,000 Liechtenstein 
Malta  673 22,400 France 
 
Source: the authors 
 
OVER-BORROWING. Box 3 shows that even if total portability were ensured by EU regulation, 
the problem of financing would not be solved. Let us take the metaphor of a Bulgarian 
studying in the UK with access to a British loan and returning to home. 
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Box 5: Example: The case of over-borrowing 
Bulgarian students are typically very mobile, often choosing to study abroad. The UK is one 
of their favourite destinations. Once admitted to a British university for a bachelor degree, 
they become entitled to a UK fees loan, currently around £3,500 per year). Assume that 
most of them return to Bulgaria. Thus far, everyone has benefited, including the Bulgarian 
students, British universities and Bulgarian society.  
This would be a triumph of a common European higher education policy.  
What about loan repayments? UK student loans have income-contingent repayments 
where income exceeds a threshold of £15,000. This income threshold applies only to people 
working in the UK, and may vary by country. But whatever the threshold, if Bulgarian 
incomes fail to catch up with British ones quickly, it will be difficult to repay the loan. This 
may not disturb Bulgarians, since any debt that has not been repaid after 25 years is 
forgiven, and the repayment rate is only 9% of income. An annual salary of BGN6,000 – 
approximately £2,500 – is regarded as very good in Bulgaria, so full repayment is unlikely, 
even though the UK loan charges a zero real interest rate.  
To put the scale of the required repayment in context, a Bulgarian with a UK fees 
loan for three years accrues a debt of around £10,000, equivalent to roughly four years’ 
average salary. A student from the UK who borrows a fees and maintenance loan for three 
years, accrues a debt of up to £25,000, roughly equal to the UK national average annual 
salary.  
The Bulgarian example may well stand in for case studies from Romania, Hungary, 
Poland, etc. An EU-level student loan scheme for mobility can address this problem rather 
better than a UK loan designed for British students. 
 
It follows from this example that student mobility cannot be supported within the framework 
of national student loan schemes, even if they are fully portable. A holistic, EU-level strategy 
is needed in order to avoid extreme scenarios of insufficient financing and over-borrowing. 
FINANCING NEEDS PER MOBILE STUDENT. It can be concluded from the above table that 
€10,000-€12,000 per year per student is in many cases a significant contribution. This 
could be the basic amount to use when tailoring an effective mobility loan scheme. Grants 
and national loans cannot be expected to increase either in size or in number. If mobility 
increases (and this is the policy aim), grants and national loans will not be able to keep up. 
 
FINANCING NEEDS FOR NON-MOBILE STUDENTS. Input data can be also used for calculation of 
the funds still lacking from the home higher education sector. It is necessary to compare 
total costs and supports at a country level (the only difference is that it is not necessary to 
add in travel costs). A significant amount of funding is also still lacking from the national 
higher education sector for non-mobile students. Cost-sharing issues are expected to arise 
in many countries. 
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5. An EU loan scheme: Design 
 
A well-designed loan scheme has two main attributes. It is:  
- attractive for the borrowers  
- financially sustainable 
Meeting these conditions makes political, legal and technical solutions easier to find. We 
know from the literature and from international practice61 that attractiveness can be improved 
by high subsidies, flexible loan conditions and effective communication and public relations 
strategies. Financial sustainability requires low subsidies, flexible conditions and efficient 
administration, collection mechanisms and finance. See Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Core characteristics of a well-designed student loan scheme 
 
 Loan Conditions Management Model 
Attractiveness  
to borrowers 
High subsidy Adapts flexibly to borrower’s 
circumstances 
Effective communication and public 
relations 
Financial 
sustainability 
Low subsidy Adapts flexibly to borrower’s 
circumstances 
Efficient administration, collection 
mechanism and finance 
 
The introduction of higher subsidies is double-edged: it has a positive effect on 
attractiveness but jeopardises financial sustainability. Thus subsidies are controversial and 
need to be handled carefully. Fortunately, other aspects of design and implementation of an 
EU-level loan scheme are more straightforward, notably the other loan conditions and the 
management model. 
 
This section concentrates on the design of the loan (i.e. the product) and less on the 
management model (i.e. the institution), which is discussed in Section 6, since we believe 
that the logical way to proceed is to: 
1) Establish the loan design which best serves the long term objectives of the EU 
2) Find the institutional architecture which best supports this product 
 
This section sets out the concept of an EU student loan system (section 5.1), 
discusses different repayment models (section 5.2), considers broader aspects of loan 
design (section 5.3), and concludes with three options for the design of an EU student loan 
which we regard as feasible and desirable, and which offer an upgrade path over the 
medium term.  
 
5.1 The concept 
 
5.1.1 Requirements 
 
We consider the following basic requirements when formulating the concept: 
 Efficiency has two aspects: (a) allocative efficiency (the right level of resources 
devoted to student loans and the right division of loans between different types of 
degree and level of student); and (b) productive efficiency (running the institutions as 
well as possible). This concept is the best reflected in low default rates and low 
administrative costs. 
                                                 
 
61 See for example the results of the CEDEFOP project.*** 
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 Effectiveness/impact indicates the extent to which a specific policy objective (i.e. the 
improvement of the higher education sector) is expected to be achieved during or 
after the policy intervention. Effectiveness relates to short-term effects: the number of 
borrowers and the size of the loan (more precisely the loan-to-costs ratio), while 
impact refers to longer-term effects that are difficult to measure, notably the effect on 
social welfare.  
 Fairness requires that the loan should be accessible for students irrespective of their 
nationality within the EU, socio-economic status, profession, etc.  
 Sustainability requires that the loan is robust in the face of economic turbulence, and 
is politically sustainable. A stable, long-term institution is necessary to assist 
investment in human capital. In order to avoid serious conflicts of interests with the 
Member States, brain circulation is preferable to brain drain. The relationship with 
national student loan schemes and other stakeholders should also be well arranged.  
The efficiency requirement corresponds to the general optimization idea of not wasting the 
resources. It is notable that the last three requirements (effectiveness, equity and 
sustainability) harmonise well with the strategic objectives of the EU: smart, inclusive and 
sustainable growth. 
 
However, these requirements are hard to measure, they can conflict with each other, 
and the trade-offs are difficult to assess. The optimal solution depends on the relative weight 
policy makers give to each objective, and the choice of weight is based on political 
considerations and value judgements. 
 
5.1.2 Basic principles of the European student loan system 
 
The analysis is based on a series of principles. 
 
KISS + EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY. Initially keep the system as simple as possible, but with an 
upgrade path. Thus it is best to start with a simple model that is financially, politically and 
administratively robust, but constructed so as to evolve into more wide-ranging and 
ambitious schemes in time. 
 
ONLY MOBILE STUDENTS IN THE EU27. Only mobile students of the EU studying in the EU are 
eligible for the loan. According to the principle of subsidiarity, non-mobile students should 
rely on national loan schemes. There is no aim of making all students mobile – the official 
target is 20% by 2020. Thus the aim is that 20% of students should be mobile, ideally the 
most open-minded and risk-taking students, who show good academic performance and 
have the best career prospects. 
 
INITIALLY ONLY MASTER’S PROGRAMMES WITH LIMITED SIZE OF LOAN. Initially the loan is 
available only for students in master’s programmes, and is limited to a maximum of €10,000-
€12,000, which can be taken over one or two years. Any master’s student is eligible for the 
loan when studying abroad. The reasons for this arrangement include:  
 To keep numbers small, which helps to test administration. 
 To keep the total loan per borrower small, which helps to keep the scheme financially 
manageable. 
 Master’s programmes are expected to have a lower brain-drain effect than bachelor 
degrees and PhD programmes.  
 Financial returns for master’s degrees are high. The increase in earnings is higher 
than for bachelor degrees or PhDs. Social benefits are also high (knowledge transfer, 
cohesion etc.). See Appendix 21. 
 Master’s programmes are efficient human investments.  
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BOTH LIVING COSTS AND TUITION FEES should be covered. Ideally coverage should be 100% of 
the costs of a degree, but initially it should at least be enough to make a significant 
contribution. The goal that the loan should be financially sustainable has to take priority over 
the goal that the loan should cover all the costs of a degree. Calculations in Section 4 
suggest that a loan of €10,000 per student provides a significant contribution to a master’s 
programme, while still being financially manageable for graduates working in lower-income 
Member States. Once the loan scheme has been introduced, the loan amount can be 
increased carefully depending on economic conditions. 
 
5.2 Repayment models: mapping the terrain 
 
Table 12 shows that loan conditions play a crucial role because they must be attractive for 
students while also assisting financial sustainability. Some loan conditions belong to the 
disbursement (eligibility, size of loan, etc.), others to repayment. This section discusses the 
menu of theoretical repayment options. Section 5.3 considers broader aspects of loan 
design, including disbursement conditions and the question of subsidies. 
 
When designing the loan contract it is essential for at least two reasons to ensure 
that the repayment of the loan adjusts flexibly to the graduate’s ability to pay:  
 
1) It makes the loan more attractive to students by reducing the amount of risk they 
face, thus reducing debt aversion 
 
2) It makes the loan system more sustainable in financial terms by reducing the 
frequency of defaults significantly 
 
Any student loan scheme faces three fundamental and unalterable constraints: 
 There is no physical collateral, unlike with home loans. 
 There is considerable risk and uncertainty about future personal incomes. See 
Appendix 21.  
 There are wide differences in income across the EU. Table 13 shows that the highest 
median income (in Luxembourg) is more than 10 times that in the lowest (Bulgaria). 
 
Table 13. Group of countries by median net income per year (EUR) of highly educated 
employees, 2008 
 
Group 1 
Median 
income Group 2
Median 
income Group 3 
Median 
income
Luxembourg 44,320 Italy 23,772 Czech Republic 8,296
Iceland 40,145 Belgium 23,600 Latvia 7,266
Norway 38,588 Cyprus 23,204 Estonia 7,079
Ireland 33,510 France 23,117 Poland 6,705
UK 30,300 Germany 22,650 Hungary 6,262
Denmark 29,227 Spain 18,667 Slovakia 6,153
Finland 25,309 Portugal 17,595 Lithuania 6,150
Netherlands 25,232 Greece 17,207 Romania 4,326
Sweden 24,171 Slovenia 15,497 Bulgaria 3,049
Austria 24,127 Malta 14,791    
Average 31,493 Average 20,010 Average 6,143
Source: Eurostat 2010 
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As illustrated in Appendix 21, tertiary education is a high-risk / high-return 
investment, both for the individuals and for the community. In addressing the default risk due 
to these constraints, the design of student loans lies on a continuum between two polar 
cases: 
 
Repayment in fixed instalments      Income-contingent repayments  
 
Moving along this continuum from fixed towards income contingent: 
 the default rate decreases, and  
 access increases, but  
 there is an increase in administrative demands 
 
The basic problem is how to create a reliable safeguard for low-income 
borrowers while at the same time keeping administration simple. 
 
Repayment rules can be ranked by the extent to which they adapt to the borrower’s 
ability to pay: 
 Fixed monthly repayments are not adapted to the borrower’s income. This is the 
simplest and the most widespread form of repayment, but a typical bank loan is of 
fairly short duration and is collateralised (for example by a mortgage), thus reducing 
the risk faced by lenders and borrowers. 
 It is also possible to agree on fixed but increasing instalments, so as to diminish the 
repayment burden in the first years. 
 With an indexed loan, instalments can change according to a predefined reference 
variable such as average incomes in a country. This type of contract makes it 
possible to adjust the repayments to the ability to pay of an average borrower, even 
during a recession. See for example Modigliani (1976). 
 With a delayed income-contingent loan repayments depend on the borrower’s 
income in his or her last tax return, thus typically with a two-year lag as, for example 
in the Dutch and the Hungarian student loan schemes. The lag of two years can 
cause problems in periods of recession. 
 In a fully income-contingent loan scheme, repayments depend on the person’s 
current income, and take the form of a payroll deduction, similarly to personal income 
tax and social insurance contributions. This is the case in the British, Australian and 
New Zealand schemes, and in the former Swedish one. 
 A final element of flexibility is to allow voluntary early repayments. These also help to 
adjust repayments to the borrower’s actual circumstances in ways that may not have 
been reflected in the tax return. 
 
The conclusion is that there is a continuum of mechanisms between pure mortgage 
loans and pure income-contingent loans, as discussed more fully in the examples below.  
 
 
 
Model 1a A pure mortgage loan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
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This is the simplest possible case. 
 
The model: 
 The loan has fixed monthly repayments that can change from year to year depending 
on the interest rate. To ensure that repayments are affordable they have to be low 
(e.g. repayable by someone with typical earnings in a country like Bulgaria); to 
ensure that the loan is reasonably large, the duration of repayment needs to be long, 
e.g. 40 years. The first part of Table 14 shows yearly repayment according to the size 
of the loan (between €10,000 and €20,000) and the maturity of the loan (20, 30 and 
40 years) assuming that the interest rate is 5% over the entire repayment period. 
Table 14 shows the results for a graduate with the median income of highly educated 
employees in Bulgaria (€3,049 per year, which is approximately half the European 
average). 
 
Table 14. Annual repayments in a fixed mortgage-type scheme in euro, and the ratio to 
the Bulgarian median income for highly educated employees 
 
DEBT  20 years 30 years 40 years DEBT 20 years 30 years 40 years
10,000 802 651 583 10,000 26% 21% 19%
12,000 963 781 699 12,000 32% 26% 23%
14,000 1,123 911 816 14,000 37% 30% 27%
16,000 1,284 1,041 932 16,000 42% 34% 31%
18,000 1,444 1,171 1,049 18,000 47% 38% 34%
20,000 1,605 1,301 1,166 20,000 53% 43% 38%
Source: the authors 
 
 It is also possible that monthly repayments rise each year in line with a variable such 
as average or median earnings in a country. Supposing that income growth rate 
equals the interest rate (the so-called “golden growth”), the results in the indexed 
repayment model are much more favourable, as shown in Table 15. 
 
Table 15. Annual repayments in an indexed mortgage type scheme in euro and the ratio 
to the Bulgarian median income for highly educated employees 
 
DEBT  20 years 30 years 40 years   DEBT 20 years 30 years 40 years
10,000 500 333 250 10,000 16% 11% 8%
12,000 600 400 300 12,000 20% 13% 10%
14,000 700 467 350 14,000 23% 15% 11%
16,000 800 533 400 16,000 26% 17% 13%
18,000 900 600 450 18,000 30% 20% 15%
20,000 1,000 667 500  20,000 33% 22% 16%
Source: by the authors 
 
 It is noticeable that even this simple mortgage-type scheme may have two income-
contingent elements: 
 The level of repayment changes in line with an aggregate income category 
 Early repayment option can be allowed 
 
Advantage: on the face of it, this model makes the fewest administrative demands. 
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Disadvantages 
 For borrowers working in low-income countries, the maximum loan is constrained to 
€10,000-€12 000, even where the time horizon is long and repayments are indexed 
to average income growth. Thus this method can support only small loans, since 
repayments have to be small. Put another way, there is little scope for expansion to a 
system with larger loans per student. 
 In reality, some people will not be able to make even small repayments. This leads 
to: 
 
Model 1b Mortgage loan with remission for low earners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model: 
 Some people cannot afford even the low repayments in Model 1a. Model 1b 
therefore introduces remission for low earners (this is the only difference to Model 
1a). 
 In principle, people with no income could be allowed to defer their entire loan 
repayment. The suggestion in Model 1b is that there is a minimum monthly 
repayment of a token amount (e.g. €5), because this arrangement helps to maintain 
contact between the borrower and the loans administration. 
 
Advantages 
 If self-certification of low income is allowed, at least for a limited period, 
administrative demands can be low. 
 The lowest earners are protected, with significant political and social policy 
advantages. 
 If low earners have some protection it is possible to have somewhat larger loans. 
 
Disadvantages 
 Even with protection for low earners, the size of the loan per borrower remains small. 
 Even the simplest threshold requires a capacity to assess the individual income of 
applicants, which adds to administrative demands. 
 The threshold creates a problem of implicit taxation. If, for example, the income 
threshold for protecting low-income earners is 100, a person whose earnings 
increase from 99 to 100 (a) faces adverse work incentives, and (b) increased 
incentives to participate in the grey economy (as more people hide their income so 
as not to exceed the limit). To mitigate this problem, a better design would have a 
series of steps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This formulation leads naturally to Model 2. 
 
Income 
Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
Monthly 
repayment 
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Model 2a Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model: 
 Model 2a potentially has three income-contingent elements: 
 Income (in this case up to 100) is assessed on an individual basis 
 The fixed monthly repayment rises each year in line with an index such as 
average earnings 
 The timing and size of voluntary early repayment depends on individual 
income 
 This model is appropriate for a fairly small loan in a country with low average income 
and limited administrative capacity. 
 
Advantages: 
 The scheme offers protection to low earners (in this case people earning less than 
100), assisting political sustainability. 
 The fact that protection is continuous avoids the potential adverse labour market 
incentives of Model 1b.  
 An income test is necessary only for a minority of borrowers whose income is under 
the threshold and who apply for income testing, significantly reducing administrative 
burdens. 
 The choice of threshold can take account of administrative capacity; the smaller the 
income-contingent element (e.g. a threshold of 50), the fewer the people whose 
income has to be measured, hence the smaller the administrative load; however, a 
lower threshold also means lower monthly repayments. 
 This threshold may be differentiated across countries. 
 As discussed below, this model has a built-in upgrade path, in that Model 2a can 
morph over time into Model 2b. 
 Conclusion: Model 2a has advantages over Model 1b, but is very similar in terms of 
administrative requirements. A key conclusion is that Model 2a dominates 1b.  
 
Disadvantages: 
 It is necessary to measure people’s income, adding to administrative complexity.  
 If the administrative capacity of the EU-student loans administration is low, it will be 
necessary to restrict income contingency to very low earnings so that only a few 
people need to have their income assessed. It follows that the maximum monthly 
repayment is constrained; thus this arrangement can support only small loans. It is 
unlikely that this option would allow loans large enough to pay the full cost of the 
most expensive master’s degrees. 
 
100 Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
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Model 2b Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low and 
middle-income earners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model: 
 Model 2b has a considerably larger range of income over which income-contingency 
applies. 
 This model is appropriate for a country with high levels of income and strong 
administrative capacity. 
 For graduates with income above 500, the loan is a mortgage loan with fixed monthly 
repayments and a known duration. 
 
Advantages: 
 Monthly repayments can be higher since low and middle-income recipients are 
protected by income contingency; thus this model can support larger loans, for 
example the full cost of an expensive master’s programme. 
 Protection for lower earners means that monthly repayments can be higher, and so 
the average duration of the loan can be shorter than for Model 2a, facilitating finance 
from capital markets. 
 As noted, Model 2a can morph gradually into 2b by increasing the income at which 
income contingency ends from 100 towards 500. One way of doing this would be to 
increase the threshold in Model 2a each year in line with average earnings; thus in 
most years, the real value of the threshold would increase.  
 
Disadvantages: 
 Model 2b has significantly greater administrative requirements than 2a since it 
requires the capacity to measure the earnings of larger numbers of people, either 
through the tax system or in some other way. 
 
Model 3 Pure income-contingent loan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
500 Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
Income 
Monthly 
repayment 
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The model: 
 Model 3a has full income contingency across all levels of income. 
 Monthly repayments can be implemented in two strategic ways: 
 In arrears, i.e. on the basis of the graduate’s last completed tax return. In 
practice this means a lag of two years, necessitating some form of adjustment 
where a graduate’s earnings fall substantially. 
 On a current basis: the only cost-effective way of doing this is through the tax 
system. 
 
Advantages: 
 This model has all the advantages of Model 2b. 
 Since higher earners repay more than in 2b, the repayment flow is faster. 
 
Disadvantages 
 This model has the highest administrative demands, since it requires that everyone’s 
income is assessed. If a country has a sufficiently well-developed tax system, the 
marginal cost of implementing loan repayments as a deduction alongside income tax 
is low. Where that is not the case, however, administrative costs depend to a 
considerable extent on the number of people whose income has to be assessed. In 
Model 3 everyone’s income has to be assessed. In Model 2 it is necessary to assess 
the income only of individuals below the income-contingent threshold (e.g. 100 in 
Model 2a, 500 in Model 2b). 
 
Comments  
 
1) All models except 1a offer protection to low earners. There are two ways of 
providing this protection: 
 Graduates should make no repayment in any year in which their earnings are low. 
 All graduates, even those with the lowest earnings, make at least a small repayment. 
As noted earlier the purpose of such repayment is to maintain contact between the 
borrower and the student loans administration. The diagram below illustrates this 
approach for Model 2a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) With a positive real interest rate, the outstanding loan balance of a low earner will 
increase and, where earnings are very small or zero, a person’s nominal debt will spiral 
upwards. The extent to which rising debt is politically palatable will vary from country to 
country. A range of mechanisms exist to address the problem: 
 Targeted interest subsidies for low earners, and/or 
 Forgiveness of a person’s outstanding balance after (say) 30 years 
 
3) All the models allow voluntary early repayment of part or all of a person’s 
outstanding loan balance. 
  
100 
Monthly 
repayment 
Income 
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5.3 Broader aspects of loan design 
 
The market failure in student lending (i.e. the reason why the competitive market on its own 
cannot provide student loans efficiently) arises mainly because the lender cannot 
differentiate between “good” and “bad” borrowers because of asymmetric information. The 
lender (principal) knows much less about the borrower’s situation, motives, behaviour and 
future prospects than the borrower (agent). Asymmetric information creates two sets of 
problems: (1) moral hazard and (2) adverse selection. Depending on circumstances, either 
problem can lead to a complete breakdown of the market. The basic problem is how 
government intervention can reduce these effects to a level that is manageable. 
 
Examples of moral hazard in this context are that borrowers may cheat during the 
application process, may hide their income, or may emigrate in order to avoid repayments 
etc. These risks can be reduced either by signalling (borrowers provide more information, 
certifications etc.) or monitoring (the lender follows up and imposes restrictions on the 
borrowers). We return to these issues in Section 6 when designing the appropriate 
management model (institutional architecture).  
 
This section focuses on the adverse selection problem as the main driver when designing 
the loan. The problem arises where the lender cannot distinguish good risks from bad, and 
thus has to charge a risk premium based on the average risk. As a result, bad risks (whose 
risk premium is inefficiently low) borrow an inefficiently large amount and good risks (whose 
risk premium is inefficiently high) borrow an inefficiently small amount. 
 
5.3.1 The adverse selection problem 
 
In principle, loan schemes can be (a) for profit, (b) zero profit or (c) subsidised. A loan 
scheme operates at zero profit (self-sustaining) if in the long run the expected aggregate 
profit / loss is zero. This means that the aggregate repayment flow exactly covers:  
 The money borrowed  
 The time value of money 
 The default losses and  
 The administration costs.  
In a self-sustaining model there is no need for external (e.g. state, EU) subsidies.  
 
Some profitable schemes are run by private institutions (e.g. MyRichUncle), but 
these target a niche sub-group of borrowers (mostly the brightest students at top 
universities), thus they are “cherry-picking” with the help of sophisticated risk-assessment 
techniques. However it can be expected that profit is reduced to zero here as well if 
competition is high. The EU-level student loan scheme should not be profit making. Any 
profits should be reinvested in the scheme, e.g. by increasing the loan amount, by 
expanding the eligibility rules or by reducing the repayment burden etc. 
 
Taking zero profit as the benchmark, default losses and administrative costs are 
financed by the overpayment of non-defaulting borrowers. Overpayment can be required in 
several forms: 
 An interest rate risk premium (this is the most straightforward and widespread 
solution) 
 A debt multiplier (e.g. the scheme at Yale university which failed and became an 
example of a badly designed student loan scheme)  
 Extra repayments, which has some remarkable advantages according to actuarial 
calculations 
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 Extra years of repayment, though these are less attractive from a communication 
point of view 
For further detail, see Appendix 7, Overpayment mechanisms. 
 
The most usual way of requiring overpayment is by introducing an interest rate risk 
premium. For example, in the Hungarian scheme the self-sustaining aspect is ensured by 
the interest rate of the student loan which contains the following elements: 
 
r = f + p + o 
 
where 
r: interest charge on the loan (8.5%) 
f: financing cost (6%) 
p: default risk premium (1.5%) 
o: operational margin (administrative costs / value of the portfolio) (1%)62 
 
If the following conditions hold: 
(1) The riskiness of the borrowers are different (income, age, debt etc.) 
(2) Loan conditions are universal (i.e. the same conditions apply to all borrowers) 
(3) The loan scheme is expected to operate at zero-profit level 
then borrowers have to cross-subsidise each other within the risk cohort. See Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 shows a hypothetical loan scheme where borrowers compose a risk cohort. 
They are ranked by the estimated profit / loss they will cause the lender. Borrowers on the 
“+” side (typically younger, with smaller loans and higher income) finance the losses on the 
“-“ side (typically older, with larger loans and lower income). In a zero-profit system, 
expected profits and losses sum to zero. The extent and pattern of cross-subsidy depend on 
the distribution of the borrowers’ income, age and debt, and also on repayment rules. 
 
Figure 8. Cross-subsidies in a zero profit loan scheme 
 
 
 
Source: the authors 
 
At first sight, cross-financing epitomises solidarity and integration. However, in 
certain conditions it can be detrimental. Provided that: 
(4) Participation is voluntary 
(5) Early repayment is allowed without any restrictions 
(6) Risk-assessed market conditions are more favourable for the better borrowers 
                                                 
 
62 Numbers rounded for simplicity. The values can change from year to year. 
borrowers 
profit/loss of 
the lender 
- -
- 
+ + + 
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then better (i.e. lower risk) borrowers will choose not to participate, i.e. will not take out a 
loan, or will leave the scheme as soon as possible (i.e. use the early repayment option). As a 
result, high-risk borrowers will be over-represented and the composition of the loan portfolio 
will be worse than expected. The initial risk premium (and hence the interest rate) needs to 
be increased in order to keep the loan self-financing. The increased interest rate will deter 
some other borrowers. This phenomenon can be accelerated and can lead to a total 
breakdown of the scheme. This problem – adverse selection – in lending is analysed more in 
detail by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Tirole (2005). 
 
The adverse selection problem can be managed in several ways: 
(1) If the lender wishes to reduce the cross-subsidies within the cohort, he must keep 
differences in the risk profiles of the borrowers to a reasonable level. For example, he 
can set up strict eligibility criteria that exclude borrowers who are expected to cause 
large losses (typically the citizens of low-income countries, women, older students or 
students with poor academic results, and/or some costly programmes). However, 
most of these exclusions are not viable politically. The easiest way to reduce risk 
difference is to limit the size of the loan. If kept low, so is borrower risk – and so, also 
cross-subsidies. 
(2) Cross-subsidies can also be reduced by giving up universality and by tailoring loan 
conditions to the characteristics of the borrower (e.g. real income of the student’s 
home country or host country, age, size of loan, etc.). 
(3) The third possible solution is to give up zero-profit operation and involve external 
subsidies to cover default losses, at least partially. In this way default losses are 
financed from outside and not by the risk cohort. 
 
All three solutions help to control the cross-subsidies built into the scheme. It must be 
emphasised that in order to maintain financial stability, the extent of the cross-subsidies 
should be kept low even if politicians regard it as desirable.  
 
Box 6: Why the loan scheme should be designed for the worst case and not for 
the average 
 
The argument is based on three statements: 
- High cross-subsidies within the risk cohort can lead to serious adverse selection and 
system breakdown. 
- Cross-subsidies are necessary for the worst borrowers who are not expected to repay their 
loan fully (because the loan is too high relative to their income, or because they are too old, 
etc.). 
- It is possible to reduce cross-subsidy (a) by setting differentiated loan conditions – but that 
makes administration difficult and expensive, or (b) via an external subsidy, e.g. from EU 
funds – but it is expensive. 
 
The conclusion to which these considerations lead is that the primary design consideration is 
to keep the expected losses of the worst borrowers as low as possible. Thus the loan system 
should be designed to cover the worst case rather than the average. If all borrowers were 
like the average it would be easy to introduce a loan scheme. But good design needs to 
recognise the considerable income differences across Europe.  
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Once the extent of cross-subsidy is determined we can turn to the other points and 
the possible solutions: 
(4) Participation could be mandatory in order to avoid adverse selection. On those 
grounds, some experts advocate a graduate tax. However, a graduate tax is neither 
fair nor feasible, therefore we do not consider it a usable option. For more detail see 
Barr (2004). 
(5) In many loan schemes, early repayment is forbidden or is too expensive. This 
approach is counterproductive since it makes the loan less attractive for low-risk 
borrowers. As a result, many of them will refuse to take up the loan. 
(6) In order to keep the best borrowers in the system, the loan conditions should be 
more favourable than those available on the free market. The right tools are tailor-
made loan conditions and/or external subsidies (for example a state guarantee can 
significantly reduce the financing cost, thus the interest rate can be kept reasonably 
low). 
 
We have ruled out options (4) and (5). The remaining possible solutions are: 
 Limitations (eligibility and size of the loan) 
 Differentiated (tailor-made) loan conditions 
 External subsidies (direct financing of default losses and costs of administration, or 
guarantees) 
Fortunately, we do not need radical limitations, highly differentiated loan conditions or large 
external subsidies. A sensible mix of measures should be enough to avoid adverse 
selection. 
 
 
5.3.2 Eligibility and size of the loans 
 
Section 5.1 argues that initially only mobile master’s students should be eligible, only for one 
year, and only within the EU. This is a politically viable limitation that contributes to the 
financial stability of the scheme. We suggest that eligibility is based on a double test of 
(a) EU citizenship, (b) contribution to the aim that 20% of young people with be mobile. Thus 
eligibility is based on: 
 Citizenship test (EU27), and 
 Doing a master’s degree in different country from the bachelor degree, or 
 Doing a master’s degree in different country from the person’s citizenship 
 
Other possible eligibility criteria include: 
 Age 
 Accumulated debt (for example in the national student loan system) 
 Academic merit 
 Financial needs (means testing) 
 Special programmes and professions 
 
The age of the borrower should be capped for financial reasons, but it is undesirable 
to exclude older students. Instead the problem should be tackled through the repayment 
conditions (see section 5.3.3).  
 
The size of other debts is also an important risk factor. However, students should be 
free to take up commercial loans at any time and without limitation, not least because it is 
impossible to monitor and control such borrowing. Moreover, loan conditions can vary so 
widely that it would be complicated to sum up different situations and to assess the overall 
repayment burden. Such tasks would be administratively demanding, hence the suggestion 
to set this aspect to one side. 
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Academic merit and financial needs should be taken into account when allocating 
grants and scholarships, but the loan conditions should be invariant to such factors. It is 
noticeable however, that master’s students face an explicit or implicit entrance examination, 
which implies filtering by academic merit. 
 
Implicit manpower planning is undesirable, not least because doing so accurately is 
not generally feasible. The EU-level mobility loan should be the instrument of competition 
and market forces, not of central intervention. 
 
Basically, the size of the loan could be:  
1. Set as a maximum amount per year available for all eligible students;  
2. Dependent on circumstances (home country, host country, other available support 
etc.); or 
3. Linked to some reference points, as discussed below  
 
The first is dangerous because it can lead to excessive borrowing, with deleterious 
effects on the default risk. The second is administratively complex. The third seems to be the 
right solution. A natural idea is to link the loan amount to the tuition fee plus the country-
specific living costs but the sum cannot exceed a predetermined level (maximum loan 
amount). 
 
Once eligibility is defined, it is possible to establish the maximum loan, which can be 
adjusted periodically according to the change in the repayment model (which in turn 
depends mainly on the development of administrative capacity), available state subsidies 
and general economic conditions (employment and income growth, and income 
convergence). The maximum loan is an important control parameter incorporating and 
reflecting these elements. 
 
5.3.3 Differentiated loan conditions 
 
Relative debt: a key element in financial stability 
 
Borrowers are mainly characterised by their relative debt ratio (R) calculated just after the 
graduation at the beginning of the repayment period: 
 
I
DR    
 
Where  
 D is total debt at graduation in euro 
  is the repayment rate (the percentage of the gross income the borrower has to 
repay) 
 I stands for the yearly gross income of the new graduate 
 
In a pure income-contingent scheme, if certain conditions hold (i.e. the interest rate 
equals income growth rate and both are constant), R equals the expected maturity of the 
loan. In any case the higher R is, the longer the maturity. That is why it is strongly related to 
the riskiness of the borrowers as well. In a reasonable student loan scheme, R requires an 
upper limit to make sure that the borrower can repay the loan before retirement. 
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Moreover, it is not only the average value of R that matters, but also variation within 
the cohort of borrowers. Greater variation in individual values of R makes the loan system 
financially more vulnerable. This gives rise to an important conclusion: 
 
If the variation of R across individuals is greater, the average value of R should be lower to 
ensure financial sustainability. The main challenge is twofold: 
 To provide as much financing to students as possible (increasing the average value 
of R) 
 To avoid over- or under-borrowing (reducing the variation of R across individuals) 
 
Possible solution to high variation: tailored repayment conditions 
 
Unfortunately, in a European-wide student loan system differences in R across individuals 
will be much higher than on national level because of high variation in: 
a) The attractiveness of educational institutions 
b) Tuition fees 
c) Cost of living 
d) Students’ income  
e) Existing student support mechanisms 
f) Graduate incomes 
The first five points (a-e) contribute to variation of a typical borrower’s total debt (D) while the 
last (f) increases the variation of the denominator of R ratios.  
 
The adverse effect of the large differences in these factors can be controlled only by 
the residual variable, namely the repayment rate (alpha). Alpha is the ratio of repayments to 
income. In an income-contingent scheme alphas are determined by the lender; in a 
mortgage-type scheme, the level of the fixed repayment is the control variable, which implies 
the value of alpha. The idea is that individual alphas should be set in such a way that R 
remains within a well-defined range.  
 
Therefore we suggest introducing tailored repayment conditions for each borrower 
according to the following parameters: 
 The borrower’s total debt at graduation (D) 
 The borrower’s age at graduation (A) 
In order to reduce the variability in R across individuals, the repayment ratio should be a 
positive function of these two factors (debt and age), so that older borrowers with larger 
outstanding loans should have higher repayments.  
 
In an income-contingent scheme repayment is automatically linked to income (I). 
However, in a mortgage-type or hybrid scheme (like 2a) this direct link is missing. To make 
the loan more attractive and financially sustainable it is useful to connect:  
 The fixed repayment (i.e. the horizontal part of Model 2a) to average or median 
graduate income in the country where the graduate is working; thus borrowers 
working in low-income countries repay less, so that repayment takes longer 
 The income threshold at which repayment starts to the poverty line or the minimum 
wage in the country concerned  
Whenever a borrower begins employment in a new country, the fixed repayment level and 
the threshold can be reset.  
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The interest rate 
 
As we have seen the interest rate of the loan depends on:  
 The cost of finance 
 The risk premium 
 Administrative cost 
 Any subsidy 
 
These elements may change over time, and are difficult, if not impossible, to forecast. A 
fixed interest rate for the entire duration of the loan would impose excessive risk on both 
lender and borrower. Variable interest rates are the right choice, noting that the interest rate 
should not be too short, since excessive volatility might also deter the borrower. The interest 
rate could be reset every one or two years, which would imply some time lag and smoothing 
as well. 
 
The interest rate and its component parts could be: 
 Universal across all member states. This, however is feasible only if all debts are 
denominated in euro. In a given period the same interest rate is accumulating on all 
debt, regardless of when the borrower contracted. The interest rate should be within 
a predetermined range. For more details, see Section 6 
 Differentiated by countries or by generations. This approach would complicate the 
administration, and might also raise sensitive political issues. For more details see 
section 5.3.4 
In conclusion, in terms of loan design it seems preferable to introduce differentiated 
repayment conditions but with a single, universal interest rate. But thus observation must be 
qualified by an awareness of the complications that may arise in terms of country-specific 
aspects of regulations and legal issues, for example, regulation concerning consumer rights. 
Such aspects need to be considered alongside the detailed design of any loan. 
 
5.3.4 External subsidies 
 
Who covers the cost of non-repayment? 
 
Even in Model 1a, in which in principle everybody repays their loan, there will be some 
leakage. At a minimum there will be people who die young. In addition there will be some 
evasion, and political pressure will inevitably lead to some form of mitigation for low earners. 
And in Models 1b, 2 and 3, mitigation for low earners is explicit. The conclusion is that there 
are default losses in any system. The design question is where those costs should fall. In 
principle, losses could be met entirely within the loan scheme (a zero-profit scheme), entirely 
from outside, or from a mix of the two (subsidised schemes). The discussion below uses 
Germany and Bulgaria purely for illustrative purposes. 
 
ALL LOSSES FINANCED FROM WITHIN THE LOAN SCHEME  
 Case 1: An EU-wide cohort risk premium  
 Suppose that all losses could be financed by an EU-wide cohort risk premium 
of (say) 4% – that is, with a 4% risk premium the loan scheme would in 
principle be self-financing in present value terms. In this system, an average 
graduate from a rich Member State (e.g. Germany), as well as subsidising the 
loan repayments of low-earning German graduates would also subsidise the 
loan repayments of low-earning graduates from a poorer Member State (e.g. 
Bulgaria). 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 79
 The scale of cross-country redistribution in this case is potentially much larger 
than in-country redistribution, leading to two problems: the greater the cross-
country subsidy the greater the potential political problems. Also, the greater 
the incentives to adverse selection (i.e. better-off Germans will opt out of the 
system). 
Conclusion: an EU-wide cohort risk premium is not feasible. 
 
 Case 2: Country-specific cohort risk premiums 
 In this case the German cohort risk premium covers only non-repayment by 
Germany graduates, and hence can be low (say 2%). However, the Bulgarian 
risk premium has to be very high (say 15%) 
 Such a high interest rate would, in effect, mean that the loan scheme was not 
available to mobile Bulgarian students 
Conclusion: it is not possible to finance all losses from within the loan scheme. 
 
ALL LOSSES FINANCED FROM OUTSIDE THE LOAN SCHEME. The other option is that all non-
repayment is financed from EU resources. This approach implies redistribution from 
taxpayers (rather than just loan recipients) in richer countries towards poorer countries. Such 
transfers could be designed in different ways, e.g. directly to the loan scheme from a special 
EU loan support fund, or via Member States, e.g. though structural or cohesion funds. 
 
LOSSES FINANCED PARTLY FROM WITHIN AND PARTLY FROM OUTSIDE THE LOAN SCHEME. It is not 
necessary to choose between the two polar cases. In New Zealand during the 1990s, for 
example, government estimates suggested that in their then system a cohort risk premium of 
2% would repay 100% of the loss on low earners. The system charged 1% above the 
government’s cost of borrowing; thus the cohort of graduates covered half of the loss, 
taxpayers the other half. 
 
PARTICIPATION BY UNIVERSITIES IN LOSS SHARING. In principle, it is possible to share losses 
with universities. In the simplest system, universities collectively agree to pay a fraction of 
the losses on the loan portfolio. However, that type of arrangement gives universities whose 
graduates’ repayment performance is less good an incentive to free-ride on better 
repayment performance elsewhere. Beyond a small scheme of this nature, it is therefore 
necessary to have university-specific arrangements – in essence, each university would pay 
an actuarial insurance premium to cover a fraction of the losses due to non-repayment by its 
graduates. This type of arrangement might be an option at some stage in the future, but is 
both technically and politically difficult even within a single country, and even more so given 
the great diversity of institutions across the EU. Thus it is not an immediate option. 
CONCLUSION. Given the current wide income differences across Member States, non-
repayment by graduates with low earnings should come largely or wholly from EU sources. 
 
Targeted loan forgiveness: a counter-incentive to brain drain 
 
A potential political obstacle to an EU student loan scheme is the concern of national 
governments that such a scheme would contribute to a brain drain. If policy makers regard 
such a worry as justified, there are ways to address it. 
 
THE INCENTIVE. Consider, as an example, a graduate from Bulgaria who takes a one-year 
master’s degree in London. One way to encourage her to return to Bulgaria would be that for 
each year she spends working in Bulgaria after her return, 10% (for argument’s sake) of her 
loan would be forgiven. Though inertia may slow a person’s return home, once the person 
has returned home, inertia will tend to keep him or her there; thus a variant would be to offer 
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20% forgiveness for the first year and 10% thereafter. Forgiveness of this sort could be 
offered to all mobile graduates returning to poorer Member States. 
 
This policy is controversial. As formulated by the expert panel: 
 It is difficult to define what is desirable 
 This type of subsidy can be regarded as interfering with the right of free movement 
 
FINANCE. Who would meet the costs of this subsidy?  
 Costs met by poorer Member States: in this case, the cost of loan forgiveness for 
returning Bulgarian graduates comes from Bulgarian resources. The problem is that 
this involves redistribution from poorer to richer Bulgarians, leaving the Bulgarian 
government open to the accusation that it is subsidising the best and the brightest, 
not spending money on (say) policies to foster early child development 
 Costs from EU resources: in this model, the cost of forgiveness for graduates 
returning to their poorer home country would come from EU resources, thus 
redistributing from richer to poorer Member States 
 
CONCLUSION. If policy makers wish to make use of this incentive mechanism, resources 
should come largely or wholly from EU sources. 
 
5.3.5 The Options 
 
THE STARTING POINT. Section 2 set out ways of organising student loan repayments: 
 Model 1a: A pure mortgage loan; monthly repayments are entirely unrelated to a 
person’s income 
 Model 1b: Mortgage loan with remission for low earners 
 Model 2a: A hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners 
 Model 2b: A hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low and middle-
income earners 
 Model 3: A pure income-contingent loan 
 
Summarising the analysis in section 2, Model 1a is not feasible; Model 2a dominates 
Model 1b; Models 2b and 3 are currently unfeasible because there is no effective way of 
implementing an up-to-date income test at EU level. Thus our chosen model is 2a, with a 
view to moving over time towards 2b as income levels in the poorer Member States rise and 
administrative capacity strengthens. 
 
THE OPTIONS. We propose four options, all based on model 2a. The two central variations 
concern (a) whether the scheme is self-financing or subsidised, and (b) whether it is 
universal (i.e. a common repayment formula and risk premium across all Member States), or 
with borrower- or country-specific elements. 
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Table 16. Four options based on the repayment model of 2a 
 
 
Universal conditions Differentiated conditions 
Non-subsidised 1 3 
Subsidised 2 4 
Source: the authors 
 
Option 1: A self-sustaining and universal loan scheme. An implication is that the loan will 
have to be small enough that non-repayment by graduates in poorer Member States can be 
financed by an EU-wide cohort risk premium. This is the least attractive solution. 
 
Option 2: A subsidised universal scheme. If non-repayment by graduates in poorer Member 
States is financed mainly by transfers from EU resources, and hence mainly by richer 
Member States, it is possible to finance larger losses and hence to offer larger loans. 
 
Option 3: A non-subsidised scheme, but with some differences across Member States. For 
example, both the level of loan repayments and their rate of change could be related to 
average (or median) earnings in the country and perhaps also to the age and debt of the 
borrower. This would improve repayment performance both in richer and poorer Member 
States, making larger loans possible. 
 
Option 4: A subsidised and differentiated scheme allows for the highest loan amounts but 
communication and administration may become complicated.  
 
Some other “accessories” may be included in any of these options, for example: 
 Grace periods 
 Targeted subsidies 
 Debt forgiveness after N years or in given circumstances 
 A minimum repayment option: as discussed in section 5.2, the loan can be designed 
with either a zero minimum repayment or with a small repayment irrespective of 
earnings to maintain contact between borrower and the student loans administration 
 Early repayment option: anyone at any time should be able to make voluntary 
additional repayments of part or all of their loan. The only restriction is that, to keep 
administrative costs low, any such additional repayment should be not less than 
some minimum amount (e.g. €500) 
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6 An EU loan scheme – Implementation 
 
We concluded in Section 5 that the loan conditions should be flexible so as to attract 
borrowers and to ensure financial sustainability. On the other hand, the operation should be 
efficient in all of the following areas: 
 Communication and client service 
 Administration  
 Collection mechanism  
 Finance 
 
The basic paradox is how simultaneously (1) to have flexible loan conditions (2) effectively to 
fight against moral hazard and (3) to have simple and cheap operation. The solution requires 
innovative techniques.  
 
In this section we discuss the main activities: communication and client service (section 6.1), 
administration (section 6.2), collecting repayments (section 6.3) and finance (section 6.4). 
The section then discusses the institutional architecture (section 6.5) and political 
implementation (section 6.6). 
 
The loan system needs a central focus, with ultimate responsibility for the system, even if 
specific tasks are outsourced.63 This responsible body is referred to as the Student Loans 
Administration (SLA). We start by discussing the functions that need to be carried out under 
the authority of the SLA, though not necessary all by the SLA. 
 
The student loan portfolio has the potential to grow considerably as section 6.4 shows, since 
a new cohort of borrowers is added each year, so that careful thought is needed to automate 
as many of the processes as possible. This will help to contain the cost base, minimise 
human intervention64, and simplify processing. The institution and the management model 
should be established during the initial set-up phase, and will require amendment when 
there are any changes to the scheme, e.g. to repayment thresholds or eligibility rules. 
 
6.1 Communication and client service 
 
Communication and client service are typically easy to outsource, once the overall strategy 
is determined by the SLA. 
 
Students, especially those from poor backgrounds, are risk-averse. This risk aversion is due 
to cultural factors but also to lack of information. International context aggravates this 
informational problem. However, student perceptions and risk aversion can be changed 
through targeted communication strategies that highlight the benefits of mobility and the 
corresponding loan options.  
 
The communication strategy should be based both on (1) a highly effective internet webpage 
where all relevant information is available; and as far as possible on (2) personalised 
consultancy. 
One of the most important issues to be addressed is the optimal extent of borrowing. 
                                                 
 
63 For example, the UK Department for Work and Pensions is ultimately responsible, but outsources the actual 
running of the system to the Contributions Agency and the Benefits Agency. 
64 The danger in leaving some, or even all, interpretation of the rules relating to (say) exception processing could 
lead to some borrowers receiving different and/or /more favourable treatment than others. 
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Because of the financial crisis, people are increasingly reluctant to borrow. The SLA must 
give a convincing message that explains why borrowing is a sensible strategy, 
 
The SLA must determine the student subgroups to be targeted by the communication 
strategy, for example: 
a) The most open-minded and least risk averse students 
b) The brightest students with the highest academic performance 
c) The most needy students 
Clearly, these subgroups are different, and so the appropriate communication is likely to be 
very different.  
 
The policy objective of the EU loan scheme is not to make all students mobile but to foster 
student mobility. To that end, student lending should focus on the most open-minded and 
least risk-averse students (subgroup a) where student lending can have the maximum 
impact by removing liquidity constraints. (The mobility of subgroups (b) and (c) can be 
supported by a well-designed grant system based on academic merit and / or means 
testing.) 
 
6.2 Administration and disbursement 
 
6.2.1 Establishing identity and eligibility 
 
WHICH DOCUMENTS? When initially applying, students would be required to produce three 
forms of documentation in order to receive an eligibility certificate. 
 
1) Identity: documentation should ideally confirm identity based on information that will never 
change. It is important to introduce an EU wide identity number for borrowers. 
 
2) Nationality / citizenship: since the loan is available only to people who meet criteria of 
nationality (i.e. citizen or long-term resident of an EU Member State), it will be necessary 
also to have details of an applicant’s passport or similar document. A question for policy 
makers is the precise definition of nationality required for eligibility; it would be desirable to 
use an existing, widely used and tested definition. 
 
3) Evidence of acceptance, or conditional acceptance for a master’s degree.  
 
The loans administration would have to establish criteria for determining eligibility, e.g. that 
the loan related to (i) a master’s degree in a different country from where the applicant did 
his/her first degree65; or (ii) nationality / citizenship is different from the country of the 
master’s degree. 
 
An additional benefit from collecting such detail is increased security when speaking to 
borrowers on the telephone, or if at some future stage any form of online functionality were 
introduced. 
 
                                                 
 
65 Mobility will require detailed definition. A German national who does a first degree in Germany and a master’s 
in the UK is clearly mobile. But would a German national who does a first degree in the UK be eligible for a loan 
to do a master’s degree in Germany? A separate issue arises where someone does a first degree in two or more 
countries. 
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WHO CHECKS THE DOCUMENTS? For convenience and to avoid the risk of losing original 
documents, it may be that that checks are best carried out by the university or place of 
study. (In this way universities can also take over a great part of the communication and 
client service.) By the time a student seeks to apply for a loan he or she will generally have 
gone through the university enrolment process. Indeed, enrolment should be the first 
condition of eligibility.66 
 
The university should also confirm that the student is in attendance prior to the release of 
any money – see below. In sum, students would be required: 
 To verify their identity by providing the university with their birth certificate, passport 
and evidence of their first degree; and 
 To provide evidence that they have completed enrolment  
 
6.2.2 The application process 
 
APPLICATION PROCESS. Application forms would be part of the eligibility certificate held by 
universities. The form would require completion either by the university67 or by the student 
prior to submission to the loans administration. Irrespective of whether this is completed by 
the student or the university, the completed document would require cross-referencing to the 
eligibility certificate to ensure the matching of documents. 
 
The reverse side of the application form would set out the terms and conditions of the loan, 
so that the applicant was fully aware of the commitment being given to the loans 
administration. Thus each applicant would have an explicit individual contract with the loans 
administration. 
 
ONLINE APPLICATION. Many arguments support the idea of establishing a new institution 
based on information communication technologies (ICT): 
 The EU is committed to the development of the “knowledge society” 
 This is a green-field initiative, where the EU is not constrained by the status quo 
 This is a flagship institution that could be a benchmark for other transnational EU 
institutions 
 A well-developed ICT strategy also contributes to the “E-inclusion” and “E-
government” initiatives of the EU by narrowing the digital divide 
 This is the best way to communicate with the top students of the “millennium 
generation” 
 
Using ICT is the obvious way to streamline the process, but requires extensive development, 
and is considerably more difficult than is often realised. The UK had a very successful paper-
based system. When online applications were introduced, the system experienced 
significant difficulties.68 Given the need for the loan scheme to operate across a wide range 
of countries with considerable differences in institutional capacities, online operations should 
                                                 
 
66 Again, more detailed work will be needed, for example where a student is offered a place to do a master’s 
degree conditional on performance in his or her final undergraduate examinations. 
67 This aspect would need to be verified as feasible since certain countries may regard this information being 
known to the university as a breach of data protection / privacy. 
68 These difficulties were at least part of the source of problems of sufficient gravity that the Chief Executive and 
almost the entire Board of Directors were replaced.  
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perhaps be considered as a downstream activity. The issues of such development should be 
examined in more detail involving specialised expertise. 
 
It is very much the case that if you get it right, nobody remembers, but if you get it wrong, 
nobody forgets. Good policy should not be jeopardised by poor implementation. 
 
6.2.3 Disbursement 
 
The student’s initial loan application would specify the amount he or she wishes to borrow 
(subject to a maximum) and whether the loan is for maintenance or fees or both. A loan for 
maintenance should be paid in (say) three tranches, for example 50% (since there are 
significant upfront costs at the start of the academic year), 25% and 25%. These amounts 
would be paid directly into the bank account nominated by the student. Any part of the loan 
that covers tuition fees should be paid direct to the university. 
 
6.3 Collecting repayments 
 
It is easy to give money away but harder to collect repayments, as illustrated by many loan 
schemes internationally. An efficient collection mechanism which minimises moral hazard 
and administrative costs is therefore crucial. This aspect is not always given the priority it 
deserves during initial set-up because it is viewed as a post-launch activity. Yet in many 
respects it determines the success of any loan scheme. Collection activity relies very much 
on the quality and in many respects the quantity of personal information gathered at the time 
of the original application, which is why borrowers must be made aware of the importance of 
keeping the loans administration up to date with any changes.69 
 
6.3.1 Assessing monthly repayments 
 
In Model 2a in section 5.2 borrowers repay in fixed monthly instalments, with the exception 
of graduates with very low earnings, who can apply for a lower repayment. Thus the system 
is income-contingent over a fairly small range of earnings, and income contingency is 
arranged on a manual basis for each graduate who applies for repayment lower than the 
fixed instalment. In Model 2b, the range of income over which repayments are income 
contingent is wider and the income contingency might be done automatically through the tax 
system. Here we mainly discuss Model 2a. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE. To assist efficient collection and for the purposes of checking 
paperwork (e.g. where a borrower requests a lower repayment), it would be desirable if the 
Student Loans Administration had a branch in each Member State, and perhaps also in 
other OECD countries. To ensure efficient handling of repayments the loans administration 
would also need to establish a contractual arrangement with a banking network in each 
country. 
 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT. On completion of the year of study for which the loan was awarded, the 
loans administration would issue letters to all borrowers advising them that they are due to 
begin repayments.  
 
                                                 
 
69 For example, empirical literature shows that the borrower’s academic performance is the most powerful 
predictor of repayment discipline. It is true that academic performance is not an eligibility criterion but this 
information should be gathered in order to help collecting repayments and establishing a differentiated client 
service. 
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The amount of repayment would be related to the graduate’s country of residence or rather 
the so-called “taxing country” (the country where the tax return is due), i.e. lower in Bulgaria 
than Germany, to start from (say) 1 January of the following year. It is the graduate’s 
responsibility to notify the loans administration about his taxing country.  
 
The graduate has the option to apply for a lower repayment rate where earnings are below a 
threshold equal to x% of median earnings in his or her country of residence. A process 
would be needed for the relevant assessment to be made, for which purpose a branch of the 
Student Loans Administration in each country is helpful. 
 
REMITTING REPAYMENTS. In Model 2a monthly repayments are fixed for a year but this fixed 
repayment level can increase each year in line with income growth in the country concerned. 
Repayments could be arranged in different ways:  
 The borrower could obtain and complete a Direct Debit Instruction (DDI) in his or 
her taxing country and return the completed form to the loans administration for 
completion and lodgement  
 The borrower could make payment direct to the loans administration via any of 
the major credit or debit cards  
 The borrower could make payment by a whole range of options available via the 
internet 
 It may also be possible to pay via mobile phone or other e-payment techniques 
 
In the last three options, borrowers will probably face charges for each transaction, which in 
normal circumstances would dissuade them from using these as a means of payment except 
on a “one-off” basis. However, these methods of payment can be used very effectively as a 
bargaining tool when it comes to collection / default negotiations. 
 
Borrowers who fail to return a DDI or similar document would be followed up as part of the 
normal collection / default process discussed below. 
 
EARLY REPAYMENT. Borrowers should be able to make additional repayments at any time 
either as a single one-off payment or a series of payments, e.g. via DDI.  
 
6.3.2 Tracking repayments  
TRACKING AND CUMULATING INDIVIDUAL REPAYMENTS. The loans administration can establish 
contractual arrangements with the banking network in each country (or with a particular bank 
after a competitive tendering process) under which they would provide the loans 
administration with details of all payments received. The information would be formatted 
electronically to keep manual intervention to a minimum. The loans administration would be 
responsible for checking data and updating the record of each account.  
 
ANNUAL STATEMENTS. Each year the loans administration will issue each borrower with an 
annual statement of account. This is perhaps best undertaken in mid-year, following a 
complete reconciliation of all records / payments. Statements will be issued each year from 
the time the loan is taken out (i.e. starting before repayments begin) and will continue until 
the loan has been repaid. 
 
COMPLETING REPAYMENTS. A final statement will be issued to borrowers who have repaid in 
full. That statement will normally not be issued when the final payment has been received 
but as part of the annual statement run. 
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Borrowers will be regularly reminded to keep details of all payments remitted to the loans 
administration and so they should have a good idea when their final payment is due. They 
will also be supplied with full contact details if they wish to contact the loans administration. 
 
6.3.3 Enforcement 
 
It is sometimes said that repayers fall into two groups – those who can’t pay and those who 
won’t pay. But this is not always the case. If a borrower can’t pay, for example because of 
low income, they will be protected by the terms of the loan. If a borrower chooses not to pay 
(moral hazard), they should be pursued under a fair but rigorous default mechanism. 
 
There are already clearly-established and proven processes for pursuing default. What is, 
however, required is a mechanism by which those procedures are kept under review. The 
normal procedure is to issue non-payment reminders, the first of which is generally issued 
around 10-14 days after an instalment has not been paid. There follows a continuing series 
of reminders, each progressively more strongly worded than the previous one, supported by 
telephone contact. Each letter would remind borrowers of their obligations under the loan 
agreement and of the consequences of continued non-repayment. 
 
Ultimately a notice of default/material breach would be served. At this time any in-built 
protection would be withdrawn and possibly the entire loan, not just the outstanding arrears, 
would become due for repayment. At this stage legal proceedings would be considered or, 
as in the Hungarian system, the tax authority could take over the whole debt, which 
becomes due immediately in a lump sum. In many countries tax authorities have strong 
enforcement powers. 
 
It may also be considered necessary to appoint external credit-collection agencies to contact 
borrowers, though with consideration of, amongst other factors, the size of the outstanding 
balance, given that agency costs tend to be high. Alongside this process, repayment default 
and registration with external credit reference agencies70 would continue, and borrowers 
reminded that this would not only show the growth and seriousness of their default position 
but would very likely inhibit their chances of obtaining credit from other sources. The SLA 
has a strong interest in publishing both positive and negative credit information about the 
borrowers (to the banking sector or if it is legally feasible to potential employers as well). 
 
This discussion is included to illustrate how the loan scheme could evolve over time, but is 
brief, since Model 2b is currently realistic only in some Member States. For the most part, 
the processes would follow those for model 2a, the difference being that the system would 
be income-contingent over a wider range of income. 
 
An alternative option is for income contingency to be implemented automatically by tax 
authorities as soon as a borrower’s taxing country becomes known. Under this scenario, the 
loans administration would send a file to the tax authorities of borrowers within their own 
national tax system informing them of the relevant defaulters and providing information 
sufficient to allow deduction from salary to begin at the appropriate time. Tax authorities in 
the entire catchment area would already have been issued with details of the threshold 
above which deductions should be made, together with the rate of deduction and when 
                                                 
 
70 This should be regarded as standard, with each agency being sent a file, normally monthly, of those borrowers 
in arrears with repayment. This would be a reciprocal arrangement, with each agency allowing the loans 
administrator access to defaulters registered by other users, and would probably be an extremely useful tool for 
future loan determination.  
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these should begin. This solution however raises technical, legal and operational problems, 
and is feasible only if tax systems become more integrated and harmonised. 
 
6.4 Finance 
6.4.1 The size of the scheme and the financing need 
 
The financial needs of the system are strongly correlated with its age. In its early years, 
students take out loans but there are no repayments. In the second phase, students take out 
loans but graduates are already repaying, though the system is not yet mature. The system 
can be regarded as mature only when new generations enter and older generations who 
have repaid in full are leaving. 
 
In order to get a picture of the potential size of the scheme we concentrate on: 
 The value of the outstanding debt portfolio 
 The number of the borrowers (clients) 
 The financing need of the scheme per year 
 
We calculate these values in the framework of three different scenarios. Firstly, we explore 
the outer boundary of the system, i.e. the “Maximum” case. A more likely scenario is the 
“Medium” or average. Finally, we present a “Minimum” scenario, i.e. a pilot project. 
 
THE MAXIMUM SCENARIO fits the mobility target of 20%, assuming that all complementary 
policy measures to achieve this goal are in place. We also assume that all students (318,000 
per year) will take out the loan. 
 
Although this scenario might seem exaggerated, it is not the maximum possible. In theory all 
master’s students (around 4.5 million people, see Table 4a) might decide to take out the loan 
immediately in the first year, but for many reasons this outcome is improbable. Our 
Maximum scenario might be regarded as the largest size that is plausible. 
 
Consider the case where the number of the students within each generation is constant, the 
size of the loan indexed to income growth, and the rate of growth of income constant and 
equal to the interest rate. Assume also, for simplicity, that defaults and administrative costs 
are financed from outside the loan system, e.g. from an EU subsidy. The aggregate 
outstanding debt will evolve as shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. Aggregate outstanding debt of the EU-level student loan scheme – Maximum 
scenario 
 
 
Source: the authors71 
      
Once the system is mature, the present value of aggregate outstanding debt becomes 
constant. Clearly, large amounts of working capital need to be gradually introduced as the 
system matures. The difference between the future and the present value is due to the 
interest accumulating on the working capital. 
 
We assume a repayment model like Model 2a, and for simplicity assume that loan conditions 
are not differentiated, there is no grace period, and no early repayment. The amount of 
working capital depends on the number of new borrowers per year (G), the initial loan 
amount per year (C), the income threshold (T), the fixed repayment level (L), and the length 
of the training period (n). In the case of the EU-level loan scheme one can use the following 
estimates: 
 G = the number of targeted new mobile students in a year = 318,000 (see section 
4.3). 
 C = loan amount per year = €12,000 (see section 4.3.3 and Table 15) 
 T = the median income of highly educated employees in Bulgaria and Romania 
(countries with the lowest income) = €3,600  
  = repayment burden =10%  
 L = *T = repayment burden * income threshold = 10% * €3,600 = €360 
 N = length of the training period (in years) = 1  
 
As we can see, repayment model 2a has two important control variables: 
1. Income threshold (T = €3,600 per year) 
2. Minimum repayment level (L = €360 per year) 
                                                 
 
71 The model is available on the project’s website. Parameters can be changed. The model recalculates 
outstanding debt, the cost of subsidy, and financial needs and its components. 
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The income threshold should be the lowest median income for highly-educated people in the 
EU, and the minimum repayment should be set at a level that does not jeopardise the 
borrower’s standard of living. The implicit repayment burden,  = L/T, can be chosen 
according to political considerations. If the repayment burden is too high, the loan will not be 
attractive for borrowers; if it is too low, repayment capacity is not sufficiently exploited. 
 
The expected length of the repayment period is given by: 
 
yearsL
C
T
nC
33.33360
12000 

  
 
As Table 15 in Section 5.2 shows, this parameter setting is feasible only if the repayment 
level is indexed to income growth in the country concerned. In this case debts can be repaid 
in 30-40 years, and the level of repayment is affordable for Bulgarians and Romanian 
earning a median income. The losses of graduates under the income threshold are financed 
from outside, while the vast majority of graduates who earn more can use the early 
repayment option. These effects are not taken into consideration in the calculations below. 
 
The outstanding debt of the mature system (D) is given by: 
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€65.52 billion 
The size of the mature loan portfolio in present value terms is €65.52 billion in the 
“Maximum” scenario. This is an important number, since the consequences of failure can be 
of this order of magnitude. The money is put into the system over the first 30 to 40 years. In 
this parameter setting the number of clients will increase gradually to (1+33,33) × 318 000 = 
10.9 million.  
   
The net financing need for a given year is the change in total outstanding debt. If total debt 
increases, new funds are required. Assuming that refinancing loans are automatically 
renewed the net financing need is the sum of three components: 
+ new loans to students 
+ interest on refinancing debts 
- repayments of graduates 
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Figure 10. Financing need per year and its components – Maximum scenario 
Financing need and its components - MAXIMUM SCENARIO
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Source: the authors 
 
In this model the financing need is around €5 billion per year. Once the system is mature, 
the cash inflows of graduates’ repayments offset the cash outflows of new loans. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the net cash flow of the scheme (financing need) is not a 
measure of success. When the scheme is expanding (e.g. if the take-up rate and / or size of 
the loan increases) financing needs are higher, and vice versa. In a given year the net cash 
flow can be positive because regular and voluntary early repayments exceed new loans and 
the interest on refinancing loans. In this case the student loan scheme can repay the 
refinancing loans and, as a result, the invested capital decreases. Depending on 
circumstances, net cash flow can be positive or negative, i.e. a liquidity-management issue, 
provided that the lender has easy access to capital markets. 
 
THE MEDIUM SCENARIO. In the previous scenario we overestimated the size of the scheme. 
Now we turn to a more realistic scenario:72 
- The number of potential borrowers is the same (318,000 per year), but we assume 
that take-up rate rises gradually from 5% in the first year to 50% in the 11th year, and 
then stabilises at this level 
- Because of the early repayment option, effective average repayment (€1,080 in the 
first year) is expected to be three times higher than the minimum repayment (€360 in 
the first year). As a result, the average maturity of the loan is much shorter (11.1 
years rather than 33.3 in the Maximum scenario)73 
 
Using more realistic assumptions (e.g. early repayments) the repayment period becomes 
shorter, the system matures earlier, hence the outstanding debt and number of clients can 
be significantly lower. See Figure 11. 
 
                                                 
 
72 One can try other parameter settings as well with the help of the Excel model on the project’s website. 
73 We made this estimation based on the Hungarian experience: in this scheme the effective repayment cash 
flow is almost three times higher than the required. In general, early repayments are expected to be higher if the 
interest rates are higher: the incomes are higher, the income differences are higher, the loan conditions are less 
differentiated and the scheme is less subsidised (because better-than-average borrowers are motivated to leave 
the risk cohort as quickly as possible).  
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Figure 11. Aggregate outstanding debt of the EU-level student loan scheme – Medium 
scenario 
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Source: the authors 
 
In this scenario the size of the debt portfolio stabilises at €11.5 billion after 21 years and the 
number of the borrowers in the mature system is also significantly lower: (1 + 11.11) x 0.5 x 
318,000 = 1.9 million. The financing need of the scheme is proportionally lower as well, as 
Figure 12 shows. 
 
Figure 12. Financing need per year and its components in future value – Medium scenario 
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Source: the authors 
 
The financing need (i.e. the amount required from capital markets) reaches its maximum in 
the 10th year (€1.8 billion), and averages around €1 billion. 
  
MINIMUM SCENARIO (a pilot project). A pilot project would shed light on: 
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- The reaction of students (take-up rates in different countries) 
- The behaviour of borrowers (default rates) 
- Administrative problems (administrative costs) 
- The reaction of investors (refinancing costs) etc 
-  
A pilot limits possible harmful effects, which are difficult to foresee.  
 
On the other hand, some phenomena appear only at a large scale and over an extended 
time period. Furthermore, any delay may be costly in welfare terms (less mobility, less 
employment, less convergence), putting at risk the aims of Europe 2020. 
 
In the Minimum scenario, we apply two sets of constraints: 
(i) A numbers constraint: the total annual number of new borrowers is limited to 
5,000 
(ii) A time constraint: loans are provided only over the first five years 
 
Figure 13 shows the time evolution of the aggregate debt portfolio. 
 
Figure 13. Aggregate outstanding debt of the EU-level student loan scheme – Minimum 
scenario 
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Source: authors 
 
The size of the debt portfolio reaches its maximum in the fifth year (€246 million in present 
value). The scheme is expected to end in the 16th year (5 + 11.11 = 16.11 years) when the 
last generation fully repays its debt. The maximum number of clients is only 5 x 5,000 = 
25,000. The corresponding financial needs are depicted in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Financing need per year and its components in future value – Minimum scenario  
 
 
Source: authors 
 
In the first five years a decreasing amount of money should be involved. The financing need 
is maximal in the first year: around €62 million. From the 6th year the cash flow becomes 
positive when new loans are not available and all borrowers are repaying.  
 
IN SUM. The three scenarios give very different results, summarised in Table 17.  
 
Table 17. Comparison of the scenarios 
 
Scenario Maturity 
of the loan 
Present value of the 
loan portfolio
(billion)
Number of
borrowers
(million)
Financing need per 
year
(billion)
Maximum 33.33 €65.52 10.9 ~ €5 (average)
Median 11.11 €11.56 1.93 ~ €1 (average)
Minimum 11.11 €0.25 0.025 ~ €0.062 (max)
Source: the authors 
 
For comparison, Table 17 shows data for the largest retail banks in Europe in terms of 
outstanding debt and number of clients. 
 
Table 18. The size of the mature EU-level loan scheme compared with some big banks in 
Europe 
 
 Centre Number of clients (million) Loans (billion)
Erste Group Austria      17.30 €130.96
Gruppo Montepacchi Italy       6.30 €151.00
Deutscher Postbank Germany      14.00 €135.31
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy      11.30 €37.80
UniCredit Group Italy      40.00 €558.77
Source: Erste Group Loan Book 
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(http://www.erstegroup.com/sPortal/download?documentPath=ebgroup_en_0196_ACTIVEDownloads
FInvestor_RelationsTables_xls%2FIR_Tab_2010_enIR_Tab_H110_EG_fin_data_sheets.xls) 
Erste Group Fact Sheet 
(http://www.erstegroup.com/sPortal/download?documentPath=ebgroup_en_0196_ACTIVE%2FDownl
oads%2FPress%2FFactsheet%2Ffactsheet_eb-group_en.pdf) 
GRUPPO MONTEPASCHI Financial Report, March 2010 
(http://english.mps.it/NR/rdonlyres/BFE565F7-FCBE-46E4-9EB7-
2AF607A5F33E/45463/1QFinancialReport1.pdf) 
Postbank Group in Figures (http://www.postbank.com/-snm-0000595076-1286545948-0000002009-
0000002923-1286990495-enm-pbcom_ag_home/-snm-0000595076-1286545948-0000002009-
0000002923-1286990506-enm-pbcom_au_about_us/-snm-0000595076-1286545948-0000002009-
0000002923-1286990517-enm-pbcom_au_postbank_profile/pbcom_au_postbank_figures.html) 
Intesa Sanpaolo Profile 
(http://www.group.intesasanpaolo.com/scriptIsir0/isInvestor/eng/chi_siamo/eng_profilo_intesa_sanpa
olo.jsp) 
Intesa Sanpaolo Financial Reports 
http://www.group.intesasanpaolo.com/scriptIsir0/isInvestor/eng/investor_relations/eng_bilanci_relazio
ni_investor_relations.jsp) 
UniCredit Group Financial Reports (http://www.unicreditgroup.eu/en/Investors/financial_reports.htm) 
 
The potential size of the system highlights the importance of the following questions: 
(i) How is it possible to reduce financing costs (the price of the money involved)? 
(ii) Who will bear the risks and administrative costs? 
(iii) Is this loan system part of the state budget or regarded as private debt (the 
classification problem)? 
The next section takes up these topics. 
6.4.2 Default risks and operational costs 
One of the basic concepts of financial literature is that risk and return go together. If 
investors bear more risk then they expect a higher return. Thus financing costs can be 
reduced via (1) reducing risks and (2) wider and more transparent competition of the 
investors.  
 
MARKET FAILURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. Private investors find student lending based on 
repayment model 2a difficult for several reasons: 
1  A heterogeneous portfolio with no risk assessment; thus the risk appetite of individual 
borrowers varies considerably 
2  No collateral 
3 No fixed cash flow and no fixed maturity 
4 Income verification is needed, thus the tax authority should be involved and 
protection of personal data is necessary 
5 Debts are cancelled in cases such as retirement or disability 
6 Debts are not inherited 
7 Early repayment is possible without penalty 
8 There is significant political risk: politicians may modify the model (for example, 
eligibility conditions, amount of loan, interest rate, grace period, etc.) in ways that 
may seriously harm long-run financial sustainability 
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Private investors are reluctant to finance a larger student loan scheme without state support, 
requiring state intervention to transform the cash flows and the corresponding risk-return 
characteristics of the loan portfolio, before passing it to the investors.  
 
Figure 15. Transformation is needed before private funding 
 
Source: the authors 
 
Basically, cash flows should be transformed, because: 
1  The term of the student loans are unusually long (30-40 years) 
2  The cash flows are volatile and hard to forecast because of safeguards to low 
earners, the early repayment option etc 
The necessary condition for the cash-flow transformation is access to EU funds or to liquid 
financial markets. Investors can also manage the liquidity risk but the price is likely to be 
high. 
 
INTEREST RATE POLICY. We have seen that without state subsidy the interest rate on the 
student loans comprises: 
 
interest rate = risk-free interest rate + default risk premium + operational margin  
    
where the risk-free rate represents the cost of finance, the risk premium covers losses due to 
non-repayment, and the margin is to cover the operational costs. The level of the risk-free 
rate is an exogenous variable (LIBOR or TB rates), but the risk premium and the margin are 
partly endogenous because they depend not only on the risk perception and the risk 
aversion of investors but also on the efficiency of the loan system. In a well-designed and 
well-implemented scheme, all interest rate elements should be sufficiently low, since high 
interest rates may deter borrowers and increase the risk of moral hazard and adverse 
selection. 
 
It is important to involve all stakeholders in financing the risks and costs, for example: 
1  Retail banks have an interest in obtaining access to clients; in exchange they can 
offer client services, assist with repayment collection and /or take over some risks 
2  Universities have an interest in attracting mobile students; in exchange they can help 
in contracting and administration as well as taking over some repayment risks 
3  Member States have an interest in supporting talent circulation, therefore they might 
also contribute toward costs 
 
STUDENT 
LOAN 
PORTFOLIO 
PRIVATE 
INVESTORS 
Transformation of cash flows, risk and returns 
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All these elements can help to reduce the risk premium and the margin. But most importantly 
the EU should intervene to reduce the interest rate by taking over part of the costs. In a 
system where the state finances all losses resulting from non-repayment and operational 
costs, investors risk nothing, so would expect only the risk-free rate on their investment. In 
many countries, the interest subsidy is even higher, covering not only the risk premium and 
the margin, but also part of the risk-free rate. Badly targeted interest subsidies such as these 
are financially unsustainable. In addition, if the interest rate is less than the Treasury bond 
rate, (clever) students might be tempted to employ arbitrage tactics, drawing the loan and 
investing the sum in Treasury bonds. Clearly, this would be a perverse redistribution of 
taxpayers’ money. 
 
In conclusion, student lending cannot operate without EU subsidy, but excessive subsidy is 
also harmful. The right balance should be found according to these principles: 
 The interest rate of student loans should not be lower than the risk-free rate (LIBOR 
or Treasury bond rate) 
 The risk premium and the margin should be low, through a well-designed loan 
product and efficient management 
 The risk premium and the margin should be financed in an optimal mix (students, 
Member States, EU). 
 
The key purpose of the mechanism’s design is to determine the optimal risk-sharing mix 
between the EU and students. There are two causes of non-repayment: 
1  Non-systemic or idiosyncratic factors such as death, disability, emigration, temporary 
low income, sporadic unemployment etc. 
2  Systemic factors such as macro shocks, recession, global unemployment, bad 
parameterisations, political changes, environment catastrophes, etc. 
Non-systemic factors can be modelled and calculated, and can thus be managed by the 
traditional risk-management techniques used in the insurance and banking sectors. 
However, most systemic factors are uncertain, hence difficult to evaluate and hedge. A 
reasonable share of risks and costs is for non-systemic risks to be financed by the risk 
community of borrowers, and systemic risks to be financed by the EU.74  
 
Operational costs could also be shared between the community of borrowers and the EU, 
with ongoing operating costs financed by borrowers and the set-up costs by the EU. 
 
Figure 16 summarises a risk- and cost-sharing model based on the minimum of EU subsidy 
necessary for the safe operation of the scheme, similar to the subsidy system of the 
Hungarian student loan scheme. 
 
                                                 
 
74 Of course, Member States can also participate in the financing but, as argued in Section 1-3, mobility should 
be supported at EU level. 
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Figure 16. A reasonable model of risk- and cost-sharing with the lowest possible EU subsidy 
 
Interest rate = Riskless interest rate + Default risk premium + Operational margin  
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the authors 
 
This model possesses a reasonable level of EU subsidy. Of course, if more EU financing is 
available, it is possible to subsidise some or all of the non-systemic risk and/or the cost of 
operation. However, the EU subsidy should not be higher than the sum of the total default 
risk premium and operational margin, i.e. the interest rate paid by graduates should not be 
lower than the risk-free rate, for fiscal reasons, for distributional reasons, and to avoid 
creating arbitrage possibilities. 
 
Students finance their share through an interest rate that may include some or all of the risk 
premium and margin. Both should be variable and recalculated each year in the light of 
actual conditions and expectations. Overpayment by “good” borrowers helps to finance the 
losses of “bad” borrowers. This is a kind of “joint liability” where borrowers provide a cross-
guarantee for each other.75 If, for example, incomes last year were lower, and / or repayment 
discipline worse than expected, the risk premium will increase. Moral hazard can be 
significantly reduced if borrowers who systematically do not repay (say after 6-12 months) 
are pursued by the relevant collection agency, which could require the whole debt to be 
repaid immediately, perhaps with the names of delinquent borrowers published on the 
interbank list of “bad borrowers”.  
 
At the same time, risks related to systemic factors can be covered by the EU through a 
guarantee. Thus, in the case of a macro shock when all graduates are unemployed or leave 
the country or die in a civil war, the EU will consolidate the system. However the EU 
guarantee should not be called down for individual defaults during normal operation, since 
these losses are foreseen and covered by the cohort risk premium.  
 
Operational costs (buildings, staff, computers, etc.) could be financed directly by the EU; 
alternatively, the costs could be spread over many years, which would increase the interest 
rate. 
 
If a significant part of risks and operating costs are taken over by the EU through a 
guarantee and upfront financing of the set-up costs, the risk premium and margin paid by the 
students are reduced to a level that makes student loans attractive, especially in comparison 
with bank loans available on the free market without collateral. 
 
                                                 
 
75 One possible remedy of moral hazard and adverse selection emanating from asymmetric information situation 
is applying joint-liability contracts, see for example Tirole 2005. 
Students Students: non-systemic risk 
     
EU:   systemic risk 
     
Students: cost of operation 
   
EU:   set-up costs 
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COSTS OF EU SUBSIDY. Calculations suggest that the total margin76 should not be higher than 
4%. To explain, consider the worst case of a Bulgarian, who earns €3,600 per year, borrows 
€10,000, starts to repay with a very high repayment burden, say 15% of net income. As 
before, assume that the real interest rate equals the real growth rate of the income. If the 
margin is 0%, he/she will be able to repay in 19 years. As the margin increases, so does the 
maturity of the loan. With a margin of 4%, full repayment requires 37 years. Figure 17 shows 
that any further increase in the margin is useless because debts are cancelled at retirement; 
thus the repayment cash flow remain the same. 
 
Figure 17. The effect of different margins on the individual debt paths 
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Source: authors 
 
These considerations suggest that a well-designed scheme should operate with a total 
margin of less than 4%. As we can see in section 4.1, in the best practice national student 
loan schemes the operational margin is around 1%. Therefore we can set a target for the 
management of the EU loan scheme to keep the operational margin below 1% and the 
default risk premium under 3%.  
 
This rule suggests that the EU subsidy should be somewhere between zero (no subsidy) 
and 4% (total subsidy). The cost of the interest subsidy can be easily calculated: a 1% 
interest subsidy results in EU expenditure of 1% of the total outstanding debt. Figures 18, 19 
and 20 show the cost of the interest subsidy in the different scenarios and in present value 
terms. 
 
                                                 
 
76 The total margin is the sum of the default risk premium and the operational margin. 
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Figure 18. Cost of interest rate subsidy per year in present value – Maximum scenario 
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Source: the authors 
 
Figure 19. Cost of interest rate subsidy per year in present value – Medium scenario 
Cost of EU subsidy - MEDIUM SCENARIO
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Source: the authors 
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Figure 20. Cost of interest rate subsidy per year in present value – Minimum scenario 
Cost of EU subsidy - MINIMUM (pilot) SCENARIO
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Source: the authors 
 
In conclusion, the cost of the EU subsidy depends on two factors: 
1. The size of the scheme, which is hard to forecast 
2. The extent of the interest rate subsidy, which depends on the EU 
 
The cost (in present value) of a 1% interest rate subsidy for one borrower can be easily 
calculated: 
- In the Maximum scenario: €2,060 (a loan of €12,000 repaid in 33.3 years) 
- In the Medium scenario: €727 (a loan of €12,000 repaid in 11.1 years) 
- In the Minimum scenario: €727 (a loan of €12,000 repaid in 11.1 years) 
 
We can also compare the costs of the subsidy with the overall budget of the structural funds. 
For the period from January 2007 to December 2013 it was €277 billion, i.e. about €46 billion 
per year.  
6.4.3 Funding  
If we look at the balance sheet of the student loans administration, we can see that student 
loans of long and indefinite maturity are on the asset side, while refinancing loans of shorter 
maturity are on the liability side (investments and equity is much less significant). See Figure 
21. 
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Figure 21. Balance sheet of the SLA without securitisation 
 
The balance sheet of 
the EU Student Loan Administration
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Source: the authors 
 
Borrowing by the student loans administration transforms private funds into student loans, 
managing the liquidity risk (renewing the loans/bonds), the market risk (exchange rate and 
interest rate changes), and the credit risk (some students will not pay back the whole loan) of 
the whole portfolio. Note that the possibility of early repayment increases the liquidity risk (for 
instance if early repayment drops unexpectedly). 
 
An EU guarantee could have two forms: 
1. An asset-side guarantee lies behind each student loan: if the particular borrower does not 
repay, the guarantor immediately takes his place 
2. A liability-side guarantee can be called down only when the SLA is not able to meet its 
obligations of repaying the refinancing debt on the liability side, due to risks that are not 
covered by the risk premium paid by the borrowers  
 
Most student loan schemes operate with an asset-side guarantee; the only exception is the 
Hungarian loan scheme. An asset-side guarantee is more expensive; it also creates adverse 
incentives during the collection of the repayments (it is easier to call down the guarantee 
than to pursue the borrower). On the face of it, a liability-side guarantee system looks to be 
the better choice, but subject to the major caveat of the classification problem discussed in 
section 6.4.5. 
 
For the sake of completeness, another possible financing model is to put some or all student 
loans into a pool, provide an asset-side EU guarantee, transform the cash flows and create 
different structured products which can be sold to the investors. This approach removes 
student loans from the balance sheet of the student loans administration. This type of 
securitisation model was used, for example, in the US for many years (Sally Mae guarantee 
fund), but in July 2010 the federal guarantee system was completely replaced by direct 
federal loans. 
 
When involving private investors, transparent competition is desirable. Such wholesale 
lending can be through a mix of the following: 
(i) Issuing student loan bonds on debt markets 
(ii) Loan agreements or credit lines with big banks (e.g. EIB) 
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(iii) Direct investments from pension funds 
(iv) Issuing securitised student loan obligations 
 
Wholesale investors will be interested if the proposition makes commercial sense, in terms 
of: 
(i) Attractive cash flows (conventional, fixed, short-term cash flows) 
(ii) Acceptable risks (good portfolio, EU guarantee) 
(iii) Reasonable return (corresponding to the risks investors face) 
 
If only some preselected retail banks were involved, competition would not be wide and 
transparent, financing would be suboptimal, and financing costs likely to be higher than in 
the wholesale model. 
 
6.4.4 Market risk management 
Financial institutions face many types of risks: 
1. Default risk 
2. Liquidity risk  
3. Operational risk 
4. Market risk etc 
In the previous sections we covered the first three (especially default risk and operational 
risks). This section discusses market risk. 
 
European lending for mobile students involves two sorts of market risk: foreign exchange 
(FX) rate risk and interest rate risk. 
 
The exchange rate regimes of the EU Member States are not yet unified. Although under the 
Maastricht Treaty all EU Member States are obliged to join the single currency, the UK, 
Denmark and Sweden have special opt-outs. Most of the central European countries have 
not yet fulfilled the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty or have just joined the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II). Accordingly 16 of the 27 EU members have already 
joined the euro zone, five countries have pegged their national currencies to the euro, (of 
which four have entered the ERM-II system), and six Member States have a floating 
exchange rate regime (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the UK). 
Figure 22 illustrates how significant exchange risk can be. 
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Figure 22. Foreign exchange rates against the euro 2001-2010  
 
 
Source: ECB statistics 
Remark: 01.01.2001 = 100% 
 
Suppose, initially, that all students borrow in euro, debts are denominated in euro, the 
interest rate on the loan is denominated in euro (the euro rate of the best borrowers + a 
margin), and graduates have to repay in euro. Two problems arise in this simple model: 
1 Mobile students studying in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden 
or the UK face exchange rate risk since the student loan is disbursed in several 
instalments. For example, if the British pound strengthens relative to the euro, the real 
value of the loans for students in the UK will decline. 
2 Graduates working in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden or in 
the UK face exchange rate risk because the repayment obligation is in euro while their 
income is in a different currency 
 
The first problem is less serious, since the bulk of the student loan is paid at the beginning of 
the course. In contrast, the repayment period is much longer (up to 40 years) and graduates 
with non-euro income face considerable exchange rate risk, potentially generating defaults 
and jeopardising the financial sustainability of the scheme. Moreover exchange rate risks 
could discourage students from taking out a loan. An additional but important problem is that 
periodical conversions could be expensive. 
 
In order to reduce the foreign exchange risk and its effects, the student loans agency could 
offer hedging. It could 
1. Offer to convert the allowance from euro to another currency during studies at a fixed 
rate. In this way students can plan their budget and are immune to exchange rate 
fluctuations  
2. Offer to convert the debt from euro to the currency in which the graduate has his 
income. In this way graduates can significantly reduce their exposure to exchange 
rate risk. 
 
In principle, students could hedge their positions on their own, but the student loans agency 
can do so more cost-effectively, because (a) it has a big multicurrency portfolio where 
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conversions may offset each other and (b) it has a better market position and can trade at 
lower margins. 
 
Debt conversion raises some technical questions: what is the optimal hedging strategy, and 
how do you determine the interest rate in different currencies? 
 
If a Hungarian student obtains a master’s degree in France, takes out the loan in euro and 
then works in Hungary, he has a clear interest in hedging his exchange-rate risk and in 
switching his debt into Hungarian forint. The possibility of changing the currency of the loan 
is optional and allowed only for the purpose of matching exposure, not for speculation. But 
what happens if after some years the same graduate goes to work in Germany? Clearly, he 
should be allowed to switch the debt back into euro. But it is possible that the debt will be 
higher than initially because of adverse changes in exchange rates. In practice, nobody can 
be sure of his future career path, and so exchange-rate risks cannot be perfectly hedged.77 
At worst, the graduate repays all his active life but cannot fully repay his debt before 
retirement. In this case the community of borrowers and the EU pay the costs in form of a 
higher risk premium. 
 
When debt is converted into another currency, the relevant interest rate should also be 
determined. Consider a hypothetical situation where the student’s debt is denominated in 
euro and the interest rate determined as the riskless euro interest rate (e.g. LIBOR or the 
German treasury bond rate) plus a default risk premium plus an operational margin, say:  
3% + 2% + 1% = 6%. The graduate returns to Hungary and converts his debt into Hungarian 
forint. What should the corresponding interest rate be in forint? One option is the riskless 
rate in forint (BUBOR or a treasury bond rate in forint) which might be much higher, say 6% 
plus the same default risk premium and operational margin, i.e. 6% + 2% + 1% = 9%. This 
formula is fair and helps to avoid arbitrage.  
 
All three elements of the interest rate may change over time. As discussed in Section 5, a 
fixed interest rate over the whole repayment period would be too risky for both borrower and 
lender. It is preferable to have a variable interest rate with a reasonable resetting period (1-2 
years) and algorithm: 
 The riskless rate should be linked to a reference rate (interbank rate, TB-rate etc.) 
 The default risk premium can be fixed (saying that all the rest should be financed by 
the EU) or can be recalculated each year depending on prevailing conditions and the 
performance of the loan portfolio 
 The operational margin can also be fixed at a low level or recalculated each year 
 
The student loans agency has the task of harmonising the student loans and refinancing 
loans in terms of their sensitivity to interest rate movements. 
 
6.4.5 The classification problem 
Devising a system where students borrow mainly from private sources but where income-
contingent repayments are collected by the tax authorities is more difficult than it sounds. 
International guidelines on national accounting include discussion of the dividing line 
between public and private spending. The issue is how to ensure that loans from private 
sources are classified as private spending under such guidelines.78  
                                                 
 
77 Theoretically hedging instruments could include option-like products, but the price of the FX options are too 
high, and this type of protection would multiply the costs of the loan.  
 
78 The EU guidelines are the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts issued by Eurostat.  
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To simplify a complex problem, four factors are relevant when deciding whether student 
loans are public or private: 
 Who designs the scheme? Does the government set the rules, or the private lender? 
 Who decides whether a student is eligible, e.g. can a private lender refuse to lend to 
bad risks? 
 Where does the money come from? 
 Who bears the risk of default, i.e. at the margin does the private lender bear the risk 
or is there a government guarantee? 
 
If a student takes out a conventional bank loan, it is the bank’s scheme (e.g. the bank can 
decide what interest rate to charge); the bank decides whether or not it wishes to lend to the 
student; the money he/she borrows comes from the bank; and the bank bears the risk that 
he/ she will fail to repay. Clearly this is a private scheme. In contrast, if the government 
designs a loan scheme, decrees that all students are eligible, provides the money that 
students borrow and bears the risk of default itself, the scheme is public. 
 
Problems arise where a scheme meets some of the criteria to be classified as private, but 
not all. Suppose a student takes out a loan from a bank, but the government gives the bank 
a full guarantee. Under international guidelines, the entire loan will generally count as public 
spending. Though on the face of it paradoxical, the logic is straightforward: since the 
government guarantees repayment, no risk is transferred to the private lender. In taking out 
the loan the student is therefore acting as an agent of government, and hence the loan is 
government borrowing. Though the student nominally borrows from a private bank, all such 
lending is classified as public. 
 
Though there is no mechanical way of assessing whether a particular scheme conforms with 
the classification criteria, there is increasing agreement about two aspects of any scheme: 
that what matters is not the letter of any arrangement but its intent, and that the critical 
element is risk transfer. Thus the fact that a student borrows from a private bank is not on its 
own sufficient to ensure that the loan is private; it is only private if the lender faces a 
significant fraction of the risk. It follows that an element of judgement is inescapable. 
Suppose the government agrees to underwrite losses of up to x% of total lending, private 
lenders bearing the risk of losses above that level. If other relevant criteria are met, if x = 2% 
there would be general agreement that the scheme was private; on the other hand, if x = 
75% the scheme would almost certainly be classified as public, since risk transfer would be 
a fiction, not a reality. Clearly, the value of x which tips the scheme from private to public 
involves judgment. The issue is germane not only to private financing of student loans, but 
also to such areas as transport and investment in hospitals. 
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6.5 Institutional architecture 
 
6.5.1 The options 
 
We argued in previous sections that (1) an EU-level loan scheme is desirable for mobile 
students, (2) the loan product should be determined according to EU-level policy objectives 
and (3) some EU-level subsidies are needed, either through direct financing and / or 
guarantee. 
 
The starting point for the institutional design is that an EU-level agency determines the loan 
product and provides EU subsidies. We can differentiate several models according to who is 
ultimately the lender institution taking the risks of the lending activity and managing the 
cooperation with all the other stakeholders, for example: 
1. A specialised EU agency 
2. Piggybacked on other, lower lever stakeholders: 
2a) National tax authorities 
2b) National student loan centres 
2c) Universities and / or 
2d) Banks 
 
In all of the five models the following activities can be either retained by the lender institution 
or outsourced to other agents: 
 Communication and client service 
 Administration 
 Collection of the repayments 
 Financing and risk management 
 
The institutional models have different advantages and disadvantages in terms of the 
technology, the cost of information, the scale effects, the externalities, the synergies and 
most importantly, the agency costs.  
 
Agency cost has two main sources: 
1. Costs that are inherent in using an agent (e.g., the risk that agents will use 
organisational resources for their own benefit and not for the achievement of EU 
objectives)  
2. The costs of techniques to mitigate these problems (e.g., the costs of monitoring and 
control or the costs of incentives to motivate the agents) 
 
In order to reduce agency costs, it is crucial to set clear targets, for example in terms of 
financing costs, the default rate, administrative cost (the best practice models operate at an 
operational margin of less than 1%), take-up rates, etc. However, for the reasons set out in 
section 6.4.1, the cash flows and the financing needs of the scheme are not appropriate 
performance measures. Nevertheless, less important, short-term measurable targets should 
not dominate the important, long-term hard-to-measure objectives. 
 
The rest of this section discusses the most important attributes of the five institutional 
models outlined above.  
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Figure 23. Model 1 Specialised EU agency 
 
 
 
The model: 
 The specialised EU agency could be a division of an existing EU organisation 
 Many activities can be outsourced. Tax authorities (TA) can provide information or 
act as final collector. National student loan schemes (SLC), universities (UNIV) and 
banks (BANK) may help with client services or collecting repayments  
 Member States can contribute to the success of the scheme by ensuring the 
assistance of the tax authorities and / or the existing student loan systems 
 Universities have a considerable interest in improving student mobility. Furthermore 
they have natural advantage in reaching students directly, to provide personalised 
information, certifications and information  
 Banks are interested in new clients especially the best HE students. This value 
added can be exploited in several ways: (i) they can provide marketing, client 
services, administration and financial services at a low (zero) price, (ii) take on a part 
of the default risk (this is less realistic), or (iii) pay a fee in line with the number of 
new clients 
 The outsourcing strategy could be country specific 
 
Advantages: 
 The EU-level agency represents EU policy objectives. One agency – one objective – 
one task: the performance is transparent and achievements can be easily monitored. 
Different objectives and interests conflict less within a single organisation; therefore 
the agency cost is lower, increasing both efficiency and effectiveness. All the 
subtasks are delegated to the most appropriate agents. 
 This new institution would help national loan schemes to collect the repayments of 
immobile students who become mobile graduate. 
 The CEDEFOP survey on European student lending practices also highlights that 
specialised institutions are more successful in managing extensive loan schemes 
(e.g., the UK, SE, NL, HU). Moreover, administrative costs are usually lower with a 
specialised agency than in a retail-bank based model. 
 The wholesale financing model (described in section 6.4), which ensures wide and 
transparent competition in financing can be easily implemented. 
 
Disadvantages: “another EU agency” 
 
Specialised 
EU agency Community level 
National level: 
TA SLC UNIV BANK 
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Figure 24. Model 2a Piggybacked on the national tax authorities 
 
 
The model: 
 Student lending is delegated to the national tax authorities, as in Australia and New 
Zealand 
 The tax authorities can implement repayments as a payroll deduction 
 In principle, tasks can be outsourced similarly to the specialised agency model, but in 
practice is more difficult 
 
Advantages: 
 Tax authorities have technical advantage in collecting income contingent repayments 
 Tax authorities have strong enforcement powers 
 Much of the necessary information and procedures for student lending are already in 
place 
 National tax offices can solve many mobility issues 
 The development of tax systems may have significant positive externalities 
 
Disadvantages: 
 An EU agency is needed to monitor and control the tax authorities and to provide the 
EU subsidy (financing and guarantee) 
 National tax systems are neither developed nor integrated enough to fulfil this task  
 The operation of national tax systems is difficult to harmonise, because timing, 
definitions and rules, etc. are very different  
 Tax authorities have no direct interest in student lending. The resulting lack of 
motivation can be costly 
 Some Members States may be reluctant to support the loan scheme (fears of brain 
drain, lack of resources to develop the tax system), aggravating the agency problem 
 It is difficult to imagine wholesale finance organised by the tax authorities 
 Presumably, the student loan debts will be classified as public. (It is hard to imagine, 
that tax authorities involve private funds into the financing) 
 It is not clear how national tax authorities would share the contracts of mobile 
students and graduates among themselves 
 
National level: 
Specialised 
EU agency Community level: 
TA SLC UNIV BANK 
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Figure 25. Model 2b Piggybacked on the national student loan centres 
 
 
 
The model: 
 National student loan centres (SLC) would get a new product defined, supported and 
monitored by the EU 
 The EU loan would be separate from other products 
 The loan could be provided either by the home or the host country’ SLC 
 Many tasks can be outsourced 
 
Advantages: 
 SLCs have a technological advantage in managing cooperation among different 
stakeholders 
 Member States would be motivated to set up a student loan centre if it did not already 
exist, which would also help immobile students 
 National SLCs would be motivated to cooperate at EU level and set up an integrated 
network. This would create a significant positive externality, helping national SLCs to 
collect repayments from mobile graduates (even if the student was non-mobile) 
 
Disadvantages: 
 An EU agency is needed to monitor and control the SLCs and to provide the EU 
subsidy (financing and guarantee) 
 SLCs may have different objectives, which can result in high agency costs 
 In many cases, SLCs are nonexistent, or small or inefficient 
 Well-established SLCs vary widely: eligibility rules differ; repayments may be income 
contingent or mortgage type; the type of institution varies; the loan may or may not 
be subsidised. For all these reasons, synergies may be limited 
 
National level: 
Specialised 
EU agency Community level: 
TA SLC UNIV BANK 
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Figure 26. Model 2c Piggybacked on the universities 
 
 
 
The model: 
 Student lending is delegated to universities as for example in the U.S. (Yale, 
Princeton etc.) 
 The loan product is defined, supported and monitored by the EU 
 Many tasks can be outsourced to other stakeholders 
 Administrative costs could be financed by the universities 
 
Advantages:  
 Universities are interested in attracting mobile students, and so clearly profit from this 
new instrument 
 Agency costs can be low, since the interests of universities are close to the EU 
objectives 
 Universities are specialised in client service and administration, all information is 
directly available 
 
Disadvantages: 
 An EU agency is needed to monitor and control the SLCs and to provide the EU 
subsidy (financing and guarantee) 
 Universities are not good at financial management; it is difficult to envisage wholesale 
lending operated by universities 
 Universities cannot be forced to participate, and some might be reluctant to provide 
this service 
 Lending is not in the main purpose of universities. Involvement in loans may alter 
their objectives and resources, especially if they take on some default risks 
 Universities are not good at collecting repayments. This core activity should be 
outsourced, raising issues of agency costs again 
 Universities are fragmented, so that economies of scale cannot be realised 
 
National level: 
Specialised 
EU agency 
Community level: 
TA SLC UNIV BANK 
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Figure 27. Model 2d Piggybacked on the banks 
 
 
The model: 
 Student lending is delegated to banks as in many countries for example Germany, 
Finland, France, Italy. The loan product is defined, supported and monitored by the 
EU as in the previous models 
 Two solutions are possible: (i) banks set up a specialised student loan agency 
together or (ii) each bank operates on its own. In any case, the EU loan would be 
separate from other products and activities (firewall) 
 It is possible to involve all the banks, or a consortium (if not contrary to competition 
law) 
 Many tasks can be outsourced in this model as well 
 
Advantages: 
 Banks have technological advantages in running bank accounts, to execute financial 
transactions and to manage default, market and other types of risks. Banks have 
branches in several countries 
 Banks could bear a part of the risks and administration costs in exchange for the new 
clients 
 
Disadvantages: 
 An EU agency is needed to monitor and control the SLCs and to provide the EU 
subsidy (financing and guarantee) 
 The objectives of a profit-making bank are very different from those of the EU. Thus 
agency costs are likely to be high. In the US and Canada in 2010 the student lending 
system was radically changed. After a long debate it was concluded that it was 
preferable for the state to make direct loans to students rather than providing 
guarantees for loans given out by the banks 
 International experience (see for example the CEDEFOP survey) shows that 
administrative costs can be high in a retail bank model 
 Loans are financed from the bank’s resources, the costs are not transparent, and 
thus there is not wide competition among the investors. This is particularly the case if 
only a consortium of banks is involved 
 
 
National level: 
Specialised 
EU agency Community level: 
TA SLC UNIV BANK 
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6.5.2 Issues and challenges 
It is beyond the report’s remit to suggest a specific administrative structure. Instead, this 
section attempts to establish the parameters of what might be feasible (Table 19), and 
outlines the particular challenges that an EU-wide system would face. 
 
Table 19. Essential administrative functions in a centralised and decentralised model 
 
 
Function 
 
  
Roles and responsibilities 
In a centralised function 
  
Roles and responsibilities 
In a decentralised function 
 
Management 
Accounting & 
Financial control 
 
  
Maintenance of all financial 
records, reporting and production 
of company accounts. The role 
will also include liaison with banks 
and other financial institutions. 
 
  
Role would remain the same to 
ensure function meets the 
requirements of legal and other 
compliance issues and 
requirements.  
 
Computer systems 
and information 
technology 
development  
 
  
This will include control and 
development of all software79.  
 
  
Systems operational activity could 
be outsourced but would require 
control and monitoring as a 
centralised function from a central 
point.  
 
Internal Audit which 
would include 
college and 
university liaison / 
auditing, and 
monitoring / control 
of external support 
functions. 
 
  
Audit responsibility and reporting 
on all internal functions. 
Developing relationship 
management and control over 
college administration. It should 
also cover outsourced facilities 
management e.g., printing etc. 
  
This role is central to an ability to 
demonstrate clearly to both partners 
and investors that a strong 
methodology ensuring data and 
systems integrity is in place. 
 
Loans 
Administration 
 
  
Responsibility for handling all 
customer enquiries, incoming and 
outgoing correspondence80 and 
telephone contact81 with 
borrowers. Controlling release of 
data to banks and financial 
institutions for payment requests, 
liaising with finance on failed 
payments and handling 
management information 
reporting. 
 
  
Telephony and correspondence 
could become outsourced functions, 
though requiring control from a 
central point. 
 
Central Operations 
 
  
Control over all incoming loan 
documentation, e.g., eligibility 
  
Role would remain largely as a 
centralised function 
                                                 
 
79 Development in-house will ensure retention of intellectual property rights and the maintenance of standard 
definitions. 
80 This could be regarded as a possibly outsourced activity but our recommendation would be to retain in-house 
because of the access required to borrower records and the aspect of confidentiality. 
81 This is an ideal function for outsourcing but consideration should be given to having this in-house for perhaps, 
say, the first operational year. 
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certificates, application forms and 
loan agreement and control over 
off-site storage and day-to-day 
support for all externally provided 
support functions 
  
 
Personnel 
 
  
Maintaining all staff records 
including training. This latter 
aspect will, at least initially, 
include training for college and 
university administration staff. 
  
  
Training, which would certainly be 
required in the initial stages could 
become an outsourced function but 
records maintenance / control would 
remain a centralised function.  
 
Collections  
 
  
Pursuit of all overdue 
repayments, enquiries from 
borrowers/banks etc. for all 
enquiries relating to overdue 
payments as well as all other 
aspects relating to pursuit of 
default. This would include liaising 
with banks, external partners and 
support providers, and instigating 
legal action where required. 
 
  
Role would remain largely as a 
centralised function, though 
functions such as appointment of 
external trace / collection etc. 
activities would be outsourced. 
 
 
 
CHALLENGES FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EU LOAN SCHEME. An EU loan faces a series 
of issues: 
 
 Tracking students is harder when they are internationally mobile. This is also true of 
students who borrow from national systems and become internationally mobile, but 
the proportion of internationally mobile students will be higher in an EU loan scheme. 
 
 The definition of income is different in different countries, e.g., in the UK contributions 
to approved private pensions are top-sliced. This point is most acutely relevant where 
there is an income-contingent element, but also to a mortgage loan that allows 
deferral where a graduate’s income is less than €X. 
 
 Income disparities across the EU are wider than those within individual member 
states. This has several implications: 
 It affects the maximum size of loan that can be repaid 
 It affects the choice of threshold at which income-contingent repayments start, 
or below which a graduate can defer repayments in a mortgage scheme 
 
 Exchange rate risk is relevant, as discussed in section 6.4.4. The problem arises also 
for students who borrow from national schemes and become internationally mobile, 
but in that case it is clear that a graduate who has borrowed from the UK scheme, for 
example, has to repay in sterling, and that the individual graduate bears the 
exchange rate risk. In the case of an EU loan (a) the rate risk will affect more 
students, and (b) the way the risk should be shared is a matter for debate. 
 
 If low-earning graduates are required to make a nominal repayment to enable the 
loans administrator to stay in contact, then a mechanism is needed to distinguish 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 115
non-receipts from this group from non-repayment by graduates who should be 
making more than nominal repayments, where the issue is one of potential default. 
Both groups will require action, but perhaps with different priorities. 
 
 Regulatory and legal requirements are both relevant to avoid a situation in which a 
series of differing rules apply in different member states. Equally, it is important to be 
careful that these do not conflict with statutory consumer rights. 
 
 If the introduction of any online application process is being considered, it is essential 
to ensure complete compatibility of computer systems within the education sector, 
and how these will fit with those of the loans administrator. 
 
6.6 Political implementation 
 
Economists tend to focus on strategic policy design and to underestimate the importance of 
implementation. Section 5 discussed policy design and this section technical 
implementation, i.e. administrative aspects. Both are core to the remit of this study. But good 
policy design and effective technical implementation are not enough. It is necessary also to 
build political support for the loan proposal, i.e. to effect political implementation. 
 
Though not central to this study, it is important to remember that politics matters: improving 
higher education requires strong political leadership. In its absence, it takes a long time, and 
political mishandling can muddy the waters, making reform harder than it needs to be. The 
situation that prevailed in the UK in the 1990s exemplifies both problems. Without strong 
political leadership reform may be impossible – see, for example the political difficulties that 
attend the discussion of tuition fees in most European countries. 
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7. Analysing the Options 
 
7.1 Delphi Method 
 
The research team used a two-round Delphi method to gather opinion about the alternatives 
for design characteristics and institutional framework. 
 
7.1.1 Methodology 
 
THE DELPHI METHOD is a systematic and interactive technique for using a panel of experts. 
The experts answer questions, make comments on statements, and express ideas on issues 
in two or more rounds. After each round, a facilitating team82 provides an anonymous 
summary of the experts’ comments from the previous round, along with the reasons and 
supporting arguments for their judgments. In the light of those replies, the experts are then 
asked to revise their earlier answers. Experience with the Delphi method shows that during 
this process the range of the answers will converge upon a consensus and in that way the 
process decreases the variation of the recommendations.  
  
FIRST DELPHI ROUND: The facilitators sent out the description of the repayment models 
(Section 5.2) and asked the following four questions: 
1. Please comment on the basic principles and their rationale 
2. Please provide arguments about the relevance of Model 2a. In your opinion what 
other measures are needed to make the scheme attractive for the students and 
sustainable in financial terms? 
3. What kind of support mechanism is needed to finance the costs of non-
repayments and/or the policies against brain drain or other purposes? Can or 
should it be connected to EU funds? 
4. In your opinion, should the parameter setting of the scheme (loan amount, 
interest rate, income threshold, level of fix repayment, percentage of income to 
be repaid) be universal or differentiated by countries and /or borrowers? 
 
At this stage experts were asked to keep the inflow of ideas, issues and comments as broad 
as possible, encouraging all participants to be creative. The members of the expert panel 
submitted their first round of ideas to the facilitators, based on which the team created a 
structured anonymous summary of all the answers, comments, clarification, questions, 
additions and further suggestions (see Appendix 4). This summary was sent out to the 
experts for the second round. 
 
SECOND DELPHI ROUND: In the second round two questions were asked:  
1. Please overview the attached summary and briefly describe the loan product you 
think would best serve long-term EU policies. If you have any further comments, 
questions, clarifications etc. please let us know. 
2. Please conclude what institutional solution is the most appropriate for the loan 
product you proposed and please also explain why. 
The Delphi method was finished by a structured write up of the experts’ views on the loan 
product and the institution (see Appendix 5, summarised briefly below. 
 
                                                 
 
82 Facilitators were Edina Berlinger and András Nemeslaki. 
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7.1.2 Delphi results: the loan product 
 
Eligibility for the loan should be transparent, with simple and clear requirements. Experts 
drew attention to the fact that simplicity and clarity also reduce administrative costs. 
Naturally, safeguards against cheating should be built in, and online self-eligibility checks 
might support the application process. In order to increase awareness of potential borrowers 
and universities, it is important to promote the scheme. Some experts raised the question of 
whether academic performance should be considered and/or how eligibility is affected when 
or if the student changes study programme. 
 
Experts agreed on the desirability of a loan product with universal characteristics for all 
borrowers. Universal parameters are easy to understand, and the political risk of acceptance 
can be minimised by offering a unified product across the whole of Europe. 
 
As far as the loan amount is concerned, there appeared to be a consensus that it should 
cover both tuition fees and living costs for the period of study. Some experts suggested 
taking into consideration available financial support (grants, national student loans) as well.  
 
The emphasis of a full income-contingent scheme and / or income contingent elements was 
dominant in the expert responses, supported by the argument that default in income-
contingent schemes is typically lower than in mortgage-style lending. It is also true that it is 
administratively more expensive but the additional costs are offset by improved cash flow 
and can be further reduced as administration develops.  
 
The collection mechanism and the default management will be critical elements, according 
to the experts. Some suggested creating a “mutual risk fund” from the graduates’ 
repayments in order to manage credit loss by applying a cohort risk premium. The downside 
of this approach is that some borrowers would opt out of the system (adverse selection). 
Expert opinion varied as to the most efficient methods of collection. The role of tax offices 
was discussed but also the attendant issue of increased coordination costs.  
 
Early repayment without penalty was also near-unanimously considered desirable, as was 
the inclusion of occasional payment holidays in the event of job transitions or employment 
problems. 
 
Some experts indicated surprisingly short maturities: for example 4-5 years. Probably, the 
Delphi experts based their conclusion on their experience of student lending with higher-
income borrowers and a more homogenous portfolio. Note, however, that in the EU-level 
student loan scheme income differences are much higher than within a single country, and 
that low-income borrowers should also be able to repay the loan. Given the extreme case of 
a Bulgarian student studying for, say, a master’s degree in the UK and returning to Bulgaria 
upon completion, it would not be feasible for him/her to repay in 12-20 years: Rather a 30-40 
year repayment schedule would be more realistic. 
 
The experts made many concrete suggestions for setting the interest rate, which are taken 
into consideration in our final report. As a basic principle, operating costs should be covered, 
depending on the type of other funds and sources that are available. This leads to the 
important issue of subsidising the scheme. 
 
A firm statement of self-sustaining operations was articulated by the experts. They 
expressed a common view that the system should not increase the burden on EU taxpayers, 
and that its operation should be streamlined and simple. On the other hand, some pointed 
out that EU policy objectives might be reinforced by using subsidies to create desirable 
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incentive structures for borrowers (for instance against brain drain). In contrast, one of the 
experts took the position that there should not be interference with the free movement of 
people and services, not even by EU subsidy, since it transgresses fundamental principles of 
the European Union.  
 
7.1.3 Delphi results: institutional models 
 
In the second round of the Delphi method, the facilitating team asked which institutional 
solution is the most appropriate for the loan product, and why. Five basic institutional models 
were presented: 
‐ Specialised, EU-level agency 
‐ National student loan centres  
‐ Consortium of some big banks 
‐ All banks  
‐ Universities 
 
First of all, the specialised EU-level agency appeared to be the first preference of all our 
experts – though qualified by a number of warnings and constraints. It was, for instance, 
emphasised that the organisation should have a flat management structure, with a strong 
management structure. Some activities can be outsourced, with the exception of mission 
critical operations, e.g. collection, raising finance and liaising with EU level authorities. Some 
of the key arguments for a specialised EU-level agency were that universities, banks and 
national student loan centres possess a national outlook on mobility, and that pan-European 
level interests are better represented by a dedicated EU-level institution. One of the experts 
also stated that banks are especially bad at cross-border student lending. 
 
Secondly, experts advocated greater involvement by universities. University administration 
can be straightforward, as there is only one product to manage. This in turn means simplicity 
in dealing with enquiries, resulting in fewer errors. By having only one product, marketing 
also becomes simpler. This new instrument would provide universities with the opportunity to 
offer a wider range of study and to become more actively involved in shaping educational 
requirements. Involving universities in administration could be presented as part of the 
overall benefits package. 
 
The involvement of alumni emerged as an interesting idea. was also mentioned – the 
underlying premise being that peer pressure might be used to improve repayment discipline. 
Innovative instruments offer opportunities in this respect, for instance social networking 
(Facebook) and creative use of information communication technologies to support outreach 
and access. 
 
Thirdly, the role of banks was discussed. As it turned out, there was a consensus that 
delegating product management to banks or a consortium of banks is a “second or third” 
best option. Several questions were raised in this regard: would the funding be provided by 
banks? Should the EIB provide loans? How should EU funds, bonds and other instruments 
be used? All these concerns and ideas are summarised in Appendices 4 and 5 and were fed 
back into the main report and incorporated in our suggestions. 
 
 
7.2 Multi-Criteria Scoring Method  
 
The research team analysed (1) the four design options (loan product) and (2) the five 
institutional models with the help of a Multi-Criteria Scoring Method. The details can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
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1. The design options 
 
The following options were assessed: 
O1: Unified conditions for all borrowers with no subsidy 
O2: Unified conditions for all borrowers with subsidy 
O3: Different parameter setting for different type of borrowers with no subsidy 
O4: Different parameter setting for different type of borrowers with subsidy 
 
According to the design options the following criteria and criteria weights were determined by 
the research team in the framework of a sophisticated evaluation process based on pair wise 
comparisons: 
 
The criteria and the criteria weights used for the evaluation of the design options: 
Efficiency (0,429) 
- Funding cost (0,010) 
- Default rate (0,052) 
- Administrative costs (0,052) 
- Financial sustainability (0,314) 
Equity (0,071) 
Effectiveness (0,5) 
- Eligibility (0,027) 
- Size of the loan (0,189) 
- Take up rate (0,047) 
- Long run impact (0,236) 
 
The design options were assessed against these criteria. The results can be seen in Figure 
28. 
 
Figure 28. Composition of the scores of the design options 
 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
As we can see in Figure 28, O4 received the highest total score especially in the criteria of 
long-term impacts and financial sustainability; because differentiated parameters and outside 
subsidy make it possible to give out a relatively high amount of loans and get it back in the 
long run. On the other hand, O3 (differentiated conditions without subsidy) secured its 
second position because of high performance in terms of financial sustainability, while O2 
reached almost the same total score with a strong assessment of its long term impact. In the 
case of O1 Figure 28 confirms that the lowest score is explained in the low values of 
effectiveness (the loan amount is seriously constraint). Sensitivity analysis showed that 
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these results are quite stable, only extreme changes in the criteria weights would result in 
different ranking. 
 
2. The institutional models 
 
The following models were assessed: 
M1: Specialized EU-level agency 
M2: National student loan centers 
M3: Consortium of some banks 
M4: All banks: the scheme is open to any financial institution upon meeting certain 
requirements 
M5: Universities 
The detailed description of the alternatives and the performance criteria can be found in 
section 6.5. For the MCSM analysis we excluded the institutional model based on tax 
authorities because experts indicated that at present the tax systems in Europe are not 
sufficiently well developed and integrated, therefore it is not a feasible alternative. 
 
The criteria and the criteria weights were different in this context: 
Efficiency (0,667) 
- Agency costs (0,500) 
- Collection mechanism (0,083) 
- Administrative costs (0,083) 
Availability (0,167) 
EU-wide positive effects (0,167) 
 
The scores are presented in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. Composition of the scores of the institutional models 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
Figure 29 clearly shows that the team gave a very high weight to efficiency, and identified 
the EU-level agency’s (M1) performance as potentially very good in this regard due to the 
fact that responsibilities are clear, the objectives are well-defined, the performance can be 
easily measured, therefore the agency problems are minimised. When comparing the result 
with the Delphi Method, the expert panel suggested a higher potential for the university-
based implementations than the MCSM approach. Though universities are good at 
disbursement, they face serious challenges in collection and managing the financial 
engineering of such instruments. But the disbursement advantages can be exploited in all 
five models by outsourcing some client service tasks. The team in the MCSM rated the 
national schemes (M2) higher than the rest of the models, because they valued the rich 
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experience of these institutions in operations and also the efficient local mechanisms. 
Sensitivity analysis showed that the ranking is quite stable in this case as well. 
 
 
7.3. Case study analysis 
 
This part of the study identified which of the alternatives defined in section 5.3.5 would best 
correspond to the national contexts of the selected countries with student loan schemes 
already in place. The case studies looked in particular at Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Spain (Catalan region) and the UK. The full analysis is contained in Appendix 
3. 
 
From a variety of variables, listed in Appendix 3, we selected those most likely to influence 
the functioning of an EU student loan scheme: 
 
 **Repayment flows will be stronger in richer than in poorer countries. 
 Administrative capacities developed in existing loan schemes could be used for 
administering the EU student loan scheme at the national level. 
 The functioning of the EU student loan scheme will also be influenced by the quality 
of education, the average loan portfolio, labour market absorption of graduates, and 
returns to higher education in particular. 
 In addition, the attractiveness of subsidised or non-subsidised models will be 
influenced by whether or not the Member State in question is a net contributor to the 
EU budget. 
 
Other variables are likely to influence the loan scheme in combinations with others and thus 
have been assessed individually. Among those, the existing loan scheme and its portability, 
mobility trends and already-available state support to students should be mentioned. Below 
we provide analysis for each country and identify the alternatives that pose minimum risks 
across the selected Member States. 
 
CONCLUSIONS. Despite significant differences and clear preference of different models in the 
selected countries, it is of key importance that the EU student loan scheme finds a common 
denominator and adequately controls risks in all of the Member States. Controlling risks may 
be even more important than benefiting from favourable national conditions. Therefore, 
based on the data in Table 24, it can be concluded that although administrative capacities in 
some countries are sufficient to implement Model 2b, the context is unfavourable and hence 
Model 2a should be preferred. In addition, differentiated solutions that increase repayment 
rates in different countries and protect certain socio-economic groups should be preferred. 
Although three countries from the sample are net contributors and the other three are net 
receivers of EU budget allocations, option O3 matched national contexts better, as O4 would 
require more administrative capacities. 
 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 122
Table 20. Comparison of the alternative models in six national contexts 
 
Country 2a 2b O4 O3 O2 O1
Germany 1 2 1 3 2 0
Hungary 1 4 3 1 0 1
Lithuania 1 0 2 1 1 0
Netherlands 2 0 0 2 1 0
Spain 
(Catalonia) 
1 -4 1 1 2 -2
UK 1 0 1 2 0 0
Total 
positive 
negative 
7 
8 
1 
2
15
13
8
13
5
10
11
1
6 
9 
3 
-1
1
2
Note: 2a refers to the Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners; 2b refers to the Hybrid model with 
income-contingent repayments for low- and middle-income earners; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
 
The sample did not include any of the countries where loan schemes do not currently 
operate at all (Czech Republic, Ireland and Romania). If other countries were introduced, it is 
likely that subsidised alternatives will be preferred, considering the uneven distribution of 
income, returns to higher education, and mobility. On the other hand, subsidies would 
require even higher administrative capacities, which are more limited in those countries 
without loan schemes. It is important that the issues faced by low-income countries such as 
Bulgaria are adequately addressed in the upcoming stages of loan design. In this respect, 
the case studies do not allow adequately identifying the need for subsidies, yet they strongly 
confirm that Model 2a for repayment and differentiated options for EU contribution are 
currently best suited to the EU context. 
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8 Potential evolutionary pathways 
 
Sections 5 and 6 advocated starting with a simple, robust and well-targeted loan scheme 
that is capable of developing in the future. The suggested starting point is: 
 Limited eligibility (only mobile students within the EU, and only master’s programmes 
 A fixed and long maturity period with income-contingent elements: (i) income-
contingent repayment for graduates with low income, (ii) a fixed level of repayments 
linked to an aggregate income category; (iii) an early repayment option without 
penalty (Model 2a) 
 The fixed level of repayments and the income threshold below which repayments are 
income-contingent and country specific (and probably depend also on the debt and 
the age of the borrower) 
 The interest rate is the same for all borrowers: the sum of the risk-free rate + default 
risk premium + operational margin, but variable over time 
 Limited size of loan (tuition fee + living costs, but with the total loan capped at 
between €10,000 and €12 000) 
 EU-level subsidies covering at least the start-up costs, perhaps also with some sort 
of guarantee for the refinancing loans 
 A specialised EU-level institution that outsources some tasks to tax authorities, 
national student loan centres, universities and commercial banks 
 
The EU-level student loan scheme can evolve in a number of directions. 
 
EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY 1: the size of the loan: the income threshold below which income-
contingency applies would rise over time, so that Model 2a (income contingency only for the 
poorest) would morph into 2b (income contingency for low and medium earners). Eventually 
full income contingency is an option. This direction of travel makes it possible to offer larger 
loans per graduate provided that (i) incomes grow; (ii) incomes converge; (iii) administrative 
capacity improves. 
 
EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY 2: widening coverage of the loan system: 
 Wider range of education levels: loans for mobile students taking master’s degree; 
bachelor degree, and/or PhD 
 Wider geographical coverage: loans for EU students studying outside the EU, e.g. 
the US 
 Wider eligibility rules: loans for immobile students, for older students, for vocational 
education etc.  
 
EVOLUTIONARY PATHWAY 3: a more sophisticated loan design.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Interviews 
 
Many different stakeholders were represented. Questions were related mainly to the CAV of 
student lending and partly to basic design issues. The interviewees were: 
 
Representative of universities: João Bacelar 
Project Coordinator at European University Foundation – Campus Europae 
Email: joao.bacelar@campuseuropae.org 
Representative of an international organisation: Andreas Blom 
Senior Education Economist, The World Bank 
Email: abloom@worldbank.org 
Representative of the banking sector: Sébastien de Brouwer 
Head of Department, Retail Financial services, Legal, Economic and Social Affairs, 
European Banking Federation 
Email: S.deBrouwer@ebf-fbe.eu 
Academic: Bruce Chapman 
Professor at Australia National University 
Email: bruce.chapman@anu.edu.au 
Representative of students: Maarten Coertjens 
Executive Policy Officer for Education, European Youth Forum 
Email: maarten.coertjens@youthforum.org 
National Student Loan Scheme manager: Tamács Csillag 
CEO, Hungarian Student Loan Center  
Email: csillag.tamas@diakhitel.hu 
Representative of an international organisation: Richard Hopper 
Senior Education Analyst, OECD 
Email: Richard.HOPPER@oecd.org 
Representative of an EU organisation of vocational education and training: 
Patrycja Lipinska 
Expert, CEDEFOP  
Email: patrycja.lipinska@cedefop.europa.eu 
Academics: D. Bruce Johnstone and Pamela Marcucci 
Researchers at State University of New York at Buffalo 
Email: dbj@buffalo.edu 
Representative of a private international student loan facility: Cameron Stevens 
CEO, Prodigy Finance Ltd. 
Email: cstevens@prodigyfinance.com 
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It is helpful to divide responses into supporting statements (A2.1), concerns (A2.2) and 
interesting ideas (A2.3). 
 
A1.1. Supporting statements  
The discussion of EU Added Value in section 1 drew in part on the statements gathered from 
the interviews, and we also made references in the text as [S-number]. Supporting 
statements are grouped in the same categories as the concerns, see below: 
 
Target of mobility of 20%  
1. Mobility has marked effects on social cohesion; therefore it should be promoted 
as an end in itself. 
2. Mobility serves equity and social cohesion purposes, it helps talented young 
people to attain higher education levels, and it is an important policy goal. 
3. The EU should support mobility, as it is important for EU integration and a 
fantastic means to foster cultural sensitivity and economic integration. 
4. I would rather emphasise how more widespread mobility may contribute for 
furthering European cohesion, mutual knowledge and citizenship. Mobility must 
carry a political weight in itself, even more so at a time when the European 
project is faced with growing nationalism in many of its domestic political arenas.  
5. Postgraduate mobility is more important than at undergraduate level. 
6. Cedefop considers mobility an important objective. There are no quantified 
targets/benchmarks specifically for VET. However, the target : ‘20% of those 
graduating in the European Higher Education Area should have a period of study 
or training abroad’ is relevant for VET as VET at tertiary level, notably ISCED 5B 
level, is a part of higher education. Also, if you look at higher education 
programmes with VET included. With reference to VET, the Copenhagen process 
laid the foundation for development of common tools and principles which 
promote mobility. These include: NQFs linked to the EQF, ECVET, recognition 
and validation of non-formal and informal learning. Much has been done at the 
EU level. It is important to implement these instruments at national level. Another 
important policy tool to promote mobility: measures promoting language learning. 
The countries implement a wide range of financial instruments that stimulate 
participation in learning, (not only/necessarily in higher education; Cedefop 
examined in particular those instruments that promote continuing education and 
training); some of which might also (on top of loans) promote mobility (e.g. 
vouchers, individual learning accounts, training funds). 
7. Student mobility is an objective which could increase skills of students in Europe 
and increase the level of skills for jobs in the banking sector. The banking sector, 
which is becoming increasingly international, would look for students who have 
more international experience and language skills There is still room for 
improvement of the existing mechanisms, e.g. not all places for Erasmus 
exchanges are filled up. 
8. Erasmus has not proven particularly flexible or efficient enough from a systemic 
viewpoint and over the years. Ambitious efficiency gains will require a 
supranational approach that goes beyond the current design and sophistication 
level. 
 
Barriers to mobility 
9. Mainly financial limitations restrict mobility. 
10. More money is needed to achieve greater mobility. 
11. With more investment the 20% target is attainable. 
12. Our research reveals that potential for mobility is not fully exploited through the 
existing instruments. In. Leonardo da Vinci (instrument particularly relevant for 
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VET) funds seem insufficient as countries call for more funding - ask for more 
resources to increase mobility, particularly for young people. Administrative 
burden is high which hampers the use of the instrument. According to some 
surveys, Erasmus grants are not sufficient. Many financial arrangements at 
national level do not promote equal opportunities enough.                 
 
Grants versus loans (cost-sharing)  
13. Loans are the mechanism, with grants as the only viable, but limited alternative.  
14. Even in some high-income countries (France, Spain) there is a high need for 
education financing.  
15. Grants and scholarships are fantastic for students, but the fiscal reality is that we 
cannot afford to increase them. 
16. The availability of grants is limited by definition due to the high financial burden.  
17. Additional grants are too expensive: a loan may be the answer.  
18. As the lifelong benefit for students is higher than for their society, it is fair to pay 
back a percentage of earnings to the society. Loans are fair and the only practical 
option.  
19. In general, subsidies to higher education are regressive. When you do not charge 
people and all is paid by taxpayers, this means financial help to advantaged 
people. Tuition without a loan scheme is a bad idea, as it stops people from 
studying. ICL is a compromise.  
20. The debt is generally a fairly small amount in graduate’s lifetime earning. In 
Australia, a graduate earns $1.5 million more than a non-graduate, and the debt 
is only $20,000.  
21. Loans and grants should complement each other and be harmonised.  
 
Brain drain versus brain circulation 
22. Overall, most students will end up in their own country – workers’ mobility is not 
as large.  
23. Loans would facilitate higher volumes of student mobility and greater access from 
various geographical areas, broader achievement of objectives, more market of 
people and ideas, international understanding, and transfer of skills.  
 
CAV and complementarity between the EU and the Member States 
24. Current programs are insufficient, not designed to take into account the holistic 
vision of students moving across borders. In the top graduate program 60% of 
incoming students are struggling to find any loan funding as the existing 
programmes are nationally centred.  
25. National schemes are facing difficulties as students work abroad.  
26. The EU needs more to achieve the targets than current mechanisms can provide, 
even though in certain aspects they address the needs of mobile students.  
27. National mechanisms for many reasons are not able to handle student and labour 
mobility: it should be handled at the EU level.  
28. The effects of national student loan schemes are still very marginal and almost 
negligible. 
29. National student loan schemes face serious difficulties in collecting repayments if 
they leave their home countries after their studies.  
30. National schemes are designed for the home country; there is always an issue 
with people going overseas. In Australia, international students have no access to 
the national loan system.  
31. The national student schemes alone are not capable of handling mobility. The 
size of the national student loan is not big enough to foster mobility. National 
systems must concentrate on their self-sustainability.  
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32. Not all national loan systems/arrangements support mobility, because in some 
countries students cannot take loans to study abroad, or foreign students 
studying  in given country might face difficulties in taking a loan due to many 
requirements (e.g. residence permit, min period of working abroad or living in a 
given country). The instruments should operate at EU level only if efficiency and 
value-added is proven. Coordination at EU level, if it is well-designed, can bring 
more benefit than national coordination. 
33. An EU-level student loan institution by its weight and size would be more efficient 
in operation. 
34. It would definitely promote mobility, but several issues would have to be tackled 
to make it efficient and sustainable. Granting of loans, repayments should be 
thought about carefully. Different institutions should cooperate. Overcoming 
financial barrier for students is the main advantage. Loans would provide better 
access to funds, allowing to borrow financial resources from future income. 
Otherwise it is difficult to have the full financial support in advance, without co-
financing.  
35. Loans would increase the contribution of private sector to funding of HE. It is 
important as the HE sector suffers from underinvestment from the private sector 
and faces public financing constraints. 
36. A European level cohort risk premium and/or EU level guarantee could make 
private finance cheaper.  
37. In case of cross-border lending the FX risk can be managed in a most efficient 
way due to multicurrency transactions, better market positions and lower 
transaction costs.  
38. It could also enhance cooperation between European student loan systems. An 
EU-level system could be positive in every sense; it could start a dialogue about 
student loan systems as well.  
39. If the EU level scheme would be income-contingent and tax authorities would be 
involved it would strengthen the cooperation between tax authorities and 
strengthen the efficiency of collection of national ICL systems.  
40. Such a system could be a catalyst for making the EU fiscal systems converge.  
41. The traditional banking model is hardly capable of financing mobile students.  
42. The scheme must be coherent with national mechanisms and other policies as to 
encourage not only geographical, but also social mobility.  
43. Implementation would make available a wealth of data on the economic return of 
studies. 
44. A federal, centralised system is much cheaper to administer.  
45. Starting from a blank page would be more efficient than trying to build on existing 
mechanisms. 
 
Political problems, conflicts of interests 
46. National loan schemes in some countries are under pressure (including private 
loans) because of increasing mobility. Mobility is not stimulated this way. 
47. National loan schemes in some countries are under pressure (including private 
loans) because of increasing mobility. Mobility is not stimulated this way. 
48. There is a need to increase opportunities for students where national schemes do 
not exist or are not portable; increase the social dimension of mobility - for people 
with financial constraints. It would put students in Europe on the same grounds, 
providing a more equal system.  
 
Income contingent repayment 
49. I would strongly argue for the income-contingent design. […] Differences in tax 
systems as such do not threaten the operation of the system. 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 128
50. ICL is less a problematic than normal loans (other loans have no built-in 
insurance). 
51. Tax authorities are expected to resist. In Australia, they said it was completely 
impossible, but the government said they are doing it anyway. And they made it 
work; now it works extremely well. The UK experienced the same bureaucratic 
resistance. 
 
Default risk 
52. You need to get graduate earning profiles in each country and then design 
collection parameters: 1 – making sure to get the money, 2 – not being severe on 
students. 
 
Financing of the scheme 
53. There is an EU basis for the scheme already – the EIB, where you have a funding 
mechanism that could potentially work with the private sector. The structures are 
already there. It simplifies the process to work with the private sector.  
 
A1.2 Concerns 
 
These concerns articulated by the experts in the framework of the interviews are classified 
by topic. We have taken care to address all these concerns in detail in the Interim Report 
when CAV was discussed.  
 
Target of mobility of 20%  
1. Increasing mobility for its own the sake is not beneficial to the EU and may even 
be a waste of resources; therefore we urge more investment in the quality of 
mobility.  
2. International student mobility as such is not the most important goal; general 
access to higher education is more important.  
3. German, French and Italian universities are overcrowded. Introducing more 
international students just for the sake of mobility will not address the needs of 
these universities.  
4. Thinking EU-wide rather than internationally, the EU loses the benefit of attracting 
human capital and export earnings.  
5. Those who want to be mobile may not intend to study in the EU but in the US. 
Mobility in the EU is limited mobility.  
6. There is a risk that older, more prestigious western universities will benefit more 
from increased mobility.  
 
Barriers to mobility 
7. Grants, scholarships, exchanges, partnerships and joint degrees can help the EU 
to improve student mobility.  
8. Not all problems can be solved by adding more money - young people face 
various administrative obstacles as well.  
9. Number of students is a function of affluence and linguistic capabilities 
10. Loan schemes rationalise students’ choices, but rational choice may work against 
mobility.  
 
Grants versus loans (cost-sharing) 
11. The EU has already got the tools - grants, Erasmus, etc. The essence of it is to 
enhance mobility among HE institutions, less so between countries  
12. The EU has lots of incentives already, mainly in the labour market policies, for 
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students to become mobile. It is enough. 
13. Students are risk-averse in some countries more than in others. They might think, 
if families pay taxes, why should they take a loan to study? If students have to get 
a loan for mobility, it may convince them to study at their national university 
instead. Expected or perceived return to graduate from high school is more 
limited. They do not see the added value of higher education sufficiently.  
14. An EU-level mobility loan scheme would be socially unfair (leaves responsibility 
of financing with the student, while the society gains considerably from increasing 
education, increased electoral participation, democracy, lower crime rates)  
15. We believe that most of education should always be financed by the state. It is 
based on the social model of Europe – the society invests in its members’ 
education and receives a return, as older generations, which benefited from 
education, pay for others’ education through taxation. Self-financing would break 
this generational solidarity.  
16. Uncertain returns of education would discourage investment. If one invests in 
education, they should be able to work. Meanwhile, youth unemployment in the 
EU is two times higher than normal…. In Spain one could never take a loan.  
17. When loans are introduced in addition to grants, they always replace grants as 
budget constraints increase. It would be naïve to believe that the new mechanism 
only adds to the existing ones – it opens the door to change the mechanism. The 
loan scheme would even lower mobility, as it is clearly meant to replace grants. 
Therefore our organisation opposes it.  
18. Loans will not foster student mobility because of debt aversion. Grants are 
needed.  
19. Student loans do not necessarily attract people.  
20. Grants are a more equitable solution.  
21. High default rates make student loans expensive. The costs of loan systems take 
public money away from grants and other forms of financial aid. Collection and 
administration is costly. Grants are better. 
22. Disadvantages of the loan: high administration costs. It would have been cheaper 
for the US government under the Carter administration to give money to students 
rather than lend. 
23. Private finance will not work without a state guarantee. 
24. EU-wide student loan needs to include additional means (preferential treatment) 
to support disadvantaged groups/underrepresented in learning. From our 
research it is clear that many financial schemes promoting participation in 
learning do not succeed in ensuring equal opportunities - do not address or 
address at low level those who need the assistance the most. Such a solution 
(additional preferential  conditions for those groups) should be considered and 
designed into the scheme 
 
Brain drain versus brain circulation 
25. Will not the loan scheme accelerate brain drain, i.e. erode the domestic labour 
force?  
26. Will not the loan scheme mean that a country will lose the best students, i.e. 
erode the domestic higher education system? 
27. One thing may be declared or stated initially by the politicians but the outcome 
may be different: people may behave in a different way in reality. Something 
declared to promote “brain circulation” can turn into brain drain. 
28. If the EU-level mobility loan is badly designed, it may push students to remain in 
the country in which they studied. 
29. A European program for Romania would lead students who cannot get 
government grants (as in most post-communist dual-track systems) to study 
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abroad, but not in Bulgaria or Greece, but rather in Germany or France. 
30. It would be important that this new EU-level institution foster international 
circulation of students, labour force and ideas, but not an East-West mass flow of 
people, a kind of a brain-drain. How it can be avoided that the richest countries 
with stronger economies, in better positions get the best students? Moreover they 
would not have to use national resources but would be supported by EU 
instruments and funds. 
31. For the Eastern EU Member States it is more important to provide options for 
students in fee-paying tracks in their national universities without looking to the 
EU to bail out the educational systems. 
 
CAV and the task sharing between EU and Member States 
32. National loan schemes would be enough. The EIB could substantially assist in 
the development of national student loan programs, by helping to capitalise or 
securitise these loan programs and thus creating a secondary market for these 
loans.  
33. Portability of national loans would be a much less bureaucratic solution than 
setting up an EU-wide system. 
34. It should not duplicate the existing national schemes that support mobility. It 
should only add to them.  
35. There is no need to duplicate the existing ones if they address the needs of 
mobile students (as in Denmark or Sweden).  
36. Another agency in Brussels to distribute the loans should not be expected.  
37. It’s not clear what purpose would be solved by a European loan program that 
cannot be solved by individual countries. Any country can start its own program 
can have one.  
38. It is important that any EU program would remain within the EU’s mandate and 
not substitute for individual country mechanisms and student loan programs. If 
the objective is mobility and equity in mobility, it is not the EC’s job to remedy that 
equity in individual Member States.  
39. Coordination of national agencies might be difficult, and such a solution could be 
costly. National institutions would have to be involved (tax authorities, authorities 
responsible for existing schemes…) - it might be difficult to motivate them to 
cooperate. Administration of such a scheme on EU level difficult task 
40. It should rather be decentralised and see how to capitalise on the existing 
schemes rather than create two parallel schemes: one national and one for 
mobility.  
41. Poorer countries would like Germany, France and the UK to pay for their 
students’ mobility. Note that better-risk German students in effect subsidise 
worse-risk Bulgarian students via an EU-wide risk cohort.  
 
Political problems, conflicts of interests  
42. Students may not want to be as mobile as governments want. The scheme will be 
helpful to students who already consider going abroad rather than convincing 
new students to do so.  
43. People feel the student loan is linked to the issue of the tuition fees. Very 
important countries in Europe do not have tuition fees and have strong resistance 
to it. German students claim they would “fight to the death to prevent them”.  
44. It needs political will: not all countries may be willing to participate.  
45. It is difficult to mobilise political will.  
46. Some countries would resist any interference with their (highly developed) 
educational systems.  
47. In the countries where national schemes exist, they will resist replacement/ 
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duplication. Possible political constraints for setting up 
 Tax authorities might resist it (in terms of repayment, they may resist 
additional tasks and responsibilities).  
 Ministries of education and finance might also resist; they might be unwilling 
towards reducing their autonomy in deciding about national loan system.  
It would be important to provide them with adequate information. The main 
technical challenges: 
 Introduce the mechanisms to verify eligibility and checking whether the loan is 
used for educational purposes.  
 Design and introduce the mechanisms which would compensate the 
differences in prices and living standards in different countries 
 Develop and implement mechanism of repayment (have access to/trace 
information on borrowers’ level of income); the mechanism should also take 
into account the differences in wages/economic development between the 
countries. 
48. Should education be financed publicly or privately? Some countries more 
advanced, so the idea of student loan has already been accepted (higher 
education financed privately), but not in other countries it has not been agreed by 
the society and authority. Diverging views would make it difficult to set up such a 
scheme, at least in the short run. Debate to be opened at national level, 
otherwise two parallel systems will develop: national, which is subsidised and 
public, and EU schemes - for mobility and privately co-financed. This makes it 
unclear whether it is realistic in short-term politically. It might imply existence of 
parallel systems: one for mobile and one for immobile students. It might be 
difficult to line such a system. Public administration might resist setting up an 
additional EU loan scheme.  
  
Income contingent repayment 
49. Monitoring of income and strong systems of tax revenue are a prerequisite, and 
these are not present across the EU.  
50. You can mimic ICL with a mortgage-type loan. 
51. It will be very expensive, because the scheme has to expect full cooperation of all 
tax systems in the EU. It is difficult to make it operational, as all countries have 
their own ways of collecting tax revenues. 
52. How can some governments collect repayments with their already fragile tax 
systems (black or grey economies)?  
53. There are so many differences in income, tax systems. Time-span of 
reimbursements is an issue.  
 
Default risk 
54. Education costs and repayment capacity differ tremendously. The EC should 
make sure not to end up with big defaults through this very predictable pattern.  
55. Venezuela had a World Bank-sponsored loan system for students going abroad. 
It was very unsuccessful: students never returned, never paid back the loans, and 
it was expensive to administer the scheme. 
56. Many students will try to avoid repayments.  
57. Collection and international enforcement are difficult. 
58. Credit risk should be handled and it is still to be found out how the European risk 
cohort could work.  
59. Students tend to over-commit in countries where they did not have loans before 
as they are optimistic about their earning capacities.  
 
Financing of the scheme 
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60. Who will finance it? EIB can be one source but it is not enough. 
61. The question of public finance will also be sensitive, ministers of finance might 
have some concerns, because you have to demonstrate that it would not cost 
more. If the scheme is not self-sustainable, it would impact on public finance.  
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A1.3 Interesting ideas 
 
The interviews provided several ideas about the design of the loan scheme, its alternatives 
and international experience. 
 
Design and implementation mechanisms 
1. Another option is that the EU only provides guarantees to national loan schemes 
for mobility.  
2. A risk-sharing approach with a layered structure is needed. Management can be 
outsourced, but the commercial sector should not be brought in to handle the 
repayment risk. E.g. the EC could assume 50% of the risk; the rest should be 
transferred to states and institutions.  
3. The EC will need to set up a clearing house, which would make sure that credit 
from one university (e.g. in the UK) is not transferred to another (e.g. in 
Romania). I.e. it needs a central data institution where the size of each 
individual’s debt is visible.  
4. Personal financial assistance is needed for the students.  
5. Performance-tested calculation of the repayment could still play a role in 
enhancing its attractiveness.  
6. Mobility windows built into curricular design would also be a good tool to foster 
mobility.  
7. We would support the introduction of a mobility card, which arranges the 
portability of social security and student benefits so that students have the same 
rights in all EU countries. 
8. An EU-level identification system would be necessary (e.g. the social security 
number). 
9. The scheme, once in place, could be subsequently scaled up to include other, 
non-mobile students. 
 
Learning from practice 
10. The EU needs to look at the US experience when designing its loan scheme.  
11. The WB experience in Colombia showed that some regions proved more risk-
averse, e.g. where mostly conservative rural families live. Many of them had 
negative experience with loans, e.g. for buying land. In other regions over-
optimism prevailed. Risk sharing should be designed to find a way out of this 
situation.  
12. It is important to overcome the overly negative reaction of student bodies in the 
context of the Bologna Process, as well as to develop an information strategy 
which targets students in regions/countries where loans are not yet widespread 
(not those that are a political risk per se but those where the information gap 
remains a major putative pitfall according both to studies and empirical 
experience).  
13. Equal access is very important and should receive due attention. The scheme 
should reach those who do not have proper access to education and training. 
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Appendix 2. Multi-criteria scoring method 
In order to enrich the arguments for our recommendations the research team executed two 
Multi-Criteria Scoring sessions. The first ranked the four design options for the loan and the 
second analysed the five alternatives of the institutional architecture.  
 
1 Methodology 
 
Multi-criteria scoring methods (MCSM), sometimes called multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM), is a discipline to support complex systems analysis and to aid decision makers 
facing numerous evaluations in connection with these systems. Measurements in MCSM are 
executed on different scales, and thus provide the opportunity to include subjective 
indicators, qualitative opinions and different preferences. The outcome of the analysis 
depends on who is making the decision, and on their goals and preferences. Because of 
these features, the methodology is particularly well-suited to large-scale policy assessment 
and strategy analysis. We used a special version of MCSM called Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP)83 supported by a software tool Criterium Decision Plus (CDP) by InfoHarvest. 
 
The multi-criteria scoring using the AHP method needs two sets of inputs. The first is the list 
of alternatives to be assessed, the second is the set of performance criteria against which 
the alternatives are measured. Performance criteria can be organised into hierarchical levels 
where the higher levels are broken down to lower level criteria. Alternatives are always 
measured against the lowest level, which measurements then add up to the higher levels. 
For the two scoring sessions the expert team84 used the existing four loan product options 
and the five institutional models.  
 
After the alternatives had been clarified, the expert team brainstormed the relevant 
performance criteria and organised them into a hierarchy suitable for assessing the 
alternatives. Since the criteria are measured on different scales and the experts at this stage 
could not have real data about the performance of the different options, a pairwise 
comparison methodology was used. During this process the expert team went through all the 
combinations of performance criteria pairs and indicated on a scale of 1-9 which criterion 
was preferred against the other. With this input, the CDP software calculated the expert 
team’s criteria weights using the AHP method. 
 
Once the performance criteria weights were determined, the expert team compared the loan 
options and institutional models. In practice, the team took each performance criterion and 
reached a consensus about how much a given option is preferred to the other in contributing 
to that criterion. All these data was fed into CDP, and final scoring calculated combining the 
criteria weights and the comparison of options. 
 
Given that AHP uses expert judgements both in determining criteria weights and comparing 
the alternatives, sensitivity analysis is useful to show how much the final scores change if 
the expert group changes its preferences. For that reasons, two sorts of sensitivity checks 
were made after the scoring sessions. The first one was to check how the final ranking of the 
options change if performance criteria weights are changed. Secondly, we examined the 
composition of the final scores and verified which criteria were the key determinants of the 
                                                 
 
83 Saaty, Thomas L. (2001). Fundamentals of Decision Making and Priority Theory, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
RWS Publications. ISBN 0-9620317-6-3. 
 
84 In both MCSM sessions the experts were the Hungarian research team members. 
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aggregate score. This information then was discussed and verified with other expert opinions 
included the Delphi study and other parts of the report.   
  
2 MCM results: the loan product 
 
Figure 30 presents the criteria-structure the team defined. The detailed description of the 
criteria and sub criteria are included. 
 
Figure 30. Evaluation criteria for the loan product options 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
 
The expert team analysed the following four options: 
O1: Unified conditions for all borrowers with no subsidy 
O2: Unified conditions for all borrowers with subsidy 
O3: Different parameter setting for different type of borrowers with no subsidy 
O4: Different parameter setting for different type of borrowers with subsidy 
 
In relation to equity for instance the research team agreed that both loans and grants are 
needed for a well-functioning higher education system. Poorer groups in society are more 
risk-averse about debt, so that their opportunities might be improved more effectively grants. 
The other reason why equity received less weight than efficiency and effectiveness is that 
the objective of the EU level loan scheme is not to include everybody but to assist the 
achievement of the desired level of 20% potentially mobile students. Comparing 
effectiveness criteria the team concluded that the size of the loan is more important than (a) 
eligibility and (b) the take up rate. When weighting the efficiency factors the team 
emphasised the importance of keeping default rates low and creating alternatives that are 
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sustainable over the long run. Administrative costs and funding, although important, seem to 
be manageable by innovative management techniques. 
 
After the criteria weights had been calculated, the performance of the four options was 
compared in pairs using each criteria.  
 
The results of the criteria weighting and comparison of options can be seen in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. MCSM results of loan product options 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
As we can see the highest score was calculated to O4 (differentiated parameters with an EU 
subsidy). The second and third are O3 and O2 respectively, the lowest score being given to 
O1 (unified parameters and no subsidy). 
 
It is interesting to compare these results with the Delphi study, where concerns were 
expressed about both subsidy and differentiated parameters. The experts could probably be 
convinced by detailed calculations showing that the loan scheme is not feasible without 
differentiated repayment conditions and some EU subsidy. Figure 32 shows the options and 
the composition of their scores. 
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Figure 32. Composition of the scores of the loan product options 
 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
As we can see in Figure 32, O4 scored highly in terms of short- and long-term effectiveness 
and financial sustainability. On the other hand, O3 secured its second position because of 
high performance in terms of financial sustainability, while O2 reached almost the same total 
score with a strong assessment of its long term effectiveness. In the case of O1, Figure 32 
confirms that the lowest score is explained in the low values of effectiveness, especially the 
scalability of that scheme. 
 
Figure 33 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis. The left-hand figure shows how the 
final scores change if the experts change the importance conferred to efficiency, while the 
right-hand figure does the same for effectiveness. The red vertical line indicates the weight 
values which were calculated for efficiency and effectiveness after the pair wise comparison.  
 
Figure 33. Sensitivity analysis of effectiveness and efficiency 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
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Figure 33 shows that the ranking of the options (between O4 and O3) changes only if the 
efficiency weight increases and/or the effectiveness weight decreases beyond the cross 
section of O4 and O3. The CDP software indicated that changing the ranking would require 
more than a 10% increase or decrease of the weight; we can therefore conclude that the 
above results are stable. 
 
3 MCM results: the institutional models 
 
In order to assess the five institutional models the expert team built the MCS model depicted 
in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 34. Evaluation criteria for the institutional models 
 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
The performance criteria were defined differently in this situation as we can see in Figure 34. 
The three top-level criteria were institutional efficiency, availability, and positive externalities 
at the EU level. The expert team described efficiency through the level of administrative 
costs, the quality of the collection mechanisms, and agency costs. Within the efficiency 
criteria the last received the highest preference weight. EU level externalities and availability 
received the same weight. 
 
The expert team analyzed the following five institutional models: 
‐ Specialized EU-level agency 
‐ National student loan centers 
‐ Consortium of some banks 
‐ All banks: the scheme is open to any financial institution upon meeting certain 
requirements 
‐ Universities 
The detailed description of the alternatives and the performance criteria can be found in 
section 6.5. For the MCSM analysis we excluded the institutional model based on tax 
authorities because experts indicated that at present the tax systems in Europe are not 
sufficiently well developed and integrated. In the long run, however, this is the target model 
to which it would be best to converge.  
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The last column in Figure 34 shows the final scores after comparing the five models. The 
specialized EU-level agency was ranked the highest, national student loan centres second, 
and systems administered by universities third; models based on financial institutions 
(consortium of banks or all banks) were ranked lowest. 
 
Figure 35. MCSM results of institutional models 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
Figure 36 shows the composition of the scores, to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of 
each model assessed by the expert team. 
 
Figure 36. Composition of the scores of the institutional models 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
 
Figure 36 clearly shows that the team gave a very high weight to efficiency, and identified 
the EU-level agency’s performance as potentially very good in this regard. When comparing 
the result with the Delphi Method, the expert panel suggested a higher potential for the 
university- based implementations than the MCSM approach. Though universities are good 
at disbursement, they face serious challenges in collection and managing the financial 
engineering of such instruments. But the disbursement advantages can be exploited in all 
five models by outsourcing some client service tasks. The team in the MCSM rated the 
national schemes highly because they valued the rich experience of these institutions in 
operations and also the efficient local mechanisms.  
 
CDP software confirmed that the results are stable within the expert group; a 10% change in 
any of the performance criteria did not change the rank order of the five options, see Figure 
29. 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 140
Figure 37. Sensitivity analysis of availability and efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Source: CriterionDecisionPlus 
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Appendix 3. Case studies  
 
This part of the study identified which of the alternatives defined in section 5.3.5 would best 
correspond to the national contexts of the selected countries with student loan schemes 
already in place. From a variety of variables listed in Appendix 3 we have selected those that 
are likely to influence the way the EU student loan scheme is expected to function: 
 
 It can be predicted that repayment will be smoother in richer countries in comparison 
to poorer countries. 
 Administrative capacities developed in the existing loan schemes could be used for 
administering the EU student loan scheme at the national level. 
 The functioning of the EU student loan scheme will also be influenced by quality of 
education, average loan portfolio, labour market absorption of graduates, and 
especially returns to higher education. 
 In addition, the countries being net contributors to the EU budget or net receivers is 
also a factor that influences whether subsidized or non-subsidised models will be 
favoured. 
 
Other variables are likely to influence the loan scheme in combinations with others and thus 
have been assessed individually. Among those, the existing loan scheme and its portability, 
mobility trends and already available state support to students should be mentioned. Below 
we provide analysis for each country and identify the alternatives which pose minimum risks 
across the selected MSs. 
 
Germany 
 
Being the largest EU economy in the EU, Germany has a vibrant higher education sector 
and a large (in absolute numbers), linguistically educated student body, for which returns to 
education are high. Just under a half of students obtaining a degree abroad leave to the 
most popular destinations, 6 out of 10 are in the EU. Among the eligible students, however, 
only a small part may be interested in the alternative of borrowing for mobility, when 
generous state support is provided and the national education system offers good value for 
money. Nonetheless, mobility trends suggest there is a market for more mobility financing: 
(a) the volume of credit (Erasmus) mobility (in absolute numbers) is very high (b) Germany 
attracts many international students, who may need additional financing and, especially after 
the labour market will be opened to workers from EU12 in 2011, many are quite likely to stay 
in Germany. 
 
A conventional type loan for students is currently administered by a special public institution. 
It has a parental/learner income/assets test to determine eligibility. The repayment period is 
long, with a long grace period and 0% interest rate. It has a means-tested element and aims 
at increasing equity. The national loan is already portable. In this respect it will compete with 
the EU student loan scheme, but only for the limited share of borrowers eligible to receive 
the national loan. Table 21 shows how the different models of repayment and EU 
contribution relate to context variables and administrative capacities. 
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Table 21. Comparison of alternative models in terms of adaptability to the German context 
 
  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
2a - High volume of Erasmus 
mobility, which increases the 
potential borrower pool with 
uncertain remaining length of 
education and education 
outcomes 
 1 Repayment 
models 
2b - Fully portable scheme already 
in place, implying 
administrative capacity 
- High returns to higher 
education, implying that few 
will request a means test 
- Transparent economy with 
high administrative capacities 
of institutions 
- High private investment in 
education implies that 
assistance from employers in 
repaying loans is likely 
- Small family size implies that 
students do not drop out of the 
labour market for extensive 
periods of time 
- For those already 
receiving state 
support additional 
loans are not likely 
to be necessary. 
Equity concerns are 
met within the 
national scheme 
- Only 20% of 
incoming Bologna 
students are EU 
nationals, which 
creates 
administrative 
burden 
- Low tax return rate 
may create 
administrative 
difficulties 
+5-3=2 
O4 - Brain regain mobility pattern, 
which implies that students 
from poorer countries are likely 
to stay in Germany and 
German students return to 
work 
- Highly valued German 
universities attract learners 
from abroad, especially poorer 
MSs 
- A large share of German 
students obtaining a degree 
abroad choose countries 
where education is expensive 
- Germany is 
expected to 
subsidise poorer 
MSs, while it offers 
a portable loan to 
domestic students. 
Therefore a 
scheme with a 
subsidy may be 
politically unpopular 
- The national loan is 
comparatively large 
and does not 
charge interest 
+3-2=1 
O3 - High incoming labour flow, 
which suggests that many 
former learners will be 
repaying loans in Germany 
- A large share of German 
students obtaining a degree 
abroad choose countries 
where education is expensive 
- High degree of self-financing 
(52%) of studies abroad is a 
market of student lending 
 3 
EU 
financing 
models 
O2 - Saving dominates over 
borrowing, therefore the risks 
of overborrowing are low 
- Means-tested support for 
students is already handled by 
- Germany is 
expected to 
subsidise poorer 
MSs, while it offers 
a portable loan to 
+4-2=2 
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  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
the state, implying that an EU-
wide scheme would highly 
benefit students who are 
‘sandwiched’ between merit-
based and means-tested 
support (i.e., not eligible for 
any of these). So far only 29% 
students receive state support 
- A large share of German 
students obtaining a degree 
abroad choose countries 
where education is expensive 
- High degree of self-financing 
(52%) of studies abroad is a 
market of student lending 
domestic students. 
Therefore a 
scheme with a 
subsidy may be 
politically unpopular 
- The national loan is 
comparatively large 
and does not 
charge interest 
O1   0 
Note: 2a refers to the Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners; 2b refers to the Hybrid model with 
income-contingent repayments for low and middle-income earners; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
Sources: see Appendix 26. 
 
Overall, model 2b can already be implemented in Germany. Option O3 would best match the 
German context, as it a) allows loans large enough to meet the needs of outgoing degree 
students from Germany (19% outgoing degree students obtain a degree in the UK), (b) 
allows addressing equity concerns and flexibility through differentiated conditions for 
borrowers (depending on age and other characteristics), and (c) is beneficial to Germany in 
terms of no additional strain on the EU budget, since it is a net contributor to the EU budget 
and is not likely to receive subsidies to cover the losses within the system: those are 
controlled by introducing differentiation among borrowers according to their country of origin, 
age, etc. As there are relevant public institutions already in place, the institutional model 
could transfer more management responsibilities to the national authorities. 
 
Hungary 
 
Despite economic uncertainty and GDP per capita significantly below EU average, the 
Hungarian economy seems capable of fully absorbing higher education graduates. High 
returns to education can be a key factor in reducing risk aversity, which is very important for 
the EU student loan scheme. On the other hand, academic mobility is rather low in Hungary. 
As many as 39% incoming degree students are from Romania and Slovakia, many of them 
could be assumed to come from the Hungarian minority of these countries. If they take 
loans, many of them are likely to work and repay them in Hungary. Meanwhile, outgoing 
students mostly leave to German-speaking countries, large numbers choose France or 
Finland, where tuition is small or zero. Therefore it can be estimated that among students 
with sufficient linguistic capacities and academic merit, free education will remain a 
preference. 
Hungary already has an income-contingent national student loan scheme since 2001, which 
uses private funds and is managed by the Student Loan Centre, aiming to make the loan 
scheme fully sustainable. The state provides a targeted interest rate subsidy (for some 
special groups of borrowers, e.g. for women while on maternity leave etc.), and guarantees 
to the whole institution. Data on outstanding debts are obtained from tax authorities which 
also creates a public bad borrowers list. Therefore it can be concluded that developed 
administrative capacities are already in place. The expected positive and negative effects 
are presented in 22. 
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Table 22. Comparison of alternative models in terms of adaptability to the Hungarian context 
 
  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
2a - This model allows using 
income from the rather large 
informal economy to repay 
the loan 
- Comparatively low average 
income and GDP per capita, 
as well as economic 
uncertainty, may imply that 
the numbers of low and 
medium income earners will 
be high 
- The national 
income-contingent 
loan is likely to 
seem ‘safer’ and 
more attractive than 
repayment in fixed 
monthly instalments 
after a certain 
income level  
+2-1=1 Repayment 
models 
2b - The already existing loan 
scheme is based on 
cooperation of several public 
and private institutions and 
allows judging the country’s 
administrative capacities 
- High returns to education 
(unemployment rate of highly 
educated individuals is lower 
than EU average and 65% 
lower than the national 
average) imply that few 
individuals will request a 
means test 
- Small family size suggests 
that most learners will not 
leave the labour market for 
extensive periods 
- Most mobile students migrate 
within the EU, allowing easier 
administration 
- Currently mobility and 
students’ linguistic capacities 
are comparatively low, 
suggesting that the number of 
borrowers will be limited until 
the loan contributes to boost 
academic mobility 
- Informal economy is 
large, hence 
complicating 
repayment 
+5-1=4 
EU 
financing 
models 
O4 - The already existing loan 
scheme is based on 
cooperation of several public 
and private institutions and 
allows judging the country’s 
administrative capacities 
- 69% mobile students leave to 
Germany, Austria, the UK, 
France or the Netherlands, 
were living costs and, if 
applicable, tuition are high, 
hence the loan should be 
large  
- Differentiated conditions are 
needed in order to address 
 +3 
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  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
brain loss and income 
differences of graduates 
among EU MSs 
O3 - Differentiated conditions are 
needed in order to address 
brain loss and income 
differences of graduates 
among EU MSs 
 +1 
O2   0 
O1  - A small loan is 
unlikely to meet the 
needs of mobile 
learners, since most 
of them choose 
countries where 
living costs and, if 
applicable, tuition 
are high 
 
-1 
Note: 2a refers to the Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners; 2b refers to the Hybrid model with 
income-contingent repayments for low and middle-income earners; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
Sources: see Appendix 26. 
 
The national loan scheme could complement the EU student loan scheme in many aspects, 
e.g.: 
 It is already fully portable; 
 It is rather similar to the EU student loan scheme by being universal (no means-
testing) and aiming at providing opportunities for all students. 
 
However, the additional market of the EU student loan scheme would be: 
 Learners undertaking expensive studies abroad (the national loan is small, yet 
returns of higher education are high); 
 Diverse learners who do not currently benefit from state support. 
 
In the future, it is possible that the national student loan could evolve into a scheme for non-
mobile learners, while mobile learners would benefit from the EU student loan scheme. 
Administrative capacities have already been developed, yet the structure of the Hungarian 
economy calls for some caution regarding the readiness to adopt the 2b model. In terms of 
EU contribution, Hungary would strongly favour the O4 option (differentiated conditions, 
subsidised) to avoid brain loss and encourage more learners to take the loan. This option 
would also be politically popular, since Hungary is likely to benefit from subsidies, while the 
differentiation would address multiple equity concerns. In terms of institutional model, the 
national authorities are already experienced in managing an income-contingent loan, and 
these capacities could be used in the EU student loan scheme. 
 
Lithuania 
 
Of the six countries selected for the in-depth study, Lithuania has the lowest GDP per capita, 
private investment in higher education, the largest informal economy and very low share of 
direct state support to students, which suggests that overall income of graduates, is likely to 
be low, and co-financing is not widespread. The student body is very large and increasingly 
mobile, with very high linguistic capacities, thus, there is a market for more mobility funding. 
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Yet the country is experiencing brain loss, with very high and rather concentrated labour 
mobility to EU15 countries. In 2005, a third of highly educated persons in the Baltic states 
and Poland considered moving to another EU country in 5 years85. Therefore many loans 
can be expected to be repaid in other countries. 
 
Lithuania already has a conventional type portable loan scheme for students, which was 
expected to become one of the milestones of the on-going higher education reform. The aim 
of the national loan scheme is to ensure high participation in education. Private loans, 
provided by retail banks and credit unions, are guaranteed by the state. There is no means 
test; borrowers are only expected to have no outstanding debts. Loans for education add to 
830 EUR per capita household loans (the number is approximately equal to mean monthly 
income). Positive and negative effects of the Lithuanian context are discussed in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Comparison of alternative models in terms of adaptability to the Lithuanian 
context* 
 
  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
2a - Medium returns to higher 
education: although 
unemployment rate of persons 
with tertiary education (5.5%) 
is 60% lower than the national 
average, it is still higher than 
EU average (4.5%), while 
mean monthly earnings 
increase only by 42% 
 +1 Repayment 
models 
2b - Tax return rate is very high at 
69%86 
- Large shadow 
economy (30% in 
2002) 
0 
O4 - Very low private investment in 
higher education (9.3% of all 
investment), which implies little 
co-financing and reliance on 
state support for education 
funding. In addition, limited 
direct public support to 
students (15%) suggests there 
will be a demand for large 
loans 
- As noted above, returns to 
higher education are medium, 
therefore incentives are 
needed to prevent brain loss 
- The national grant and loan do 
not cover all study costs at 
home and are even less 
responsive to the needs of 
learners abroad 
- Large shadow 
economy (30% in 
2002) 
+3-1=2 EU 
financing 
models 
O3 - Labour mobility is high,  1 
                                                 
 
85John R. Dobson, Irina Sennikova (2007), “From fundamental freedom to political and economic ‘hot potato’ in 
50 years: labour mobility and migration within the EU”, Journal of Business Economics and Management, 8(2): 
123-136, p. 128. 
86 State Tax Inspectorate (2010). <http://www.vmi.lt/lt/?itemId=10816022>; estimate in percent provided at 
<http://www.zebra.lt/lt/naujienos/verslas/31-proc-gyventoju-nepanoro-susigrazinti-pajamu-mokescio-permokos-
206183.html> 
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  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
therefore many loans are 
likely to be repaid elsewhere. 
It is important that students 
who return to Lithuania are 
not disadvantaged vis-à-vis 
those who stay in the 
countries they studied in 
O2 - Most Lithuanian degree 
students choose countries 
where tuition is low or zero: 
Germany (25%), France (4%), 
Sweden (2%). The loan would 
be mainly used to cover living 
costs. 
- Currently 51% students self-
finance their studies abroad, 
implying that a large part of the 
students go abroad as a part of 
some programme 
- While it is true that 
many students are 
part of 
programmes, it is 
likely that those 
who cannot finance 
their studies from 
any programme are 
often excluded from 
mobility 
+2-1=1 
O1   0 
*Note: 2a refers to the Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners; 2b refers to the Hybrid model with 
income-contingent repayments for low and middle-income earners; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
Sources: see Appendix 26 
 
The national loan, although portable and offering a significant contribution in cases when 
only living costs are borne by the student (esp. in Erasmus), will not compete with the EU 
student loan scheme in: 
 Financing more expensive studies, esp. since studying in the UK is gaining 
popularity; 
 Financing studies of students who receive neither merit-based nor means-tested 
support; 
 
It will contribute to expanding the choices of Lithuanian students. Nonetheless, support for 
students repaying their loans in their home country should be envisaged to prevent further 
acceleration of brain loss. Having taken all context variables into account, repayment model 
2a is the most feasible, and option O4 would best meet the needs of Lithuanian borrowers. 
Local administrative capacities could be used in collecting information about income, but it 
cannot be predicted whether they could also contribute to loan administration. 
 
The Netherlands 
 
With the highest GDP per capita and poverty threshold, particularly low unemployment rate 
and as many as 10 universities among Europe’s top 100, the Netherlands has a highly 
developed higher education system and economy which absorbs the benefits of higher 
education. The fact that the national higher education system provides good value for money 
may be a disincentive to borrow for financing mobility, but almost every fourth outgoing 
student chooses to study in the UK, creating a market for student lending. Private investment 
in higher education is higher than EU average, and direct public support to students is also 
comparatively high. A vast majority of students maintaining own households are reported to 
benefit from state support in some way. 
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There are two types of loans in the Netherlands: an income-contingent public loan scheme 
and a (rather marginal) conventional private loan scheme. The public loan, which aims to 
ensure high participation in education, is managed by a special public agency. A part of it is 
performance-related and becomes a grant if studies are successfully completed; the other 
part is repaid with low interest. There is a means test for applicants. Income data is provided 
by tax authorities. The two loans are closely linked, and none is guaranteed by the 
government. Loans for education add to 2,005 EUR per capita of household loans, and it 
has been reported (see earlier in this report) that borrowing for studies is rather unpopular 
(35% students’ disposable income is from employment). Table 24 presents the positive and 
negative effects of the national context on the EU student loan scheme. 
 
Table 24. Comparison of alternative models in terms of adaptability to the Dutch context 
  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
2a - Household debts are 
already rather high, 
therefore accumulation and 
administration of debt 
should be as simple as 
possible 
- As a brain gainer, the 
Netherlands is likely to 
administer repayments of 
other countries’ nationals’ 
loans. Fixed instalments for 
more beneficiaries will 
allow easier cross-national 
administration. However, 
interestingly, the share of 
EU15 nationals in the 
country’s labour force is 
many times higher than of 
those from EU1287 
 2 Repayment 
models 
2b - Very high tax return rate 
(85%) 
- Almost negligible informal 
economy 
- Returns to higher 
education are 
comparatively low. 
Tertiary education 
reduces the probability 
of unemployment by 
under 50% and 
increases mean 
monthly earnings by 
just 33%.  
- Family size is 
comparatively large 
(over EU average), 
therefore ways to 
prevent decreases in 
monthly earnings from 
constituting a burden 
on former learners 
would have to be 
mainstreamed into the 
loan scheme (in the 
national scheme the 
+2-2=0 
                                                 
 
87 Dobson, Sennikova (2007), p. 128. 
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  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
borrower may request 
repayment to be 
postponed) 
O4   0 
O3 - Currently 54% mobile 
students self-finance their 
studies abroad, which 
potentially excludes those 
who currently cannot afford 
to be mobile 
- Labour mobility is quite 
high (16% Eurobarometer 
respondents have lived and 
worked in another country), 
thus some loans will be 
repaid elsewhere, and 
other countries’ nationals 
loans will be repaid in the 
Netherlands. 
 2 
O2 - High costs of studies at 
home may encourage to 
opt for paid studies abroad, 
which asks for a large loan 
-  1 
EU 
financing 
models 
O1   0 
Note: 2a refers to the Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners; 2b refers to the Hybrid model with 
income-contingent repayments for low and middle-income earners; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
Sources: Sources: see Appendix 26 
 
As it can be seen from the table, although highly developed administrative capacities are 
readily available, model 2b would be challenged by the labour market and mobility trends in 
the Netherlands. Since the Netherlands is a net contributor to EU budget, it is likely to favour 
the O3 option. Administrative capacities are sufficient to both collect information and 
administer the loan. There are unmet needs in higher education financing, and especially in 
ensuring access to education for people from all socio-economic backgrounds. 
 
The EU student loan scheme is likely to complement the national schemes by: 
 Providing bigger loans for expensive studies abroad; 
 Expanding equity and facilitating access to mobility. 
 
Spain (Catalonian region) 
 
Even with GDP per capital higher than EU average, Spain remains a net receiver of EU 
budget allocations88, and its education system is facing several challenges89. Nonetheless, it 
continues to attract students from abroad, particularly Erasmus students (over 28 thousand 
according to recent data) and degree students from non-EU countries (29% of incoming 
                                                 
 
88 “Programming and management of structural funds 2007-2013 - local and regional perspectives”, SRN Europe 
(2006) seminar, Barcelona, 21 April 2006. http://www.srneurope.net/docs/Barcelona_Seminar_with_S3.pdf. 
89 According to Eurostat data and thematic reports, early school leaving is widespread among persons with lower 
socio-economic backgrounds, and social selectivity of higher education prevails. In addition, high youth 
unemployment and 9% unemployment rate of persons with tertiary education signal low returns of higher 
education. 
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students obtaining a degree in Spain come from top 5 sending Latin American countries). 
While absolute numbers of mobility are high, relative numbers are low. 
 
The Catalonian region in Spain has a mortgage-type loan for students, which is private and 
provided by retail banks without government guarantees. It includes a means test of 
parental/learner income/assets in determining eligibility. Interest rate is 2-4%. Although the 
loan is cheap, it has to be repaid fast and in monthly instalments, hence increasing risk 
adversity. In this study, a loan scheme with any public sector role has only been identified in 
Catalonia, which does not allow judging national administrative capacities. Expected positive 
or negative effects of Catalonian context on the various models identified in section 5.3.5 are 
presented in Table 25. 
 
Table 25. Comparison of alternative models in terms of adaptability to the Spanish context 
 
  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
2a - Graduates returning to 
Spain are likely to find 
themselves in a variety of 
situations, including 
unemployment, therefore 
the threshold for means 
test should be low 
 +1 Repayment 
models 
2b - Administrative capacities 
are already in place in 
Catalonia 
- Particularly high youth 
unemployment, 
including those with 
higher education (9%), 
will lead to many 
persons requesting 
means test 
- Returns to higher 
education are 
comparatively low 
- Administrative 
capacities are only 
regional 
- The loan would add to 
already large household 
debts (2,163 EUR 
household loans per 
capita) 
- Tax return rate is less 
than 50%, and shadow 
economy is 
considerably large 
+1-5=-4 
EU 
financing 
models 
O4 - There is a large unmet 
demand for mobility 
financing (70% mobile 
students currently self-
finance their stay abroad), 
especially if it increases 
access to higher 
education 
- Mobility flows of outgoing 
students are concentrated, 
most students leave for 
EU countries, 47% to 
either the UK or Germany, 
- Administrative 
capacities are only 
regional 
- Brain loss scenario 
implies that many 
students will be 
repaying their loan 
abroad 
+3-2=1 
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  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
where tuition and living 
costs are high 
- The regional loan is small 
and has to be repaid fast, 
with fixed monthly 
instalments, thus 
increasing risk adversity 
O3 - Mobility flows of outgoing 
students are concentrated, 
most students leave for 
EU countries where tuition 
and living costs are high 
- The regional loan does not 
address risk adversity 
- Brain loss is already an 
issue in Spain. With low 
returns to higher 
education and unmet 
potential for mobility, 
brain loss is likely to 
increase 
+2-1=1 
O2 - There is a large unmet 
demand for mobility 
financing, especially if it 
increases access to higher 
education 
- Mobility flows of outgoing 
students are concentrated, 
most students leave for 
EU countries where tuition 
and living costs are high 
- The regional loan does not 
address risk adversity 
 2 
O1  - Brain loss is already an 
issue in Spain. With low 
returns to higher 
education and unmet 
potential for mobility, 
brain loss is likely to 
increase 
- A small loan is unlikely 
to meet the needs of 
most mobile learners, 
since they choose 
countries where tuition 
and living costs are high 
-2 
Note: 2a refers to a conventional loan which becomes an ICL for persons receiving low income; 2b refers to a conventional loan 
which becomes an ICL for persons receiving low or medium income; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
Sources: Sources: see Appendix 26 
 
The regional loan scheme cannot be a viable competitor to the EU student loan scheme, as: 
 It is limited by region; 
 It is fairly small in scope, without a public contribution. 
 
The EU student loan scheme could: 
 Boost currently low mobility; 
 Promote equity among regions and social groups. 
 
Overall, model 2a is more suitable for Spain. Although there is a demand for differentiated 
solutions promoting equity in education and mobility, the country may be administratively 
challenged by options O4 and O3. Provided that Spain is likely to be a receiver of the 
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subsidy, O2 would be the most viable alternative. In terms of institutional settings, some 
administrative capacities are available, but it is not clear (esp. having in mind regional 
decentralisation) to what extent they could be used to administer the EU student loan 
scheme. 
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The United Kingdom 
 
While the UK is a very attractive destination to many students from other EU MSc, only 19% 
of its foreign students from the top 10 destinations are EU nationals. The UK embodies a 
brain pass-through scenario. Its education system, with as many as 29 universities among 
Europe’s top 100, is attractive to foreign students (outgoing Erasmus mobility is only a half of 
the numbers of incoming Erasmus students, and the number of outgoing students is 10 
times smaller than that of incoming students). Additional funding may further increase 
mobility. 
 
Co-financing of higher education is very common in the UK. Private investment in education 
is particularly high, and so is direct public support to students. There are three loan schemes 
in place (two are rather marginal, see comparison in the previous sections). A very well-
developed UK student loan scheme has a very high take-up rate and covers both tuition and 
living costs. The loan is deducted automatically from the employers’ payrolls. A means test 
determines what part of the loan will be allocated as a grant. The loan is currently not 
accessible to non-resident foreign students, and if it were, the brain pass-through scenario of 
mobility and differences in living standards between the UK and sending countries 
estimating the income threshold after which the loan is to be repaid would be especially 
challenging. Meanwhile, the main destinations of UK students do not require large loans, but 
the needs of outgoing students are not met through the non-portable scheme. Table 26 
shows which positive and negative effects of the UK context the different models identified in 
section 5.3.5 are likely to face. 
 
Table 26. Comparison of alternative models in terms of adaptability to the UK context 
 
  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
2a - High labour mobility may imply 
that many loans taken in other 
countries will be repaid in the UK 
 1 Repayment 
models 
2b - Good administrative capacities 
developed in three local student 
loan schemes, the biggest of 
them being an ICL 
- Strong effects of higher 
education on employment: the 
risk of unemployment (3.2%) is 
reduced by 58% compared to 
the national average. Therefore 
few persons are expected to 
request delays in repayment 
- The effect of 
tertiary education 
on income is 
medium (mean 
monthly earnings 
increase by 39%), 
therefore a large 
body of students 
will find 
themselves in 
medium or even 
low income 
cohorts 
- Large family size 
(1.9 children) and 
insufficient levels 
of income 
protection during 
parental leave 
may lead many 
beneficiaries to 
request delays or 
means test 
+2-2=0 
EU 
financing 
models 
O4 - Compared to mean earnings, the 
amount of household loans per 
capita is not very large (897 
-  1 
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  Positive effects Negative effects Balance
EUR) 
O3 - 86% students already receive 
state support, which is not 
portable. Having in mind the 
strength of the UK’s education 
system, studies abroad can 
mainly be attractive to UK 
students if they are cheaper or 
for the purpose of language 
learning. Unsurprisingly, the 
main European host countries of 
mobile UK students are France 
(9%) and Germany (8%). By far 
more students leave for the US 
or Australia. Therefore mobile 
students going to another EU 
country are likely to take 
relatively small loans to cover 
their living costs. It is important 
that these loans facilitate access 
to education mobility 
- Compared to mean earnings, the 
amount of household loans per 
capita is not very large (897 
EUR) 
 2 
O2   0 
O1   0 
Note: 2a refers to the Hybrid model with income-contingent repayments for low earners; 2b refers to the Hybrid model with 
income-contingent repayments for low and middle-income earners; O4 is an EU-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated 
eligibility conditions, O3 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with differentiated eligibility conditions, O2 is an EU-subsidised loan 
scheme with universal eligibility conditions, and O1 is a non-subsidised loan scheme with universal eligibility conditions. See 
section 5.3.5 for details. 
Sources: Sources: see Appendix 26. 
 
Taking into account the living standards and quality of education in the UK, mobility is often 
influenced by other factors rather than competitive advantage of universities abroad (e.g. 
language learning). In this respect, the pool of potential beneficiaries of the EU student loan 
scheme is likely to be limited. However, its niche is expected to be: 
- Outgoing UK students who are unable to transfer student support, yet need funds to 
cover the living cost in the countries of their choice; 
- A small number of UK students studying in other EU MSs where universities charge 
tuition. 
 
Since access to mobility is of key importance, O3 could be the most viable alternative. 
Regarding repayment models, although excellent administrative capacities are in place to 
implement model 2b, some features of the UK labour market and mobility patterns suggest 
that model 2a would be a less risky solution. Local administrative capacities can be used for 
both collecting information and administering the loan. 
 
The main conclusions of the case study analysis are set out in section 7.3 of the main text. 
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Table 27. Country data used in case studies 
 
Indicator (and EU 
averages where 
relevant) 
Hungary Netherlands Germany Spain Lithuania UK 
Socio-economic background 
GDP per capita 
(PPP) 23600.00* 14834.79 30704.25 28375.51 24496.77 12460.27 27348.44 
At-risk-of-poverty 
threshold (PPS, 
single person)* 
3,957 11,500 10,776 8,372 4,170 11,348 
Strength of the HE 
system NA: 
universities among 
Europe top 1001 
0 10 13 0 0 29 
Private investment 
into HE (%, EU27- 
13.5)* 
9.5 16.2 14.6 12.7 9.3 30.5 
Direct public 
support as % of 
expenditure on 
education*  
 
15.1 
 
26.8 
 
21.9 
 
8.8 
 
14.5 
 
30.8 
 
Total support to 
students (grants 
and loans)**** 
1,700 
+Interest 
subsidy 
9,200 9,000 6,000 3,300 13,700 
Receivers of state 
support (own 
households)** 
: 
Substitute: 
loan take-up 
14-24% 
83 29 30 : 86 
Size of shadow 
economy2 25,1 13 16,3 22,3 30,3 12,6 
Tax return rate3 : 85% 30% 41% 784,815 - 69%90 : 
Characteristics of the target group 
Participation in 
ISCED5-6 (EU27 
19,040,200, 3.8%) 
% population* 
413,700 
4.1% 
602,300 
3.7% 
2,245,100 
2.7% 
1,781,000 
3.9% 
204,800 
6.1% 
2,329,500 
3.8% 
Costs of studies 
(PPP)**** 7501 9685 7979 6574 7675 13305 
Unemployment rate 
of persons with 
tertiary education 
(EU average: 
4,5%)* 
3.5 
Total: 10 (-
65%) 
2 
3.7 (-46%) 
3.3 
Total: 7,5 (-
56%) 
9 
Total: 18 (-
50%) 
5.5 
Total: 13.7 (-60%) 
3.2 
Total: 7.6 
(-58%) 
Mean monthly 
earnings by 
educational 
attainment (ISCED 
5A, 2006)* 
1775 
Total 1052 
(+69%) 
3293 
Total 2453 
(+34%) 
: : 1164 Total 822 (+42%) 
4095 
Total 2955 
(+39%) 
Contribution of 
monthly job income 
to students’ total 
income** 
: 35 28 52 : 31 
Fertility rate of 
persons aged 20-
40* 
1.35 1.77 1.38 1.46 1.47 1.90 
Average loan 
portfolio (EU 
5157.41 
514 EUR per 
33046.00 
2005 EUR 
-15971.00 
no debt (?). 
99134.17 
2163 EUR per 
2776.51 
830 EUR per 
54894.01 
897 EUR 
                                                 
 
90 State Tax Inspectorate and http://www.zebra.lt/lt/naujienos/verslas/31-proc-gyventoju-nepanoro-susigrazinti-
pajamu-mokescio-permokos-206183.html 
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Indicator (and EU 
averages where 
relevant) 
Hungary Netherlands Germany Spain Lithuania UK 
average 346480.8 
mio. EUR/700 EUR 
per capita)* 
capita 
 
per capita 
 
195 EUR 
per capita 
savings 
capita capita per capita 
Student mobility trends 
Erasmus outgoing4 3518 4902 23407 24399 2425 7429 
Erasmus incoming4 2205 6894 17722 28175 1117 16065 
Students studying 
in another 
EU/EEA/candidate 
country5 
1.7 2.1 2.8 1.3 3 0.7 
Linguistic 
capacities of 
students (ISCED5-
6 knowing >=2 
languages** 
31.1 : 52.2 33.6 89.1 : 
Financing needs at 
home, EUR**** 5037 0 0 1535 3611 0 
Self-financing of 
mobility (family, 
own income + job 
while abroad)** 
: 48+6 : 65+5 39+12 : 
% lived and worked 
in another country 
in the past6 
3 
 
 
16 
 
 
8 
 
 
10 
 
 
11 
 
 
16 
 
 
Labour flow in and 
flow out balance -0.1% 1.2% -0,4% -0.1% 0 -0.2% 
Mobility scenario BL BG BRG BL BL BPT 
Incoming and 
outgoing mobility 
data by country 
Available at: Education International and the European Students Union. 2008. Mobility barometer: 
An assessment of the mobility of academic staff and students in Europe 
Characteristics of the national loan scheme 
Public/private*** Private Public Public Private Private Public 
Size of the loan*** 
143 
EUR/month 
for publicly 
supported 
courses and 
179 
EUR/month 
for privately 
supported 
courses 
650-850 
EUR, 
depending on 
the period of 
studies 
648 EUR 
A total of 9 000 
EUR for 
preferential 
loans and 30 
000 EUR for 
postgraduate 
loans (approx. 
188 or 625 
EUR/month 
during 4 year 
studies) 
for tuition fees – 
no more than the 
standard study 
price set yearly; 
for living 
expenses – 1882 
EUR / year 
(approx. 157 
EUR/month); for 
Erasmus – 2259 
EUR / year 
(approx. 188 
EUR/month). 
: 
Objective*** Social Cost-sharing Social Social Cost-sharing Cost-sharing 
Period of 
repayment 
(years)*** 
Until the 
beneficiary is 
65 years old 
15 30 10 15 25 
Portability of the 
loans (yes, no, 
limited)*** 
L L Y L L  N 
Sources:  
* Eurostat; 
** Higher Education Information System (HIS). (2008), Social and economic conditions of student life in Europe. Synopsis of 
indicators / Final report. Eurostudent III 2005-2008; 
*** Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). The role of loans in financing 
vocational education and training in Europe; 
**** Own calculations; 
Other sources:  
1 Times Higher Education-QS World University Rankings 2009 / Financial Times Global MBA rankings 2010;  
2 Schneider, F..(2002), ‘Size and measurement of the informal economy in 110 countries around the world’, World Bank;  
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3 OECD (2008), Returns filed electronically - personal income tax and corporate income tax. 
4 “Erasmus student mobility 2008/2009: Total number of students for studies by home and host country”, European 
Commission DG EAC (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/education/erasmus/doc/stat/table109b.pdf 
5 “Key data on education in Europe”. EACEA (2009), 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/key_data_series/105EN.pdf 
6 Special Eurobarometer 337 / Wave 72.5 – TNS Opinion & Social
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Appendix 4. Summary of the first round of Delphi method 
 
QR1.1. Please comment on the basic principles and their rationale (see 
section 1). 
 
The overall view on the requirements and the concept: 
‐ I believe that you have singled out the most impossible requirements – efficiency, 
effectiveness, equity and sustainability. I want such facility/scheme to increase 
access, increase the equality of opportunities without requiring much additional 
“government/EU” funds in the sector. 
‐ The requirements mentioned in 1.1 are both important and appropriate, but the 
fulfillment of Efficiency (especially: low default rate) is particularly important so that 
the others could be realized. 
‐ I have a positive view on the basic idea. It converges with an increasing pressure on 
governments (and student) to increase private contribution to higher education / 
private funding of universities parallel to diminishing public funding, and higher 
financial needs of teaching and research.  
‐ We believe that the requirements outlined for an EU wide programme represent the 
key criteria sufficiently. 
 
Experts would add/change the following requirements: 
‐ Political acceptability of the scheme by as many stakeholders as possible  
‐ Financial stability of the scheme 
‐ Specific targets that would let us measure the performance of the scheme. This is 
particularly true for the default rate and the administration costs, and the impact for 
the individual student. Saying low for the former and high for the latter is too 
abstract. You need to define what low and high means with concrete values.  
‐ The loan scheme should not require huge (or unfettered) subsidization from the EU 
budget;  
‐ Limited exposure to cheating; 
‐ Avoid overlap or displacement of national/regional schemes. 
‐ KISS – explicit reference should be made to the transparency of the system eg. 
Clear eligibility requirements and to ensuring low administrative overhead/simple to 
administer. 
‐ We believe that a more appropriate term for “Equity” should be “Access”. Without 
being overly semantic, the difference is that we subscribe to the view that all 
students should be able to access the loan regardless of demographics (assuming 
that risk indicators like prior default do not appear in their credit profiles). However 
“Equity” potentially implies that the loan parameters should be harmonized at a 
programme level for all borrowers – and we do not believe this is a desired outcome.  
‐ The meaning/intention behind the requirement “A stable, long term institution is 
necessary to assist investment in human capital” is not clear to us. Investment in 
human capital is a desirable outcome, and clearly this should represent a long term 
policy choice for the EU. This specific loan scheme, which is incremental and 
experimental in nature, might be stifled by long term bureaucracy if an initial 
requirement is to create (or involve) a long term stable institution. In other words we 
think that the programme should be designed to be long term, but should retain the 
flexibility and dynamism in its early stages to allow for adaptation and flexibility. Our 
rewording of this requirement would be: “A long term student loan programme is 
necessary to assist investment in human capital”. Or drop it as a requirement.  
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Strengthening statements: 
‐ Basic principles make sense.  
‐ Balance between safeguards and administrative simplicity is needed: The concept 
note include various models in terms of repayment rule which depict very well tow 
internal contradictory forces: financial stability of the scheme (payments need to be 
high enough to enable the system to become self-sustainable) but with strong 
income safeguards to protect low earners and to minimize potential debt aversion 
while at the same time they should be easy to administrate. Whether it is feasible 
from am administration standpoint to have “full income” contingent payments might 
be too difficult to implement.  
‐ Administrative constraint: “full income” contingent payments might be too difficult to 
implement. 
‐ KISS+ evolutionary pathway: Initially the system must be simple since this will be to 
the benefit of everyone involved, administrators and students alike. The design 
must, however, be capable of scalability to cope with what will become an ever 
increasing demand. Designed such that future development is seen as an integral 
part of the system already in place and not as a ‘bolt-on’ development since these 
often become difficult to manage. The over-riding principle is to ensure that the 
system works first time since failure will undoubtedly tarnish the scheme’s future 
image. All of these issues should assist in easing political sensitivity. 
‐ Smooth evolution: The introduction of the scheme for masters programmes for 
mobile students only will help firstly in proving system functionality albeit on a small 
customer base, allow input from university staff on issues arising from their 
perspective, identify issues with expanding eligibility and at the same time minimize 
losses and any other risks involved. It must be borne in mind that although initial 
running costs may be lower because fewer administration staff are involved this will 
not necessarily have the same impact on system development costs. The system 
should be developed on the basis that greater numbers can be added to the portfolio 
with minimal effect. The loan programme is short meaning that borrowers will move 
into repayment relatively quickly (say) 9/10 months after graduation. 
‐ Information on mobility and human investments: The participation of only mobile 
students should provide an opportunity of considering the likely numbers moving 
between member states. It will allow clear identification of the numbers staying in the 
country of study/returning home and consider the benefits to their own economy. It 
will assist in the design of recruitment programmes in conjunction with universities 
and at the same time perhaps remove some of the difficulties in achieving policies 
regarding mobility and learning across Europe.  
‐ We agree on the KISS and Evolutionary Pathway. We also think that 1 year Masters 
programmes are indeed best-placed for pilot purposes for the reasons outlined. 
 
Concerns, disagreements: 
‐ It is a good idea to start with a pilot operation that can then be extended to other 
groups. But there is also the risk that it works because it is small and it will not work 
if it becomes too big. I find important that you show how the features of the model 
you will be considering can then be expanded and tested.  
‐ Why only 1yr Masters programmes? Many countries have 2yr Masters under 
Bologna and to narrow only to 1yr might lead to some countries (which have a 
predominance of 1yr programmes) being favoured as destinations loan & 
programme shopping. Last bullet about the value of 1yr Masters seems 
inappropriate here 
‐ Full degree mobility assumed, no discussion of credit mobility? Eg. One year of a 2yr 
master. Double degree programmes with one period at home and one abroad. 
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‐ Masters programmes have less brain drain than Bachelors – I am not sure what the 
background for this assertion is. We don't have any evidence to this effect and in-
fact it might seem counter-intuitive. 
‐ Mobility this is sometimes difficult to define. There is a blurred area between 
citizenship/nationality/residence which can leave students between the cracks. For 
instance a UK resident who has not been resident in the UK for the 3 years prior to 
studying cannot access a particular UK national scheme. This should be borne in 
mind. Perhaps pricing can be slightly higher than equivalent national schemes so 
that applicants self select.  
‐ We do not agree with the arbitrary assessment of E10,000 as the amount that 
makes a “significant contribution” as the differences are large at a country, university 
and even course level. E10,000 might be far too little for a student at a top university 
in the UK, and too much for a student studying philosophy in Bulgaria.  
 
Further suggestions: 
‐ I can understand the rationale for choosing degree mobile students. But I can also 
see strong arguments to start with Erasmus students and consider putting together 
Erasmus grants and loans. One issue that might be raised is the issue of mobility 
vis-à-vis outside the EU from EU students outside their host country and from non-
EU students to EU countries. It is part of the mission of the EU to facilitate the 
mobility of non-EU countries that are part of existing agreements between the EU 
and those countries. Quite often these students do no return to their countries but 
contribute through remittance flows to the wealth of their country of origin. If the idea 
is to enlarge mobility outside the EU we are moving to a discussion related to 
immigration policy and skills drain. 
‐ It is mentioned that the value of the loan should be small because of financial 
stability of the scheme (agreed), but “big” enough to respect the principle of free 
education at the point of entry (agreed). I think we also should take into account in 
the amount of the loan where the student is coming from (sources of financing 
available at domestic level) and where is going to (average costs of studying in the 
country of destination) to avoid having students double dipping and taking too much 
debt. I don’t see anywhere reference that if the student comes from a country with 
full portability and large loan amount whether this will be taken into consideration 
and he/she will not be eligible for the EU loan facility. This of course and that goes 
without saying brings in additional complication into the system with an overall cap if 
needed. 
‐ I am wondering whether you are considering any academic performance as a 
requirement (or as a sweetener in terms of repayment conditions?). 
‐ The loan should relate to the extent of living costs and tuition fees in the host country 
and also the supports available. A graduate from a poorer State will finish his Master 
program in a rich State by substantially more debt. Returning to his country, because 
of the likely lower incomes this graduate means higher default risk.  
‐ Eligibility should be extended to EEA. However, an argument should be given as to 
why a scheme would not cover EU/EEA students wanting to be mobile globally 
(outside EEA borders) or incoming students to the EEA. 
‐ Both tuition fees and living costs should be covered. 
‐ I am an advocate of the building up of a saving system, NOT of a loan system. The 
current financial crises (and its causes) indicate the weaknesses of bad loans. 
‐ Academic merit of the students should also be taken into consideration.  
‐ We believe that the loan sizing and interest rates should be granular to at least 
university level (and preferably to course level). This fairly recognizes that some 
universities have better placement for graduates at higher salaries (reflected in their 
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cost of tuition) and thus higher loans could be made available to their students who 
can be confident to repay due to their improved earnings. 
‐ Universities need some skin in the game and should be prepared to invest into their 
students. 
 
Some points were not clear: 
‐ Can you please explain the meaning “a stable long-term institution is necessary ..” 
Too vague.  
‐ Brain circulation preferable to brain drain – this needs to be unpacked a bit. 
Preferable to individual Member States/participant countries? In which case does it 
not come under political sustainability/acceptability? 
‐ What is meant by the last bullet on the need for a stable long-term institution 
necessary (i.e. the scheme?). Not demonstrated. Investment in human capital is 
largely the competence of individual Member States/regions. This point should 
rather refer to where the gap lies, and which cannot (or with great difficulty) be 
plugged at individual country level – EU added value, this links to the conflicts of 
interest point above. 
‐ Could students change programme or institution without jeopardising the loan? 
‐ Would the status of the institution awarding qualification be an eligibility criterion? Eg 
public HEI, private, recognised/accredited study programme? 
 
Missing points: 
‐ Institutional architect: No discussion of whether should be administered front end 
(loan giving) and payment collecting, at EU or other level. Devolved to 
national/regional level? Loans awards at EU level and collection at national level 
through taxation schemes? This point is a very complex one and essentially sits in 
the basic principles area. Eg. A mortgage-type scheme offers much greater potential 
for simplicity of collection at EU level, ICS or hybrid requires a mechanism to assess 
payment capacity (other than self-certification, which leaves the way open for 
abuse). 
‐ Management model: The concept paper does not address the critical issue of the 
setting-up, implementation, monitoring... i.e. all the practical aspects related to the 
management of pan-European system ((EU agency, networks of banks, national 
schemes, etc). I believe that the option to be chosen may have an impact of what is 
feasible to implement and the type of repayment rule that is “optimal” so I would like 
to have seen a discussion of the model and its practical implications. The paper is 
silent on the basic conditions to set up such a scheme. Further research is needed 
to analyze the possible legal structures, the source of financing of the scheme, the 
management of the scheme, the reporting and control mechanisms....The recent 
experience with the European Financial Stability Facility offers an interesting case 
study. Another interesting model is the work on the preparation of the micro credit 
fund supported by DG Employment. 
‐ Duplications: The concept note needs to make much clearer the links between this 
EU scheme and the various National schemes. What about for example the level of 
debt that the students can accumulate from both national and EU scheme? 
Shouldn’t the level of debt be capped at some level (ideally that depends where the 
student is going to). 
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QR1.2. Please provide arguments about the relevance of Model 2b (see 
section 2). In your opinion what other measures are needed to make the 
scheme attractive for the students and sustainable in financial terms? 
 
Strengthening statements: 
‐ Basically, I agree with the analysis and the consequences, as well as your choice. 
‐ Can we say that a system with mortgage repayment with strong income safeguards 
built in has more than default and weaker access than a pure income contingent 
one, while the latter definitely has higher administrative demands.  
‐ the difference is not so much between a scheme with income contingent and a 
scheme with mortgage payments, but whether we have strong income safeguards 
built in (which by definition exist in an income contingent scheme and may not exist 
in a system with mortgage repayments!). So whatever model we choose we have to 
have very strong income safeguards built in to minimize debt aversion. 
‐ I do not think that pure income contingent repayments are feasible in the context of 
the EU loan scheme and that for two reasons. First because that would require to 
have all participating member states with working Tax Systems which is not the 
case. So if we consider income contingent repayments they would have to be closer 
to the Hungarian system and even then in countries with high level of fiscal evasion 
it might be an issue. On the other hand we know that income contingency is heavier 
to administrate then income contingency.  
‐ It is possible, that administrative demands and costs of income-contingent system 
are higher than that of mortgage system, but these higher expenditures are 
compensated by much less credit losses. 
‐ The model must be simple and transparent in terms of form, implementation, and 
administrative features. It should be equitable, control-free and fraud-resistant) to be 
Europe wide acceptable. 2b does not meet these basic requirements. In Europe, tax 
systems, welfare and (the quality of) education systems and institutions are too far 
apart for such sophisticated system. Implementation costs will be too high. Other 
risk/disadvantage: insecurity for the student. 
‐ Perhaps Model 2b responds better to equity but may pose significant administrative 
burden and EU financial exposure is higher.  
‐ After reading the paper, the mortgage-based seems perhaps a better option than my 
initial perception. 
‐ Wholly or substantially self-financing in the long term. Limited exposure for the EU 
budget. 
‐ The implementation of model 2b has advantages covering the wide and differing 
needs of a potentially multi-faceted customer base. It has the advantage of being 
more income contingency focused allowing the potential of perhaps moving more 
easily to this basis of lending as the scheme grows in number with expected growth 
in levels of required lending. Although requiring a fully detailed evaluation this could 
perhaps simplify any future systems development required for any such migration.  
‐ It would also provide a good test bed to evaluate student lending, future 
development and could possibly be used as the vehicle to attract the banks and 
other institutional investors to become involved. 
‐ Model 2b’s key benefit is increasing the available loan cap, and thus making it more 
relevant to more students. This comes with the administration burden of monitoring 
income levels across countries (and internationally since there is no guarantee the 
student will remain in the EU post-graduation).  
Further suggestions: 
‐ One possibility which would be a variant of your model 2b) so to speak is that you 
could consider a mortgage system with say three levels of repayment to be chosen 
by the graduate (e.g. x0 to be paid during 10 years, x1 to be paid during 15 years or 
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X2 to be paid during 20 years) possibly depending on the amount borrowed and on 
the average level of incomes in different countries so to allow that poor borrowers in 
poor countries can choose the small payment for some time. 
‐ graduates could ask for a temporary waiver of the payments if the income level of 
the graduates falls below a certain amount (which could vary according to the 
country where the graduate lives). In a first stage the burden of the proof would fall 
on the graduate, and to ease administration verification could be done only in case 
that the client would claim this remission for more than x months/years. 
‐ I believe that a symbolic repayment should always be the rule (like in Hungary where 
graduates have repay at least 6% of the minimum wage making the minimum 
repayment in this case country dependent but with a generic rule that does not 
change by country). In the case of countries where fiscal evasion is high at least the 
graduates would have to pay something. 
‐ Loan sizes should be capped at course tuition fees rather than at an arbitrary level 
which will significantly under provide for many students and significantly over provide 
for others. 
‐ Interest rate and terms (average and maximum) are determined at a 
university/course level. (In brief this can be done by building a scorecard based on 
data obtained from university surveys of graduates over the previous five years). An 
average term could be assigned, with an automatic option for any student to 
increase the maximum term for affordability concerns. 
‐ University should put up the default cushion of say 4% (100% or in 50:50 partnership 
with an EU fund). 
‐ All students can access the loan programme, at different amounts (based on their 
course tuition), the default cushion is provided by the university since this institution 
has a direct impact on the student’s employability, salary and post-graduation 
affordability. There is more effort required upfront in building the scorecard but 
significant savings over the life of the loans as there is no need to monitor individual 
student’s income levels (as in contingency-linked systems). The student has the 
option to revert to the maximum term automatically in the event of hardship. In other 
words it is a mortgage model that predicts future affordability on a course/university 
level and then allows the individual to personally adjust the term to take into account 
individual affordability issues. As more and more data is added to the model the 
scorecard becomes better at predicting interest rate and maximum term for cohorts. 
‐ The involvement of the national tax authorities could result in decreasing of the 
administrative demands and costs of repayment, and it could help to keep the 
default rate on a reasonable level. My opinion is that the main reason for non-
repayment and late repayment in a well-designed income-contingent system is not 
the solvency, but the willingness.  
‐ Expanding the customer base doesn’t generate higher administrative demands and 
costs directly.  
‐ The arguments about size and potential exposure are difficult to judge. Would it be 
possible to do with a worked model – more to give an indication of the proportional 
differences between the models than the accuracy of size on each model? 
‐ Awareness of availability of financial support is often cited as one of the most 
significant barriers faced by (potentially) mobile students. The scheme would need to 
be widely promoted, at EU level or by national authorities. 
‐ Managing expectations – how to deal with eligible applicants in efficient/effective 
manner and non-eligible applicants eg. Online self-check of main qualifying criteria. 
‐ The way to set-up earnings confirmation for low earners would best be achieved by 
building the system such that as much as work as possible can be undertaken by 
human intervention at loans administration level. This model perhaps requires 
significantly higher levels of administration staff, with higher administrative costs to 
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handle processes and the income confirmation and support documentation required 
from students. It could also lead to increased administration at university level.  
 
Some points were not clear: 
‐ Paper indicates that admin. capacity needed for 2b is substantially higher. Why is 
the administrative capacity difference so distinct between 2a and 2b?  
‐ Measurement of people's income – tax system or some other way? What would be 
the other way? Self-certification leaves exposure to the same risk/perverse 
incentives identified in 1b, just perhaps different level. 
‐ How to determine the level of when income-contingency fades out and flat-rate 
repayment kicks in? Does this differ across countries? Implications for (central) 
administration?  
‐ All the several models presented include a listing of advantages and inconvenient 
that could have also been included in the others. I give an example: in model 2a it is 
stated “ the timing and size of voluntary early repayment depends on individual 
income” . Isn’t that something that can be included in all models without exception 
regardless of the type of repayment rule? Or am I missing something here? 
 
Missing points: 
‐ Voluntary early repayment mentioned but not expanded. 
‐ Potential for payment holiday/freezing for graduate & basis? 
‐ Securitization of loan? 
‐ Mutual guarantee? 
‐ What is in it for national administrations/taxation authorities? Implies significant 
additional workload. 
  
QR1.3. What kind of support mechanism is needed to finance the costs of 
non-repayments and/or the policies against brain drain or other purposes (see 
section 3)? Can or should it be connected to EU funds? 
 
Some experts are against EU subsidies for default loss covering: 
‐ In my opinion a student loan scheme could become a self-sustaining system and 
exists safely if all the losses are financed within the loan scheme in the long term. 
This is the best way to avoid or to reduce the political problems. Personally I think 
the greater incentives to adverse selection (i.e. better debtors will opt out of the 
system) is a more manageable problem than the potential political problems of the 
loss-financing from EU resources.  
‐ Any EU lender institution should be not for profit AND self-sustaining. Except for the 
costs of setting up such a facility, EU-funding (taxpayers money too) should not be 
an option.  
‐ Default contingency at EU level – this is one of the biggest risk (and cost) areas. 
Concern that exposure of EU budget should be minimised insofar as possible. 
‐ The simplest way of offsetting some of the risks involved is to have a cohort risk 
premium thereby spreading the risk across the entire portfolio which could have the 
downside of students deciding to opt out of participation. 
 
Some experts are against EU subsidies for brain-circulation policies: 
‐ Any secondary policy objective other than providing the possibility to study at an 
accredited university/he-program, like equal division of higher education workforce / 
policy against brain drain, should be avoided. This would be contrary to European 
free movement of people and services (the European citizenship). 
‐ Differentiation by countries: this poses difficulties. Whilst individual MS have natural 
desires that their graduates return to make a positive economic contribution to their 
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country of origin, at EU-level mobility for learning, but also to establish oneself, live, 
work start a family etc is positive and one of the fundamental freedoms of the EU. A 
substantial amount of case law on the portability of grants and loans exists. See, for 
a summary: A guide to the rights of mobile students in the European Union 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/yom/wpguidance_en.pdf  
 
Some experts are for an optimal mix in financing default losses: 
‐ As far as the default is concerned (and I include here both true defaulters and those 
that will benefit from a remission of the loan, i.e., those that will die, long term 
unemployed, handicapped you name it) I would say that there are as you present in 
your paper very strong arguments to have the EU at least partially (mainly) financing 
it. If nothing else the political argument is very strong. But in the case of mobility 
degrees, and in a context of increasing competition between Universities and if they 
are charging tuition fees (and since the Universities will have all the interest in 
attracting these students) we may consider that the Universities could also 
contribute with a symbolic percentage of the tuition fees received but it would 
increase their responsibility in the scheme.  
‐ If banks are going to be chosen (like for example in NRW, Germany) then I would 
defend that they should also bear a small percentage of the default (moral hazard). 
We can also consider other contributors such as the member states, and the 
students, but the main contributor should be no doubt the EU. 
‐ If it is not possible to finance all the losses within the loan scheme the other 
suggested solution could be that the losses should be financed only partly from 
outside subsidy. 
‐ We believe that there are many improvements become particularly relevant when 
dealing with cross-border, internationally that can be made to the operational design 
of the programme to improve portfolio performance. These include best practices in 
underwriting, application processing, relationship management and lifecycle 
management. And new innovations such as community cohesion/peer-to-peer 
models that demonstrate particular relevance in reducing default in student loan 
portfolios. Assuming that these best practices are in place, and that the interest rate 
and terms are set at statistical scorecard levels, we believe that first loss liability 
should be allocated to the university. This could be done on a shared basis with an 
EU fund, but having the university with “skin in the game” encourages honesty in 
tuition fee pricing, improvements in career development services and graduate’s 
employability and a clear benefit to the universities for developing and increasing 
brand equity and competitiveness (i.e. increased loans for students to pay the 
increased tuitions). At a level of 4% we believe that this would not require EU funds 
to be committed and would be a manageable “expense” for universities (default on a 
properly managed programme should be less than 4%).  
 
Some experts are for an optimal mix in financing brain circulation policies: 
‐ I like the idea of offering some sort of forgiveness to create incentives for mobile 
graduates to return to poorer Member States, but I also can see the member states 
raising many issues here and the costs off such measure more than setting its 
benefits. First, let’s be clear what is meant? Do we mean Bulgarians returning to 
Bulgaria or would be a Sweden going to Bulgaria eligible? What about a Romanian 
to Bulgaria? Where would the line be drawn? The only case we would truly 
preventing brain-drain from the member country perspective would be the first one 
where we require the student to go back to their country of origin and in addition the 
country is poor (defined as GDP per capita below the EU average?) but member 
states might see it in conflict with freedom of move. Still the idea has some merits 
and might be worth discussing it/raising it as a possibility at a consultation meeting 
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with a wider range of stakeholders. I agree from a technical standpoint if such idea 
were to be taken on board then financing should come from the EU budget. But 
wouldn’t be unacceptable for the EU perspective to finance this sort of thing? 
‐ I think, there must be some way of tying any such policy must be linked to EU 
funding. To counter brain drain is, in some respects, a finely balanced issue which 
must be looked at very carefully. One way would be too consider some form of (say) 
annual financial incentive for students returning to their home country after 
graduation but this runs the risk of being seen as cross-subsidisation and introduces 
also the sovereign debt question. It could also be the case that students could be 
made to stay for a prescribed period in their home country at the end of which their 
loan would be considered for write off. 
 
Missing points: 
‐ Potential for involvement for other institutions in risk taking or sharing incl. 
commercial banking sector? 
‐ 'Minimum loss is from graduates with low lifetime earnings' – please clarify 
‐ Rather than focusing on the negative impacts of brain drain, we would advise further 
research into the positive impacts of migration such as ambassadorship, diaspora 
effects, inward investment and remittances and social cohesion.  
 
QR1.4. In your opinion the parameter setting of the scheme (loan amount, 
interest rate, income threshold, level of fix repayment, percentage of income 
to be repaid) should be universal or differentiated by countries and/or 
borrowers (see section 4)? 
 
General views on parameter setting: 
‐ It is mentioned that the loan should be accessible for students regardless of their 
nationality, socio-economic status… What about level of debt? Is that going to be a 
condition? In some “quasi-universal schemes” without means testing or credit risk 
scoring the level of debt is a screening condition.  
‐ In my opinion the parameter setting of the scheme should be universal. (To design a 
loan scheme with some differences across the Member States with the requirements 
that it should be fair, appropriate, effective and efficient, etc. is almost impossible, 
and it could cause a lot of disagreements and dissatisfactions for the graduates.) 
‐ The establishment of an EU-level scheme with this sort of differentiation by country 
is also politically sensitive. Currently, for example, EU mobility programmes operate 
on the principle of solidarity. In addition, ‘Poorer Member States' – how do you 
define poorer MS (presumably GDP per capita, or could be average (graduate) 
earnings)? Which would fall into this category, a cut-off line or gradient? Would it be 
reviewed over time?  
‐ The setting of parameters for any scheme should, as far as possible, be universal 
since it is much easier to understand and to administer. Many of the arguments for 
setting these differently on a country by country basis apply her in exactly the same 
way as they do to incentives for low earners and/or to possibly a lesser extent to 
differing repayment thresholds although this may well be the easiest of all to 
understand. That said, however, it all needs to viewed against the background of the 
levels of participation sought as well as whether this should be an even spread or 
increased participation from poorer countries. The introduction of universal 
parameters is easy to understand as is any systems development although 
variations could probably be quite easily achieved by (say) look-up tables. It may 
well add to any administrative difficulties outlined in the answer to question 1.2 
above. 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 167
‐ We believe that the loan parameters should be set at university/course level (it is 
possible to do this at borrower level as we already implement this in our scorecard 
model for MBAs – but this can affect equity perceptions and introduce political 
questions). As mentioned this requires an effective scorecard to determine interest 
rate and term (and sufficient datapoints from university surveys to enable the 
building of a scorecard – this is relatively easy to achieve electronically). 
Alternatively you could start with larger first loss provisions from universities until 
actual default became apparent to allow for pricing and terms to be more accurately 
adjusted.  
‐ In summary I would support a scheme with elements of differences between rich and 
poorer member states to be addressed may be with a grant element. I would prefer 
the element of differentiation to be addressed by differences between “poorer” and 
“richer” graduates regardless where they are from or going to.91 That could be 
addressed with lagged income contingency system where the percentage of 
repayment depends on the level of earnings or that the graduate can choose the 
level of mortgage depending on the income subject to verification/based on own  
‐ declaration of earnings. If the management model to be chosen includes a EU 
student loan agency then why not using the grant element (Dutch model of 
combining grants and loans in the same agency) to handle those differences?  
 
Loan amount: 
‐ Loan amount should be limited by the preset (annual) study costs in the country in 
question; below, it should be at the request / choice of the student.  
‐ Of course country differentiation will need to exist in terms of amount of loan. 
 
Interest rate: 
‐ A fixed and universal interest rate is strongly advisable. 
‐ In my opinion it would be difficult to justify having differing rates for risk. Graduates 
from less affluent countries and therefore perhaps more likely to default may not 
accept they should pay a higher premium and be turned off applying when it may 
well be the case that is from such students that increased involvement in student 
lending at a European level is required. 
‐ Cannot be a profit, significant surplus generating but equally cannot be subject to 
huge subsidization from public purse.  
 
Repayment: 
Max duration of loan scheme (4 or 5 year) should be indicated. 
 
Missing points: 
‐ Loan amount €10k seems roughly ok. Would this be an average? Or a cap? If 
average, would there be a cap? Is there differentiation by country of the size of the 
loan, eg linked to cost of living index or other? 
‐ Interest rate – start at point of graduation (preferable) or immediately? Market-rate, 
government-rate plus small amount? Capped?  
‐ Who is providing the capital? 
 
                                                 
 
91 Of course country differentiation will need to exist in terms of amount of loan.  
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Appendix 5. Summary of the second round of Delphi method 
 
Expert A 
 
Universal parameter setting 
Political risk is more relevant than the issue of adverse selection.  
Loan amount 
Living costs and tuition fees should be covered 
Income contingent  
This could be administratively more expensive but at the end they produce less credit 
loss then mortgage type 
Repayment 
Mutual risk fund should be built from the graduates repayment in order to manage 
credit loss. For a self sustaining system the default rate is a very important measure 
to be controlled. Using the tax offices in collection could result in keeping the default 
low and improving collection. 
EU subsidy only for enforcing policy objectives, for instance the brain drain „policy”. 
System should be self sustaining. This is the best way to achieve high performance 
criteria (effectiveness, equity, efficiency). Consequently, the scheme should minimize 
the EU support (not use at all) in the long run.  
EU level agency supported by universities 
Non-profit agency with a strong management structure 
Management of the product which is defined by EU 
Fundraising 
Collecting repayment (only outsource this, is control mechanisms are in place)  
Operational tasks are outsourced, banks only act as technical contributors.  
EU is the guarantor of the loan – for liabilities not for the repayment. 
 
Expert B 
 
Unified parameters 
Loan amount 
 Tuition fee and living costs 
Mortgage type seems better after reading our paper 
Eligibility 
Transparent, clear requirements. This also ensures low administrative overhead. 
Simple access with online self eligibility checks. Promotion is very important, student 
should be aware of the system. Safeguarding against cheating should be built in.  
Should be clarified if study results have an impact and/or changing study programs. 
Repayment 
Clear and fair repayment with payment holiday opportunities. Involving tax authorities 
requires additional workload and increases complexity. 
EU subsidy 
Self financing in the long run is important, to have a limited exposure to the EU 
budget. 
Brain circulation should be preferred to brain drain. The system should clearly 
address the CAV on this issue: how does it address problems which are not done by 
national schemes. 
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Expert C 
 
Loan amount 
Capped at value that ensure financial stability of the scheme but ideally (i) covers 
tuition fees at the University and (ii) living costs in the destination country netted out 
of grants and loans that the student gets in his home country. 
Income contingencies:  
Debt is written off in the case of death, long term disability. Low-income earners have 
the possibility of deferrals of repayments. After 25 years debt to be forgiven and 
taken by guarantee/default fund.  
Eligibility:  
All master students from EU-EEA attending a recognized institution in the EU area (if 
programme lasts for two years then the loan should cover the two years). Age limit of 
40 years at the time of enrolling in the programme. Loans to be available for the 
official duration of the studies plus one semester. 
No credit scoring/no means testing 
Repayment  
Normally 10 years, max 15-20 years (precise numbers to be decided based on what 
are the requirements to ensure financial stability). 
Grace period: 6 months -1 year. Only to be extended if the student decides to pursue 
further studies (i.e. PhD). 
Three levels of mortgage (if we want the banks involved that will make the scheme 
acceptable for them). (students can choose one of the three levels) with very strong 
income safeguards built-in. Minimum repayment obligation even in the case of 
unemployment or inactivity (e.g. 5% of minimum wage or unemployment benefit in 
the country of residency). 
Interest rate: Universal, variable as a rule with possibility to choose fixed. Interest 
charged during studies, not compounded, but only paid after graduation. 
Early repayments possible without penalty.  
Default: 
Catching defaulters: use of all systems available – credit system/tax system/social 
security. 
Default to be financed by a combination of (i) EU subsidy, (ii) Banks, and (iii) 
Universities.  
 
EU level agency 
Specified as narrow as possible. At minimum they will need to: 
‐ manage various flows of information (with University about the student 
status; with the various tax authorities to know about income status of the 
student for income safeguards) 
‐ manage default fund 
‐ monitoring and evaluation of the scheme 
‐ liaise with EU on regulation matters 
Confidentiality issues are managed more easily than with “consortium of bank” 
solution. 
Counter argument: one more EU level agency! 
Outsourcing possibilities: for example, one can have a model where the lender 
institution is the Specialized EU-level agency with Banks providing financial services 
and collection of repayments and they will bear some of the default risk alongside the 
universities. 
Consortium of banks  
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 170
Second best alternative: coupled either with a EU guarantee or with the 
establishment of a default fund to be co-financed by EU and Universities and 
participating banks.  
Disbursement of loans and collection of repayments should be outsourced to banks. 
Innovative in applying new instruments  
such as new networking tools (e.g. Facebook to keep in touch with 
students/graduates.) 
Questions to be resolved 
Working capital to be provided by banks?  
Bond issues? EU funds? EIB loan? 
 
 
Expert D 
 
Loan amount 
Should be limited by the preset (annual) study costs (living costs and tuition fees) in 
the country in question; below, it should be at the request / choice of the student 
Eligibility 
 Equitable, control free, and fraud resistant. No income threshold of parents or 
alumnus. 
Repayment 
Fixed repayment (amount and time-frame) is preferable. Earlier repayment always be 
possible. 
Max duration of loan scheme (4 or 5 year) is indicated. 
Interest rate: A fixed and universal interest rate bases on rate of inflation + small 
extra to co-cover the costs of the system is strongly advisable.  
EU subsidy 
Self sustaining: EU taxpayers should not be used for this. Should be simple and 
transparent in administration. Should take into consideration that European tax and 
welfare systems are far apart from each other. 
Policy enforcement 
Only the enforcement of study at accredited universities/programs. All other policy 
enforcements should be avoided (such as brain drain and division of higher 
education work force) since they are against the free movement of people and 
services. 
EU level centralised agency 
 
 
Expert E 
 
Loan Amount 
Capped at tuition fee level. This ensures that students have some “skin in the game”. 
Also tuition fees reflect differences in university quality, exit salary, career potential. 
Mortgage with income contingent safeguards 
Eligibility 
All students regardless of background. Eligibility set at university/course level. Any 
students accepted into an eligible course become eligible. We think it makes sense 
to include non-EU students studying at EU institutions due to the Human Capital 
objectives of EU policy. This can be done if the contracts and programme are 
correctly structured. 
Each student should be subjected to background checks, and where possible bureau 
data to make a risk decision. Loans should be declined for judgments, criminal 
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record, bankruptcy, fraud or unresolved default. This is critical to maintain low 
default. 
Mandatory life insurance! 
Repayment 
Loan Term: Study period (with no payments) + 6 months no payment + 7 year 
paydown. Maximum loan term would be 12 years. Students would have the option to 
prolong the term automatically if it is needed. 
Payment holidays - up to 2 periods of 3 month payment holidays during term (interest 
still accrues, term remains same). Graduate can choose to halt payments for 3 
months automatically 2 times during the term. This provides for short term 
employment issues, job transitions, etc.  
Interest only period - up to six months one time during term.  
Early Repayments - can be made at any time with no penalty. 
Interest Rate: E3M + 4%: It also depends on the source of funding and could be 
lower if subsidised.  
Default  
University guarantee: 10% guarantee kicking in at 5% student default. Kicking it in at 
5% means that the university is not affected by expected ‘normal’ default. The 10% 
level is high to start with and could be reduced over time to more realistic levels (of 
around 3-4%) once an accurate picture of default is built. 
Administration fee: 1.25% charged upfront to borrower to cover cost of risk 
screening, background check and admin. 
EU level agency 
Universities, banks, and national student loan centres have a national outlook on 
mobility. Pan-European level interest can be represented by a dedicated EU level 
institution. Banks are especially bad at cross-boarder student lending. 
EU level guarantee looks less politically palatable. 
Alumni and school stakeholders as funders/investors 
This would ensure peer pressure therefore add more social cohesion to the scheme. 
Funding  
By the use of a simple securitization structure (with just two bands of debt – senior 
and junior), in order to ensure sustainability and private funding. 
 
Default Band (approximate) IMPACT 
 Junior Layer 
(e.g. EIB) 
Senior Layer 
(e.g. commercial 
banks) 
University 
0%-5% default Return reduces - - 
5%-15% default - - Guarantee 
Called (10% at 
risk) 
15%-25% default Return reduces - - 
25%-100% default - Return reduces - 
 
Example funding mix: 
Junior Debt: 25% of total @ E + 7.5% 
Senior Debt: 75% of total @ E + 1.5% 
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Expert F 
 
Universal parameters 
The introduction of universal parameters is easy to understand as is any systems 
development although variations could probably be quite easily achieved by (say) 
look-up tables.  
Loan amount 
The potential of loan availability to mirror more closely costs of study would, in all 
probability, result in a desire from students to participate. It would also mean 
Universities could become more competitive 
Income contingent 
The additional costs will be partially offset by increased cash flow and would be 
further reduced as administration evolves becoming simpler. Further savings will also 
arise not least will from a reduction on collection costs. Default on income-contingent 
schemes is traditionally lower than, for example, mortgage style lending. For that 
reason the costs associated with pursuing non-repayers become lower, as do the 
costs of pursuing and the registration of default and potentially legal costs. Factors 
such as this are very often marginalised in the debate on income-contingent vs. 
mortgage style lending 
Eligibility 
It must be borne in mind that although initial running costs may be lower because 
fewer administration staff are involved this will not necessarily have the same impact 
on system development costs. The system should be developed on the basis that 
greater numbers can be added to the portfolio with minimal effect. The loan 
programme is short meaning that borrowers will move into repayment relatively 
quickly (say) 9/10 months after graduation 
Repayment 
It is advised to develop a cohort risk premium thereby spreading the risk across the 
entire portfolio which could have the downside of students deciding to opt out of 
participation. This, however, is a variation widely available in the UK but is generally 
sold under the banner of payment protection or some other guise. In my opinion it 
would be difficult to justify having differing rates for risk. Graduates from less affluent 
countries and therefore perhaps more likely to default may not accept they should 
pay a higher premium and be turned off applying when it may well be the case that is 
from such students that increased involvement in student lending at a European level 
is required 
EU-subsidy 
To counter brain drain is, in some respects, a finely balanced issue which must be 
looked at very carefully. One way would be too consider some form of (say) annual 
financial incentive for students returning to their home country after graduation but 
this runs the risk of being seen as cross-subsidisation and introduces also the 
sovereign debt question. It could also be the case that students could be made to 
stay for a prescribed period in their home country at the end of which their loan would 
be considered for write off. I think, however, there must be some way of tying any 
such policy must be linked to EU funding. 
Universities as lending agencies 
The scheme should be an income-contingent scheme then in case of the 
involvement of University administration will become simpler since there is only one 
product to understand. This in turn will mean simplicity in dealing with enquiries and 
fewer errors. By having only one product, marketing becomes simpler across the 
entire spectrum which in turn Universities may decide to augment with their own 
information leaflets/packs. One product will mean they require fewer administration 
staff (further savings). Any increase in cash flow arising from income-contingent 
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repayment would provide Universities with the opportunity to offer a wider range of 
study and to become more actively involved in shaping educational requirements. 
Any need to involve Universities in aspects of administration could be argued/sold as 
part of the overall benefits package on issues such as this. Savings could also 
become a consideration allowing Universities to actively promote themselves and to 
become more competitive. 
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Appendix 6. Spill-over effects of student lending 
 
Table 28 shows how other Member States may be affected if a given Member State 
implements its student loan scheme for a specific subgroup.  
 
Table 28. Spill-over effects of student lending 
 
Member State 1 
implements  
SL scheme for 
these subgroups: 
N1 
Non-mobile 
home 
students 
working in 
MS1 
N2 
Non-mobile 
home 
students 
working in 
MS2 
I1 
Incoming 
foreign 
students 
working in 
MS1 
I2 
Incoming 
foreign 
students 
working in 
MS2 
O1 
Outgoing 
home 
students 
working in 
MS1 
O2 
Outgoing 
home 
students 
working in 
MS2 
Spill-over effects  
on  
Member State 2 
 
neutral 
 
positive 
 
positive? 
 
positive? 
 
positive 
 
positive 
 
Source: the authors 
 
N1+N2: If a Member State implements a student loan scheme exclusively for their non-
mobile students the other Member States will rather benefit from the increasing number of 
better educated workers “brain gain”. Even if it may produce some political tensions due to 
crowding out fears, the overall balance is rather positive. 
 
I1+I2: If a Member State implements a student loan scheme for the incoming foreign 
students, his HE become more attractive and the other Member States will suffer from the 
negative “brain drain” effect but at the same time they will benefit from the competition, the 
knowledge transfer and also from savings public money or state guarantee by not supporting 
the mobility of their citizens. The sum of these spill-over effects is positive although difficult 
to assess. 
 
O1+O2: If a Member State implements a student loan scheme for the outgoing home 
students, other Member States will profit from this “brain gain”. 
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Appendix 7. Overpayment mechanisms 
 
Overpayment can be required in several forms: 
1. An interest rate risk premium  
2. A debt multiplier 
3. Extra repayments 
4. Extra years of repayment 
 
Let us exclude administration costs for the sake of simplicity. We will use the following 
notation: 
H: individual debt 
I: income 
α: repayment burden 
 
1. Interest rate risk premium (p) 
 
The interest rate of the loan (r) equals the risk free rate (f) plus the default risk premium. 
Debts are accumulated according to r and the repayment obligation is due until the debt 
becomes zero or for N year at maximum.  
 
r=f+p 
 
0,0, ii dH   
  t,i1t,it,i IrH;0maxH    
  t,i1t,it,i I;rHminc    
 
2. Debt multiplier (M) 
 
The interest rate of the loan equals the risk free rate (f) but the loans taken out are multiplied 
by M which is greater than 1 and this increased amount is to be repaid. 
 
r=f 
 
MdH ii  0,0,  
  t,i1t,it,i IfH;0maxH    
  t,i1t,it,i I;fHminc    
 
3. Extra repayment ( ) 
 
The interest rate of the loan equals the risk free rate (f) but the repayment burden is 
increased to   . The debt is reduced only by I , the rest goes into a fund dedicated to 
finance the expected losses. 
r=f 
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0,0, ii dH   
  tititi IfHH ,1,, ,0max     
   t,i1t,it,i I,fHminc    
 
4. Extra years ( ) 
 
The interest rate of the loan equals the risk free rate (f) but when the debt becomes zero, the 
repayment obligation still lasts for   years: 
 
r=f 
 
0,0, ii dH   
  tititi IfHH ,1,, ,0max     
 
Let t* denote the year when debt becomes zero: 
 
0*, tiH  
   tititi XIfH ,,1, ,min    ha *tt   
tic ,   tiI ,     ha  ** ttt  
0    ha  *tt  
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Appendix 8. CAV and subsidiarity in student lending 
 
FISCAL FEDERALISM This question can be answered by applying a theoretical framework of 
„fiscal federalism” for the concrete situation. (Musgrave 1997, Oates 1999) An overview the 
below considerations and the trade-offs between them can help to make a well-structured 
analysis, and to avoid incorporating too much personal and value-based judgements. 
 
GOVERNMENT LEVELS can be: EU, national, provincial or local. Now we concentrate only on 
the first two: EU and national government levels. Task sharing is a question of competences. 
Competences can be: 
First pillar:  Exclusive or EU competences (e.g. competition policy) 
Second pillar:  Shared competences (e.g. foreign affairs) 
Third pillar:  National competences (e.g. secondary school curriculum) 
 
In the case of EU competences the decision making is „Supranational”: 
• Commission proposes new laws that are voted by the Member States 
(Council of Ministers and EP). If passed by majority voting it will be binding for 
every member even those that disagree with it. Majority voting is an important 
element here. It tells us that Member States have transferred sovereignty to 
the EU-level. 
• Commission may have direct executive authority (like in competition policy).  
• European Court of Justice can alter laws, rules and practices in the Member 
States. 
In the case of Shared competences the decision making is „Intergovernmental”:  
• Cooperation is voluntary. 
• All the members have to agree unanimously on any common policy. 
In the case of National competences there is no common policy: 
• Decisions are made by the sovereign governments. 
 
PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY: The Principle of subsidiarity suggests setting policies as close to 
people as possible. 
„In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.” 
92 
 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY: The „Principle of Proportionality” complements it: EU should 
undertake only the minimum necessary actions.  
„Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty.” 93  
THE FIRST ANSWER TO THE TASK-SHARING QUESTION: When in doubt, allocate the tasks to the 
lowest practicable level. In this way the policy will be subject to more democratic control. 
This is a strong argument for decentralisation. Centralisation can be justified basically by 
three considerations: 1) the spill-over effects and 2) the scale economies94 and 3) 
informational advantages. 
 
                                                 
 
92 Article 5 Treaty on European Community, 1957 
93 Article 5 Treaty on European Community, 1957 
94 Compare this statement to the citation from the Treaty of Rome on page XXX. 
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1. Spill-over effects (externalities) 
 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN GENERAL: Spill-over effects are the economic side-effects, known as 
externalities.  
- In case of a positive spill-over (i.e. army) if all parties decided separately, the size of 
the policy would be too small. (Free-rider problem) 
- In case of negative spill-over (i.e. state aid to national firms) if all parties decided 
separately, the size of the policy would be too big. 
Both positive and negative spill-overs make local decisions suboptimal for the EU as a whole 
(this situation is called Prisoner dilemma in game theory), thus the presence of externalities 
necessitates common policy thus centralization. 
 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN STUDENT LENDING: Significant positive spill-over effects are present. If 
a Member State creates its own comprehensive student loan scheme supporting all kinds of 
mobility, the other countries will profit from the mobility and the enhanced competition 
without spending public money or guarantee on student lending and without risking high 
administration costs and default losses. Free-riders benefit from the student loan systems 
set up by the others, thus Members States have interest in limiting their student lending 
activity to a minimum level which is definitely suboptimal. This argument provides another 
justification why it cannot be expected that Member States solve the problem by their own 
and why a common policy is needed.  
 
2. Scale economies 
 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE: Scale economies in the provision of public services also favour 
centralization, because cost savings can be realised as the size of the service increases.  
 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN STUDENT LENDING: The possible sources of scale economies in 
student lending are the followings: 
• wider risk cohort, better diversification; [S-23] 
• more efficient financing and risk-management (due to better market position); [S-23-
33] 
• more efficient collection mechanism, lower administration costs especially in mobility 
lending; [40] 
• better crisis-resistance (political, financial and social crisis); 
• lower costs of design and implementation (set-up costs, consultancy) etc. 
 
COOPERATION OF NSLSS IN COLLECTION OF REPAYMENT: It must be emphasised that the 
collection of the repayments of the mobile workers cannot be solved at national level by 
definition. The cooperation of NSLSs becomes inevitable if graduate mobility significantly 
increases.  
3. Informational advantage 
 
DIVERSITY OF PREFERENCES: Fiscal federalism suggests considering an additional issue as 
well: the informational advantage. We have seen that people’s policy preferences are very 
different related to HE financing issues and also to student lending. In such a situation a 
one-size-fits-all policy would require too much compromise; therefore student loan policy 
should be differentiated. If differentiated policies are to be set, then the question is: which 
government level is probably better in determining the appropriate policy elements. It is an 
issue of information and incentives to adapt policies to the preferences of the people. 
 
NSLSS HAVE INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE IN NON-MOBILE LENDING: National student loan 
schemes vary country by country, due to the fact that they were designed for specific needs 
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and alongside specific policy objectives within the specific political, cultural context of a 
particular member state. The vast majority of the borrowers study and work at home (> 95%) 
and systems were designed basically to serve these borrowers. It is beyond discussion that 
in non-mobile lending NSLSs have absolute informational advantage. 
 
EU HAS INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE IN MOBILE LENDING: In principle, NSLSs could develop 
new products to serve mobile students and workers as well, but it is important to see that 
definitely they have information disadvantage in mobile lending. The necessary information 
on preferences, opportunities, financing needs, riskiness and income perspectives of mobile 
students and workers are much easily accessible at EU level. 
 
THE FINAL ANSWER TO THE TASK-SHARING QUESTION: We have to evaluate the trade-off 
between the arguments for decentralisation (principles of subsidiarity and proportionality) 
and the arguments for centralisation (spill-over effect, scale economies and informational 
advantage). Trade-offs are difficult to measure, but it follows from the above discussion that 
arguments of the centralisation are the strongest with mobile students, rather modest with 
mobile workers and non-convincing in the case of non-mobile students and workers. Putting 
all elements together we suggest the task sharing presented in Table 29. 
 
Table 29. Suggested task-sharing in student lending (EU and national governments) 
Loans for  
mobile students 
Exclusive or EU competence  
(participation is obligatory for all Member States if it 
is accepted by majority voting) 
Collection of repayments of  
mobile graduates 
Shared competence  
(voluntary cooperation) 
Loans for 
non-mobile students and graduates 
National competence 
Source: the authors 
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Appendix 9. Mapping of loans available for students at ISCED 5A 
and 6 levels across 33 European countries, by type of loan 
 
Table 30. Mapping of loans available for students at ISCED 5A and 6 levels across 33 
European countries, by type of loan 
 
Type of loan 
Country 
Conventional / traditional loan 
Income-contingent loans or 
loans with income-contingent 
elements 
Austria X  
Belgium (French-
speaking community) X  
Bulgaria* X  
Croatia (Međimurje 
county) X  
Cyprus (no role of 
government) X  
Czech Republic NO schemes with role of government (political discussions undergoing) 
Denmark X  
Estonia X  
Finland X  
France X  
FYROM X  
Germany X  
Greece** X (only at ISCED 6 level)  
Hungary  X 
Iceland  X 
Ireland NO schemes with role of government (political discussions undergoing) 
Italy X  
Latvia X  
Liechtenstein  X 
Lithuania X  
Luxembourg***  X 
Malta  X 
Netherlands 1 – 
Public student 
financial support 
 X 
Netherlands 2 – 
private loan X  
Norway X  
Poland - The X  
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student loan and 
credit scheme 
Portugal X  
Romania NO schemes with role of government (plans to introduce the scheme in 2011)
Slovakia X  
Slovenia X  
Spain **** X  
Sweden  X 
Turkey X  
United Kingdom1 - 
Student loan  X 
United Kingdom2 - 
Professional and 
career development 
loan 
X  
TOTAL 24 8 
* The Bulgarian loan scheme starts to operate in October 2010. However future features of 
the latter scheme are already known and therefore it is included in the study. 
** In Greece a loan scheme with government role is applied only for postgraduate students 
at ISCED 6 level (PhD studies). 
*** In Luxembourg the type of repayment is agreed between the bank and the borrower, so 
there may also be some cases of conventional loan repayment. 
***** In Spain we have identified two loans: preferential (for all university students) and 
postgraduate (for postgraduate students) loans in Catalonia and a national (state) loan 
scheme for postgraduate students at ISCED 5A (Master studies) and 6 levels (PhD studies).  
 
Source: Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop 
(forthcoming). The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
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Appendix 10. Access restrictions: Eligibility/risk assessment 
criteria applied in 32 European loan schemes 
 
Table 31 
Country Age 
Nationality/ 
Citizenship 
Place of 
residence 
Labour 
market 
status 
Parental/ 
learner 
income/assets 
(means test) 
Absence of 
outstanding 
debts 
Academic 
merit 
Other 
criteria 
Austria X X X  X X   
Belgium 
(French 
speaking 
community) 
 X X     X 
Bulgaria X X      X 
Croatia 
(Međimurje 
county) 
 X       
Cyprus  X      X 
Denmark  X       
Estonia   X X     X 
Finland X X X  X (indirectly) X  X 
France  X X X   X  X 
FYROM  X       
Germany X X X  X    
Greece  X X     X 
Hungary X X X   X  X 
Iceland  X       
Italy  X X    X  
Latvia X X X  X   X 
Liechtenstein   X      
Lithuania      X   
Luxembourg   X      
Malta X X      X 
Netherlands1 
– public loan X X X  X  X X 
Netherlands2 
– private loan X  X   X  X 
Norway  X X      
Poland – The 
student loan 
and credit 
scheme 
X X   X X  X 
Portugal     X X  X 
Slovakia  X       
Slovenia   X  X    
Spain   X  X    
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Country Age 
Nationality/ 
Citizenship 
Place of 
residence 
Labour 
market 
status 
Parental/ 
learner 
income/assets 
(means test) 
Absence of 
outstanding 
debts 
Academic 
merit 
Other 
criteria 
(Catalonia) 
Sweden X X X   X X X 
Turkey  X       
United 
Kingdom1 – 
UK student 
loan 
X X X  X   X 
United 
Kingdom2 – 
Professional 
and career 
development 
loan 
X X X  X X  X 
Number of 
cases 14/32 25/32 20/32 0/32 11/32 10/32 2/32 17/32 
  
Source: Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop 
(forthcoming). The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
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Appendix 11. Breakdown of loan scheme users by different 
characteristics 
 
Table 32 
Group of 
learners Austria Finland France Hungary
Netherlands 
– public 
loan 
Poland Sweden
Female 50,2% 58,4 % n/a 57% 49% n/a 61 %
Male 49,8% 41,6 % n/a 43% 51% n/a 39 %
Full-time 
learners n/a 100 %
n/a 70% n/a 77,8% 90 %
Part-time 
learners n/a 0 %
n/a 30% n/a 22,2% 10 %
Aged 15-24 15,3% 67,8 % 86% 25 % 12% n/a 55 %
Aged 25-34 44,3% 28,7 % 13% 65 % 63% n/a 31 %
Aged 35-54 35,0% 3,4 % n/a 10 % 25% n/a 14 %
Aged 55-64 5,4% 0,08 % n/a 0 % 0,2% n/a 0 %
Foreign 
nationals n/a <5.5 %*
n/a 0.002 % n/a n/a 7 %
Nationals 
learning abroad n/a ~10 %
n/a 0.0005 % n/a n/a 8 %
* Only the total number of foreigners using any kind of student support is known. 
 
Source: Survey of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). 
The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
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Appendix 12. Loan amounts 
 
Table 33: Loan amounts across 32 European loan schemes, in euro 
Country Maximum amount of loan per month (unless indicated otherwise) 
Austria 25 000 in total approx. 625/month for 4 years of learning/studies)  
Belgium (French speaking 
community) 124 
Bulgaria 50-130 
Croatia (Međimurje county) 145 
Cyprus 75 000 per family member / 150 000 per family approx. 1875/month for 4 years of training/studies) 
Denmark 367  
Estonia 1917 per year (approx. 190/month) 
Finland 
Depends on the age and the level of education: in ISCED level 3, if 
learner is aged under 18 – 160, if 18 and over – 300; in ISCED level 
5-6 – 300; recipients of adult education allowance – 300; studies 
abroad: for ISCED 5-6 – 440, for ISCED 3-4 -360. 
France 15 000 in total approx. 375/month for 4 years of learning/studies) 
FYROM 39 
Germany 324 
Greece 300 
Hungary 143/month for publicly supported courses and 179/month for privately supported courses 
Iceland No limit 
Italy 6000 in total approx. 150/month for 4 years of training/studies) 
Latvia For studies in Latvia – 170/month, for studies outside Latvia – 805/month 
Liechtenstein 900 
Lithuania 
Depends on the purpose; for tuition fees – no more than the 
standard study price set yearly (30/month in 2009/2010); for living 
expenses – 188/month; for Erasmus – 226/month. 
Luxembourg 880 
Malta 23 300 in total (approx. 580/month during 4 year studies) 
Netherlands1 – public loan 1st period – 650, 2nd period – 853 
Netherlands2 – private loan 2 500 in total (5 000 for HE studies abroad approx. 63 or 125 /month for 4 years of learning/studies) 
Norway 1 112  
Poland - The student loan and 
credit scheme 150  
Portugal 416  
Slovakia 133 
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Slovenia 21 000 in total (approx. 525/month during 4 year studies) 
Spain (Catalonia) 9 000 – 30 000 in total, depending on the level approx. 225-750/month) 
Sweden 619 
Turkey For ISCED 4-5 levels – 100/month; For ISCED 6 (Masters) – 200/month 
United Kingdom1 – UK 
student loan 
Rates for England for 2010/2011: 
Tuition fee loan: 3950 in total per year approx. 395/month) 
Maintenance loan: for those living in London 8315 in total (831 
/month), elsewhere in the UK – 5940 (594/month), living with 
parents – 3200 (320/month) 
Rates for other regions may be different 
United Kingdom2 – 
Professional and career 
development loan 
360-1 230 in total (18-62/month for 2 years of training/studies) 
 
Source: Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). 
The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
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Appendix 13. State subsidies in student lending 
 
Table 34 
Country 
General 
interest 
rate 
subsidy 
General 
alleviations, 
grace 
periods 
Targeted 
support 
State 
guarantee 
Loan 
forgiveness Other 
Austria      
Subsidy to 
the saving 
payments of 
the borrower
Finland  Yes 
Yes, 
interest 
rate 
subsidy 
Yes Yes Tax deduction 
France    Yes   
Hungary  Yes 
Yes, 
interest 
rate 
subsidy 
Yes, for 
the 
managing 
institution 
Yes  
Netherlands1 – 
public loan  Yes   Yes  
Netherlands2 – 
private loan 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Poland – The 
student loan and 
credit scheme 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Sweden Yes Yes   Yes  
United 
Kingdom1 – UK 
student loan 
Yes Yes   Yes  
United 
Kingdom2 – 
Professional and 
career 
development 
loan 
Yes Yes     
 
Source: Survey of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). 
The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
 
Loan scheme managers provided comprehensive information on state subsidies: 
 
Austria: The Government provides a subsidy to the saving payments of the borrower prior to 
taking the loan. This subsidy is to be paid back if the borrower does not use the deposits 
(and the loan) for the defined purposes (e.g. vocational education). Furthermore, in 
comparison to an ordinary bank loan, the loan fee (0.8% of the loan amount) is not 
applicable to building society loans.  
Finland: Specialised publicly owned institution (KELA) co-managing loans with retail banks 
can pay the interest due on student loan on the basis of the following criteria: 1) low income, 
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and 2) the fact that the interest on the borrower’s market-rated loan is not being capitalized 
or that the student hasn’t received financial aid during the 5 months preceding the month in 
which the interest on his interest-subsidized loan is due. Furthermore, in Finland student 
may receive a student loan tax deduction, if s/he completes his/her degree within the set 
time and if, at the end of the semester in which s/he completes his/her degree, he has more 
than € 2.500 in outstanding student loan debt. Finally, Finnish students may also usually get 
a 2 year grace period for repaying their loans (however different grace period may be agreed 
between borrower and the bank).  
In France, the state only provides a loan guarantee to all borrowers, for at most 70% of the 
loan amount and for the maximum period of 10 years.  
Hungary: Government provides the targeted child care subsidy (interest rate allowance). In 
the case of customers raising small children, receiving maternity/childbirth allowance, child 
care allowance/subsidy, interest is paid by the central state budget; the customers may 
receive an earmarked interest subsidy. Furthermore, Hungarian students may receive a 
short grace period (3 months) for their loan repayments. Finally, state guarantee is also 
provided. However it is provided not to individual borrowers, but for whole managing 
institution - Diákhitel Központ Zrt. 
Poland: Student loans and credits are granted from the Student Loan and Credit Fund, by 
commercial banks on preferential terms. The Fund’s resources are used to finance: mainly 
loans for low-income earners, a part of interest on loans taken by students, costs of loan 
forgiveness (as the loans are guaranteed by the state) and its administrative costs (of the 
Fund). Furthermore, students in Poland may get a grace period of 2 years for repayment of 
their loans.  
Sweden: 30% of the interest rate of the usual loans is tax-deductible. The VET loans are not 
subject to this deduction, therefore the Government provides a general interest rate subsidy 
of 30% to compensate. Government also provides grace period of 6-12 moths for the 
repayment of loans. The maximum duration of grace period depends on when studies end – 
in spring or autumn term. 
The UK: In the PCDL scheme, Government compensates the interest rate for the learner 
during the period of learning and for one month afterwards. This subsidy is available to all 
learners taking this loan. PCDL scheme also allows for a short grace period for a maximum 
of 2 months (its duration depends on the banks). Meanwhile UK student loan does not 
foresee any additional interest rate on loans. The only purpose of the applied interest rate of 
the loans is to adjust the payment to the changing monetary value of the currency. The 
interest rate is calculated and applied annually, starting in September. It is derived from the 
Retail Prices Index (RPI) figure as at 31st March. The current rate since September 2009 is 
0%. The duration of the grace period under this loan scheme is not precisely defined: 
student starts to repay on next April when s/he graduates and if s/he is earning more than 
€18 000 (£ 15 000) a year. 
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Appendix 14. De jure portability of loans across European 
countries 
 
Table 35 
Countries Loan is available for foreign nationals coming to a country 
Loan is available for 
nationals studying abroad 
Austria 
Yes, but needs to have a permanent 
residence and use loan for training/education in 
Austria 
Yes, no limitations 
Belgium (French 
speaking 
community) 
Yes, but only for children learning/studying in 
French of foreign nationals resident in the 
region. 
Yes, if the course is in 
French language and not 
available in the French 
community 
Bulgaria Yes, for EU citizens only No 
Croatia 
(Međimurje county) No Yes, no limitations 
Cyprus No 
Yes, for parents residing in 
country who child(ren) study 
abroad 
Denmark Yes, no limitations Yes, but approval of school/university is required 
Estonia Yes, but only those with long-term residence 
permit or permanent right of residence  Yes, no limitations 
Finland 
Yes, but needs to have a residence permit 
(which is given after 4 years of living in a 
country) and live for a purpose other than 
studying 
Yes, but studies should 
correspond to Finnish 
studies or form a part of a 
Finnish degree programme 
France Yes, for EU/EEA citizens living in a country for 
5 years 
Yes, but only for partial 
studies (e.g. Erasmus) 
FYROM No No 
Germany 
Yes, for EU nationals and non-EU citizens 
with certain residence permit – no minimum 
residence requirement; for others – 5 years 
residence (or 3 years parents residence) 
Yes, unlimited in EU, but 
maximum 1 year elsewhere 
Greece Yes, but there may be some restrictions 
applied by the bank  
Yes, but there may be some 
restrictions applied by the 
bank 
Hungary 
Yes, for EU/EEA citizens with residence 
permit and living for a purpose other than 
studying 
Yes, no limitations 
Iceland No 
Yes, but there are limits for 
the amount of loan for 
school fees and the number 
of years person can receive 
a loan 
Italy Yes, only residents of Italy, aged between 18-
35 and complying with the set merit criteria 
Yes, but only for partial 
studies (e.g. Erasmus) 
Latvia Yes, for EU and other citizens with valid 
residence permit 
Yes, but only for universities 
accredited in a foreign 
country 
Liechtenstein 
Yes, but only for persons with at least 3 years 
of uninterrupted residence or 5 years regular 
residence or having a parent with regular 
residence  
5 years residence during the last 10 years) 
Yes, but only if they had 5 
years regular residence 
during last 10 years and do 
not receive support from 
country of their current 
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Countries Loan is available for foreign nationals coming to a country 
Loan is available for 
nationals studying abroad 
residence 
Lithuania Yes, EU nationals or non-EU nationals with 
residence permit 
Yes, but only for partial 
studies (e.g. Erasmus) 
Luxembourg 
Yes, but only for those working in 
Luxembourg, family of a person working in 
Luxembourg, or resident in a country for a 5 
years 
Yes, no limitations 
Malta No 
Yes, only portable loans 
exist (they must be brought 
abroad or used for distance 
courses based abroad) 
Netherlands1 – 
public loan 
Yes, for EU/EEA/Switzerland living in a country 
for five years without interruption or, if they 
lived less, they (or they parent(s)) have to wok 
minimum 32 hours/week. Citizens of other 
countries are eligible with certain residence 
permits. If person has a study permit then s/he 
is not eligible 
Yes, but only for registered 
full-time students in a 
country and for 
training/studies which a part 
of Dutch training/studies 
Netherlands2 – 
private loan 
Yes, but only if foreign nationals get public 
loan 
Yes, but only if 
learner/student continued 
receiving public loan 
Norway 
Yes, special quota for students from 
developing countries; EU/EEA/EFTA nationals 
are eligible if they reside for family reasons or if 
they were working 2 years continuously before 
starting an education 
Yes, but only for 
programmes approved by 
Norwegian Agency for 
Quality Assurance in 
Education) 
Poland - The 
student loan and 
credit scheme 
Yes, for EU nationals working/living or whose 
members of family work/live in Poland and who 
are studying in Polish HE institutions  
Yes, but only for registered 
students in a country and 
only for partial studies (e.g. 
Erasmus) 
Portugal Yes, no limitations, however additional 
collateral may be requested by banks 
Yes, but only in programmes 
approved by Portuguese 
Ministry of Higher Education 
Slovakia No Yes, no limitations 
Slovenia Yes, only residents of Slovenia Yes, no limitations 
Spain (Catalonia) Yes, only for studies in Catalonia, additional 
collateral may be requested by banks 
Yes, only for Catalan 
residents 
Sweden 
Yes, for EU-citizens (and equals) having 
residence permit or living or working in Sweden 
for 2 years or family members of Swedish 
citizens/residents and who did not come to 
Sweden in the purpose of studying. Other 
nationals with residence permit are also eligible 
Yes, but for those who lived 
in a country for at least 2 
years and for training/studies 
provided by institutions 
approved by authorities 
Turkey No No 
United Kingdom1 
– UK student loan 
Yes, for EU nationals residing in a country for 3 
years and attending a full-time course at a UK 
university 
No 
United Kingdom2 
– Professional and 
career 
development loan 
Yes, but foreigner has to be settled in the UK 
and have a residence permit 
Yes, but only if the course is 
not available in the UK 
‘Yes’ answers/all 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
25/32 26/32 
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Countries Loan is available for foreign nationals coming to a country 
Loan is available for 
nationals studying abroad 
answers 
*In this table only the formal (de jure) conditions of loan portability are considered (survey 
did not examine how/if they are applied in practice (de facto).  
Source: Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop 
(forthcoming). The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
 
   EAC-2009-5253-000-001 Feasibility study on student lending – Final Report 
 
 192
Appendix 15. Default losses in student loan schemes 
 
Student loans and websites listed - throughout the text stated that not much information on 
the French Student Loan Scheme. In the table though there are two mentioned (in fact there 
is only one scheme in France and the two sites included is for the same scheme but from 
different sources and covering different angles). In fact, the system that was introduced in 
France is very similar to the Portuguese one – award of loans is done though commercial 
banks that have signed an agreement with the Government that will partially guarantee the 
loans.  
 
Table 36. Writing off of the loans  
Number of contracts 
written off
Amount written off, in 
millions EUR
Country 2006/ 
2007 
2007/
2008
2008/
2009
Average 
default 
rate* 2006/ 
2007 
2007/ 
2008 
2008/
2009
Austria n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Finland 4 947¹ 6 635¹ 7 471¹ 2,13 1,3¹ 0,7¹ 15,6¹
France n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Hungary 5481 7770 10658 8,23 6,2 8 11,3
Netherlands1 – public 
loan n/a 2967 4328 0,82 14,24 9,05 18,39
Netherlands2 – private 
loan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland – The student loan 
and credit scheme n/a n/a n/a 2,32² 1,5 1,5 1,2
Sweden 66 000³ 72 000³ 68 000³ 9,35³ 63 68 86
United Kingdom1 – UK 
student loan 4200 6500 8500 0,29 8,11 13,12 44,99
United Kingdom2 – 
Professional and career 
development loan 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
* Calculated as number of written off loans divided by total number of loans (averages during 
the last three years) 
¹ Data provided for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 
² Only total data during 12 years of operation available. Average was calculated for the 
whole period. 
³ Including loans partly written off as part of the state. 
 
Source: Survey of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). 
The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
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Appendix 16. Take-up rates in student loan schemes 
 
Table 37. Take-up rates of the loan schemes 
Take-up rates
Country
2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009
Austria n/a n/a n/a
Finland 40,2 % 38,2 % 37,0 %
France n/a n/a n/a
Hungary 24 % 22 % 20 %
Netherlands1 – public loan n/a n/a n/a
Netherlands2 – private loan n/a n/a n/a
Poland – The student loan and credit 
scheme 11,4% 10,8% 10,5%
Sweden n/a n/a 40-50%
United Kingdom1 – UK student loan 80% (England); 81% (Wales)
80% (England); 
83,6% (Wales) n/a
United Kingdom2 – Professional and 
career development loan n/a n/a n/a
 
Source: Survey of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). 
The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe 
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Appendix 17. Lack of information in student lending 
 
Table 38 
Country Availability of information in English Websites 
Austria Some information is available in English 
https://www.bausparen.at/eBusiness/rai_template1/31
4933534010554625-
308249056768873230_311711251989244200-
320806963203987028-NA-19-NA.html  
Belgium (French speaking 
community) 
Information is available only in national 
language http://www.cfwb.be/index.php?id=146 
Bulgaria 
Information is available only in national 
language (some documents will be 
made available in English next year) 
www.mon.bg  
Croatia (Medjimurje county) Information is available only in national language www.medjimurska-zupanija.hr  
Cyprus Some info is available in English http://www.laiki.com/web/w3cy.nsf/WebContentDocsByID/ID-E2166081673DE954C225728A003CCB5C  
Czech Republic Loan scheme not available 
Denmark Some information is available in English www.sustyrelsen.dk  
Estonia Only legal information is available in English 
http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/tekst.asp?loc=t
ext&dok=X70048K3&keel=en&pg=1&ptyyp=RT&tyyp=
X&query=%F5ppelaen  
Finland Detailed information is available in English 
http://www.kela.fi/in/internet/english.nsf/NET/0810011
33800IL 
France Information is available only in national language 
http://www.etudiant.gouv.fr/pid20474/pret-
etudiant.html 
FYROM Information is available only in national language http://konkursi.mon.gov.mk/cgi_sliki/MON/K4  
Germany Information is available only in national language www.das-neue-bafoeg.de  
Greece Information may be available only in national language - 
Hungary Some information is available in English www.diakhitel.hu  
Iceland Some information is available in English http://www.lin.is/lin/UmLIN/english.html  
Ireland Loan scheme not available 
Italy Information is available only in national language www.diamoglicredito.it/  
Latvia Information is available only in national language http://www.sza.gov.lv/  
Liechtenstein Very little information is available in English 
http://www.liechtenstein.li/en/eliechtenstein_main_site
s/portal_fuerstentum_liechtenstein/fl-buw-
bildung_wissenschaft/fl-buw-ausbildungsbeihilfen.htm  
Information in national language: 
http://www.llv.li/amtsstellen/llv-sa-amtsgeschaefte-
stipendien_darlehen.htm 
Lithuania Information is available only in national language www.vsf.lt  
Luxembourg Information is available only in national language www.cedies.lu  
Malta Information is available in English http://www.education.gov.mt/youth/ysss.htm  
Netherlands1 – public loan Detailed information is available in English http://www.ocwduo.nl/  
Netherlands2 – private loan Information is available only in national language 
http://www.abnamro.nl/nl/prive/lenen/studentenlimiet/i
ntroductie.html  
http://www.ing.nl/particulier/lenen/lenen-met-variabele-
rente/studentenkrediet/index.aspx  
http://www.rabobank.nl/particulieren/producten/lenen/s
peciaal_voor_studenten/studentenkrediet/default  
Norway Detailed information is available in English www.lanekassen.no  
Poland – The student loan 
and credit scheme 
Information is available only in national 
language 
http://www.nauka.gov.pl/szkolnictwo-wyzsze/sprawy-
studentow-i-doktorantow/system-pomocy-
materialnej/kredyty-studenckie/ 
Portugal Information is available only in national language 
http://devel.mctes.pt/archive/doc/emprestimos.pdf  
http://www.dges.mctes.pt/NR/rdonlyres/DB16C19A-
3C9A-4D42-A538-
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20A9DE823C74/554/dl_2007_309A.pdf  
http://www.dges.mctes.pt/DGES/pt/Estudantes/Apoioa
oEstudante/Emprestimos/  
Romania Loan scheme not yet in operation 
Slovakia Information is available only in national language www.spf.sk  
Slovenia Information is available only in national language http://www.sklad-kadri.si/  
Spain 
Regional (Catalonian scheme):  
Detailed information is available in 
English only for postgraduate loans 
 
State scheme for loans at ISCED 5A 
(masters) and 6 levels:  
Information is only available in national 
language 
Regional (Catalonian scheme):  
Information on preferential loans (for all university 
students): 
http://www10.gencat.cat/agaur_web/AppJava/english/
a_beca.jsp?categoria=predoctorals&id_beca=16648  
Postgraduate loans (only for postgraduate students): 
http://www10.gencat.cat/agaur_web/AppJava/english/
a_beca.jsp?categoria=universitaris&id_beca=16645  
 
National scheme for loans at ISCED 5A (masters) and 
6 levels: 
http://www.educacion.es/educacion/universidades/con
vocatorias/titulados-doctores-profesores/prestamos-
renta-universidad.html 
Sweden Some information (mainly for repayment) is available in English http://www.csn.se/  
Turkey Information is available only in national language www.kyk.gov.tr  
United Kingdom1 – UK 
student loan 
Detailed information is available in 
English http://www.slc.co.uk/  
United Kingdom2 - 
Professional and career 
development loan 
Detailed information is available in 
English 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/EducationAndLearning/Ad
ultLearning/FinancialHelpForAdultLearners/CareerDev
elopmentLoans/index.htm 
http://pcdl.ypla.gov.uk/  
 
Source: Surveys of loan scheme managers in the framework of study Cedefop (forthcoming). 
The role of loans in financing vocational education and training in Europe, literature review 
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Appendix 18. Estimation of tuition fees 
Table 39 
For one 
year 
Public Private For non-
EU 
Year of data Comments Tuition fee 
      foreigners     estimation 
Austria 724 higher   2007-2008   1000 
Belgium 500-800     2007-2008   700 
Bulgaria 50-200 n.a. 2200-5500 2007-2008 state quota, he 
government do not offer 
student loans for private 
universities 
60 
Cyprus none n.a. up to 6850 2007-2008   0 
Czech 
Republic 
none   3000-
10000 
2007-2008   0 
Denmark none   9000-
16000 
2007-2008   0 
Estonia 840-2400 n.a. 1920-3000 2007-2008   1000 
Finland none n.a.   2007-2008   0 
France none up to 7500   2007-2008 enrolment fees: 150-420 0 
Germany  none in some 
Länder, in 
others: 100-500 
4000-10000   2007-2008 private: it depends on 
courses and universities 
5000 
Greece varying n.a.   2007-2008 universities set the fees, 
EU students are 
exempted to pay tuition 
fees 
0 
Hungary from none up to 
800 
640-2800   2007-2008 state quota, it depends on 
academic performance, in 
2006, 50% of students 
had to pay fees  
700 
Ireland none n.a. up to 
36000 
2007-2008   20000 
Italy from 750 2000-10000   2007-2008 universities set the fees, 
performance-related 
10000 
Latvia 700-5811   750-5811 2007-2008   5000 
Lithuania from none to 
3475 
  1000-5000 2007-2008 students 24% are state 
funded, 
http://www.aic.lv/portal/en/ 
5000 
Luxembourg 200 n.a.   2007-2008   200 
Malta none n.a. 2500-3000 2007-2008   0 
Netherlands 1538 n.a.   2007-2008   1538 
Poland none 4000-10000   2007-2008   6000 
Portugal 1000 1500   2007-2008   1500 
Romania from none up to 
400-700 
400-700 3500-9000 2007-2008 it depends on academic 
merits 
700 
Slovakia none n.a. 2200-8800 2007-2008   0 
Slovenia undergraduates: 
none, graduates: 
up to 1500 
n.a.   2007-2008   1500 
Spain 550-900 up to 6000   2007-2008 depends on regions and 
courses 
6000 
Sweden none n.a.   2007-2008   0 
United 
Kingdom 
up to 3464 up to 20000   2007-2008 there is no student loan 
for graduates 
12000 
Iceland       2010-2011 source: 
www.studyineurope.eu 
2200 
Liechtenstein n.a. n.a.     estimated upon tuition 
fees in Switzerland 
3000 
Norway none n.a.   2007-2008   0 
Turkey 30-250     2005-2006 source: Johnstone 100 
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 Appendix 19 Grants in Europe 
 
Table 40 
Eurydice, EACEA [2008], 
p. 109 Other sources (from surveys) 
Country Gran
ts 
min. 
Grant
s 
max. 
Year of 
data 
Grant
s 
min. 
Grant
s 
max. 
Comments 
Austria 180 7272 2005-2006    
Belgium 201 4203 2005-2006    
Bulgaria  148 2005-2006    
Cyprus 1709 2563 2005-2006    
Czech 
Republic  653 2005-2006    
Denmark  7608 2005-2006  7226  
Estonia  1606 2005-2006    
Finland 349 2331 2005-2006 380 6940 included 440€/month for mobility support 
France  3895 2005-2006  7495 included 400€/month for mobility support 
Germany 120 4656 2005-2006    
Greece n.a. 
Hungary  0 2005-2006    
Ireland  3325 2005-2006    
Italy  variable 2005-2006  variable  
Latvia 988 2174 2005-2006   mobility grants exist 
Lithuania  1303 2005-2006    
Luxembourg  8174 2005-2006    
Malta 524 1134 2005-2006    
Netherlands 2510 2726 2005-2006  5072 2010, IB-Group, http://www.ib-groep.nl 
Poland  variable 2005-2006    
Portugal 375 5603 2005-2006    
Romania  variable 2005-2006    
Slovakia  386 2005-2006    
Slovenia 603 3013 2005-2006    
Spain n.a. supports are available through universities 
Sweden  2528 2005-2006    
United 32 2966 2005-2006    
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Kingdom 
Iceland n.a. 
Liechtenstei
n 7302 10953 2005-2006    
Norway  3924 2005-2006    
Turkey  792 2005-2006    
Switzerland n.a. 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
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Appendix 20. Financial needs in the Erasmus Mobility program 
 
Erasmus grants. The typical duration of a study abroad within the Erasmus programme is 
5 months (one semester). All students with accepted registrations are excused additional 
tuition fees of the host universities. Students have to cover maintenance or living costs, and 
other costs of studying. The EU Commission offers grants which vary from Euro 702 to Euro 
1781 for this 5 month placement in 2010, the amount usually depends on the country. 
(There is also a so called label category for students who are not eligible for Erasmus grant, 
but a right to study in abroad with no tuition fees is offered.) This means Euro 140-360 per 
month. The average amount of grant/month was 157 Euro in 2005-2006, and 242 in the 
academic year of 2007-2008. 
 
Cost of studying abroad with Erasmus According to the calculations of Carbonell (2008), 
accommodation costs are usually higher than other living costs. 
 
Table 41. Living costs of Erasmus students 2005-2006 (In power of purchasing parity Euro, 
for one month) 
 
 ACCOMODATION OTHER COSTS TOTAL COST 
    Non-    Non-    Non- 
 Average Capital capital Average Capital capital Average Capital capital 
  cost city city cost city city cost city city 
Austria 278.99 294.12 259.28 388.11 386.74 389.89 667.10 680.86 649.17 
Belgium 246.28 307.61 223.19 503.74 457.16 521.28 750.02 764.77 744.47 
Cyprus 206.00 206.00 n.a 300.00 300.00 n.a 506.00 506.00 n.a 
Czech 
Republic 
120.00 127.94 94.82 231.27 225.36 250.00 351.27 353.30 344.82 
Denmark 324.62 335.47 315.18 431.54 425.66 436.65 756.16 761.13 751.83 
Estonia 180.00 110.00 200.00 250.00 350.00 200.00 430.00 460.00 400.00 
Finland 244.55 300.00 224.09 457.07 405.86 475.97 701.62 705.86 700.06 
France 269.97 427.56 223.81 460.73 591.96 422.29 730.70 1019.52 646.10 
Germany 231.84 224.35 234.47 462.66 553.73 430.59 694.50 778.08 665.06 
Greece 228.31 268.52 201.83 398.68 400.00 397.80 626.99 668.52 599.63 
Hungary 268.61 281.83 100.00 375.16 386.87 400.00 643.77 668.70 500.00 
Iceland 394.00 394.00 n.a. 585.00 585.00 n.a. 979.00 979.00 n.a. 
Ireland 381.36 376.17 386.50 573.17 581.29 565.08 954.53 957.46 951.58 
Italy 350.01 375.89 333.09 375.09 377.15 373.77 725.10 753.04 706.86 
Latvia 250.00 250.00 n.a. 250.00 250.00 n.a. 500.00 500.00 n.a. 
Lithuania 106.42 106.90 n.a. 277.28 277.43 n.a. 383.70 384.33 308.00 
Malta 233.00 233.00 n.a. 300.00 300.00 n.a. 533.00 533.00 n.a. 
Netherlands 346.83 450.00 336.53 413.22 446.94 409.86 760.05 896.94 746.39 
Norway 309.61 364.64 282.84 650.39 626.85 654.87 960.00 991.49 937.71 
Poland 161.57 200.55 136.81 224.04 167.38 260.02 385.61 367.93 396.83 
Portugal 203.47 245.65 171.52 393.94 380.00 404.50 597.41 625.65 576.02 
Romania 179.43 181.97 175.00 274.37 259.83 300.00 453.80 441.80 475.00 
Slovakia 125.00 125.00 n.a. 225.00 225.00 n.a. 350.00 350.00 n.a. 
Slovenia 175.53 210.00 150.00 280.85 255.00 300.00 456.38 465.00 450.00 
Spain 242.17 336.64 203.46 431.12 412.83 438.61 673.29 749.47 642.07 
Sweden 313.40 315.55 312.91 463.66 457.16 465.14 777.06 772.71 778.05 
Turkey 192.26 204.86 179.05 316.29 317.44 315.10 508.55 522.30 494.15 
United 
Kingdom 
444.88 491.65 439.58 513.22 599.30 503.48 958.10 1090.95 943.06 
 
Source: Carbonell (2008), EAIE Forum 2007, p. 28. 
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Financing need. In the academic year of 2005-2006, average cost of living were between 
PPP Euro 350 to 980 (this range is somewhat higher in nominal Euro), the average amount 
of grant was 157 Euro. Students have to finance around 200-400 Euro per month by their 
owns which is 1000-2000 Euro per semester. This amount could be easily financed from 
national student loans even in the lower income countries. 
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Appendix 21. Income effects of different degrees 
 
INCOME EFFECTS OF GRADUATION. Graduation significantly impacts on future incomes in 
Europe. Eurostat (2009) report on Bologna Process in Higher Education emphasises: 
"Differences in wage levels are above all a matter of educational attainment. Highly 
educated EU-25 workers earn twice as much as medium- and low-educated workers." 
According to Eurostat database (Eurostat (2010), Social Inclusion and Living Conditions), 
median income differences between educated and medium educated employees (people 
who have been included in tertiary education and who have only higher secondary schools) 
are very high (160-191%) in Romania, Portugal, Poland, and also considerably high (130-
150%) in the most of European country (Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Luxembourg, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Hungary, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Spain). 
The lowest value is 117% in Sweden. The range of income levels from highly educated 
workers is very wide, and in Bologna countries, median income of male is higher than female 
workers.  
 
Table 42. Mean and median income in EU countries by education level, and income effect of 
tertiary education, 2008. 
 
 Mean income (EUR)  Median income (EUR)  
Country 
Upper 
secondary 
and post-
secondary 
non-tertiary 
education 
Tertiary 
education
Tertiary 
/ Non-
tertiary 
Upper 
secondary 
and post-
secondary 
non-tertiary 
education 
Tertiary 
education
Tertiary 
/ Non-
tertiary 
Romania 2493.2 4943.6 198% 2266.7 4326.3 191%
Poland 4708.1 8074.9 172% 4194.7 6706.7 160%
Portugal 12489.2 20727.8 166% 10420.1 17594.8 169%
Lithuania 4684.7 7246.7 155% 4148.0 6150.1 148%
Latvia 5784.2 8787.3 152% 4911.2 7265.7 148%
Greece 12993.8 19439.3 150% 11600.0 17206.7 148%
Luxembourg  34748.0 50840.5 146% 31690.7 44320.0 140%
United Kingdom 25398.9 37028.4 146% 22107.5 30561.8 138%
Hungary 4831.8 7038.6 146% 4544.6 6261.7 138%
Slovenia 11441.7 16522.1 144% 10892.0 15500.6 142%
Finland 20877.7 29297.3 140% 19451.3 25495.7 131%
Ireland 26931.3 37755.8 140% 24033.4 33613.5 140%
Cyprus 18905.3 25989.8 137% 17038.5 23208.1 136%
Estonia 5967.5 8195.6 137% 5395.7 7078.9 131%
Czech Republic 6811.2 9327.3 137% 6169.2 8300.7 135%
Italy 19831.8 26995.2 136% 18151.7 23772.0 131%
Belgium 19691.5 26242.5 133% 18325.6 23600.0 129%
France 19995.8 26539.0 133% 18048.5 23116.7 128%
Netherlands 21769.3 28819.8 132% 19843.3 25302.5 128%
Slovakia 5190.9 6859.0 132% 4849.6 6158.4 127%
Bulgaria 2878.2 3762.6 131% 2514.8 3049.4 121%
Spain 15530.3 20208.5 130% 14356.5 18701.9 130%
Germany 20089.3 26128.4 130% 18014.0 22450.0 125%
Iceland 36879.0 47217.0 128% 32517.9 40144.7 123%
Malta 12527.2 15678.4 125% 11847.6 14807.2 125%
Austria 22177.2 27753.9 125% 20247.1 24127.1 119%
Norway 34092.2 42507.6 125% 32192.4 38742.5 120%
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Denmark 26190.5 31731.6 121% 24666.5 29226.8 118%
Sweden 21929.0 26289.7 120% 20975.8 24541.3 117%
European Union (27 countries) 16263.8 24525.5 151% 14803.0 21283.4 144%
European Union (15 countries) 20721.2 27612.6 133% 18511.6 23629.3 128%
Source: Eurostat (2010), Social Inclusion and Living Conditions 
 
Table 43. Mean annual gross earnings by educational attainment in European countries, 
2006. Sorted in ascending order by total employment rate. 
 
 
No 
degree
* 
Tertiary 
programm
es with 
occupatio
n 
orientatio
n 
Tertiary 
programm
es with 
academic 
orientatio
n
Doctorate
**
Tertiary 
with 
occupa
tion o. / 
No 
degree
Tertiary 
with 
academic 
o. / 
Tertiary 
with 
occupati
on o.
Doctorate 
/ Tertiary 
with 
academic 
o. 
Tertiary 
with 
academi
c o. / No 
degree
Doctorate 
/ No 
degree
Bulgaria 1986 2537 3937 5684 128% 155% 144% 198% 286%
Lithuania 4259 5200 8171 12290 122% 157% 150% 192% 289%
Latvia 4399 6038 8545 137% 142%  194%
Slovakia 5750 6745 10926 11833 117% 162% 108% 190% 206%
Estonia 6502 7790 10679 120% 137%  164%
Hungary 6738 8619 14587 128% 169%  216%
Poland 7636 12328 11009 14205 161% 89% 129% 144% 186%
Czech 
Republic 8614 10245 16443 14742 119% 160% 90% 191% 171%
Slovenia 13119 20874 28257 159% 135%  215%
Cyprus 19186  35252   184%
Netherlands 34891 49027 49187 141% 100%  141%
Ireland 36473 52309 40250 56176 143% 77% 140% 110% 154%
United 
Kingdom 34196 48622 57025  142% 117%   167%  
Average 14135 19195 22636 19155 135% 133% 127% 177% 215%
Source: Eurostat (2010) 
* Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education - levels 3-4 (ISCED 1997) 
** Second stage of tertiary education leading to an advanced research qualification - level 6 (ISCED 
1997) 
Tertiary programmes with occupation orientation approximates bachelor degrees (but some kind of 
postgraduate degrees also), tertiary programmes with academic orientation approximates master 
level degrees (and also professional degrees) 
 
According to Financial Times rankings (Financial Times (2010)), the top Global MBAs 
increased the participants' salaries by 100.96 percentages in average, nearly after 
graduation. Approximately 80 percents of the participants of best one hundred MBA 
programmes had found employment or accepted a job offer within three month of 
graduation. Considering only the European MBA degrees, graduating in a top European 
MBA program means 60-160 percent higher salaries in the labour market (table below). 
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Table 44. Top European MBAs’ effects on individual’s salaries and employment. 
Rank 
in 
2010 
School name Country
Weighted 
salary 
(USD)
Weighted 
salary 
(EUR, 
1EUR = 
1,3USD)
Salary 
percentage 
increase 
Employed 
at three 
months 
(%)
1 London Business School U.K. 142340 109492 124 81
5 Insead 
France / 
Singapore 139941 107647 102 79
6 IE Business School Spain 139458 107275 159 89
11 Iese Business School Spain 128891 99147 136 86
15 IMD Switzerland 140320 107938 86 88
18 HEC Paris France 122086 93912 104 89
19 Esade Business School Spain 122825 94481 126 81
21 
University of Cambridge: 
Judge U.K. 125690 96685 110 89
24 
Lancaster University 
Management School U.K. 112214 86318 131 78
25 
Rotterdam School of 
Management, Erasmus 
University Netherlands 113595 87381 102 85
26 
Cranfield School of 
Management U.K. 133886 102989 89 95
32 
Imperial College Business 
School U.K. 120306 92543 107 85
38 SDA Bocconi Italy 103560 79662 105 85
40 
Manchester Business 
School U.K. 111150 85500 91 93
41 City University: Cass U.K. 120632 92794 83 93
42 Warwick Business School U.K. 110700 85154 86 89
51 
University of Strathclyde 
Business School U.K. 109994 84611 106 91
73 Aston Business School U.K. 93717 72090 90 77
74 Durham Business School U.K. 95662 73586 84 90
75 
Birmingham Business 
School U.K. 90161 69355 97 98
87 
University of Bath School of 
Management U.K. 103640 79723 69 95
87 
Vlerick Leuven Gent 
Management School Belgium 97677 75136 65 65
89 
University of Edinburgh 
Business School U.K. 98256 75582 73 89
89 
Bradford School of 
Management/TiasNimbas 
Business School 
U.K. / 
Netherlands / 
Germany 96993 74610 85 86
94 
Hult International Business 
School 
U.S.A. / U.K. / 
U.A.E. / China 98644 75880 87 73
97 EM Lyon Business School France 91122 70094 69 81
98 
University College Dublin: 
Smurfit Ireland 99456 76505 64 96
Source: Financial Times (2010), http://rankings.ft.com/businessschoolrankings/global-mba-
rankings 
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EMPLOYMENT RATES ARE STRONGLY HIGHER AMONGST GRADUATED WORKERS. It is worth to 
look at the main characteristics of the total employment rates (as the percentage of the 
working age population), and the employment rate of high educated workers (Table 39). In 
those countries, where employment rates are relatively low, the high educated workers have 
higher advantage in employment. In central and in south European countries, employment 
rate of graduated people is 20 percentage points higher in average than total employment 
rate. Looking at the graduated employment rates, the minimum is around 77-80 percents 
(Italy, Hungary, Spain), and the maximum is near to 87-88 percents (Slovenia, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Austria), which signs relative homogeneity in graduated 
employment rates. 
 
Table 45. Employment rates by the highest level of education attained in European 
countries, sorted in descending order by total employment rates 
 
 Employment rates   
Country 
Upper 
secondary 
and post-
secondary 
non-
tertiary 
education
Tertiary 
education Total
Difference: 
Upper 
secondary 
- Total 
Difference: 
Tertiary 
education
 - Total
Switzerland 80.3 89.2 79.2 1.1 10,0
Iceland 79.5 88.2 78.3 1.2 9,9
Netherlands 80.9 87.6 77.0 3.9 10,6
Norway 80.3 89.9 76.4 3.9 13,5
Denmark 78.6 87.3 75.7 2.9 11,6
Sweden 78.7 87.0 72.2 6.5 14,8
Austria 76.6 86.1 71.6 5.0 14,5
Germany 74.6 87.0 70.9 3.7 16,1
United Kingdom 72.4 84.2 69.9 2.5 14,3
Cyprus 72.5 84.8 69.9 2.6 14,9
Finland 71.9 84.4 68.7 3.2 15,7
Slovenia 70.0 88.1 67.5 2.5 20,6
Portugal 66.3 84.3 66.3 0.0 18,0
Czech Republic 71.3 82.0 65.4 5.9 16,6
Luxembourg 65.8 83.8 65.2 0.6 18,6
France 68.3 80.0 64.2 4.1 15,8
Estonia 66.3 82.1 63.5 2.8 18,6
Bulgaria 70.0 85.5 62.6 7.4 22,9
Ireland 64.3 80.7 61.8 2.5 18,9
Belgium 65.4 81.9 61.6 3.8 20,3
Greece 60.4 81.6 61.2 -0.8 20,4
Latvia 64.6 82.3 60.9 3.7 21,4
Slovakia 67.1 80.3 60.2 6.9 20,1
Lithuania 61.9 85.9 60.1 1.8 25,8
Spain 62.6 79.0 59.8 2.8 19,2
Poland 62.7 83.7 59.3 3.4 24,4
Romania 62.2 84.1 58.6 3.6 25,5
Italy 66.5 77.0 57.5 9.0 19,5
Croatia 60.3 81.1 56.6 3.7 24,5
Hungary 61.6 78.1 55.4 6.2 22,7
Malta 72.7 83.4 54.9 17.8 28,5
Turkey 48.8 70.5 44.3 4.5 26,2
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Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. the 49.9 70.6 43.3 6.6 27,3
EU (27 countries) 69.1 82.9 64.6 4.5 18,3
EU (15 countries) 69.5 82.8 65.9 3.6 16,9
Source: Eurostat (2010) 
 
According to Eurostat (2009), "in half of the Bologna countries, the unemployment rate of 
low-educated people is higher than 16 %, while it was a third less for highly educated people 
(6 %) and stood at 10 % for the medium category. Figures within the EU-27 were either quite 
similar or higher." The unemployment rates of graduates are different in each field of study. 
The field of humanities, arts and languages appears to be the field most affected by 
unemployment Eurostat (2009). There is also verification mismatch in the Bologna Area, this 
affects a quarter of tertiary graduates in the European Union, more than 20% of graduates 
aged between 25 and 34 are employed below their skill level, especially in Cyprus, Ireland 
and Spain. 
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